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Abstract 
Partnerships between developing country governments and the private sector are increasingly 
being seen as a means of improving water service provision and delivery to rapidly growing 
urban populations. So far, formal engagement with the private sector has been mainly through 
international water service companies. The indigenous private sector has generally been 
involved in small-scale informal provision in low-income urban areas. 
This research assesses the potential for formal participation by the indigenous private sector, 
in operating at a scale intermediate between small-scale informal provision and large-scale 
urban water utility operation, to participate effectively in the provision and delivery of piped 
water supply. 
The study is based on a case study of a water supply concession in Central Nigeria in an 
urban area close to the capital city that has experienced rapid population growth in recent 
years. The concession, awarded by the Nasarawa State Government to an indigenous 
company, has been in operation since early 2000. lt is believed to be the first indigenous 
company that has been given responsibility for the provision and management of water supply 
infrastructure on this scale in Nigeria. Furthermore, there are few comparable examples in 
sub-Saharan Africa. 
Data were obtained through interviews with key staff in the relevant State Government 
agencies and the concession operating company, standpipe operators and water vendors. In 
addition, a survey of water usage was carried out in the study area. 
The concession enabled the establishment of a new water supply serving 15,000 people 
without the investment of government funds. Government's undeveloped regulatory capacity 
was found to be counterbalanced by the existence of competition within the market. The 
concession operating company was well-run and had outsourced its retailing activities in order 
to improve its ability to meet the needs of residents and reduce its operating costs. The study 
established that revenues could be increased through the provision of more appropriate water 
service levels and the adoption of commercial marketing and pricing strategies. Management 
constraints included tensions between shareholders and operations managers and 
vulnerability to the effects of the actions of external bodies including government. 
The study concludes that indigenous businesses operating at the medium scale provide a 
potentially viable model for water supply in low-income urban areas of developing countries. 
The adoption of enabling roles by the authorities to ensure competition and promote the 
adoption of customer focused and commercially oriented approaches by indigenous water 
supply businesses could further contribute to the fulfilment of their potential. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Recent estimates suggest that between a third and half of urban dwellers in Africa, Asia and 
Latin America lack access to a regular and affordable supply of clean water. Many of those 
without access reside in slums or small urban settlements that the state-owned water utilities 
have failed to reach. In those settlements that are served by public water supply networks, 
services are often inadequate and not accessible to the poor. In many cities and towns across 
the developing world the indigenous private sector, in the form of informal small scale 
operators, has now become a major provider of water services to the urban poor. 
Starting in the 1980s, the governments of many developing countries adopted various reforms 
aimed at improving direct provision of urban water supply by the public sector. More recently, 
a small but increasing number are entering into partnerships with international water 
companies in an attempt to improve services in their main urban centres. Throughout this 
process, the role of the indigenous private sector in urban water supply has generally 
remained limited to informal small-scale provision. 
This thesis examines the potential for formal participation by the indigenous private sector in 
the provision and delivery of piped water supplies in low-income urban areas of developing 
countries. The research is concerned with a scale of operation (the medium-scale) that falls 
between the city-wide operations of large urban utilities and the localised activities of informal 
water providers. The study was based primarily on findings from a water supply concession 
awarded to an indigenous company, and serving some 15,000 people in the Karu-Mararaba 
area of Nasarawa State in Nigeria. 
This first chapter presents the background to the research, states the aims and objectives of 
the research, discusses the justification for the research and presents an overview of the 
methodology used. The chapter concludes by delimiting the scope of the study, defining key 
terms and outlining the structure of the thesis. 
1.1 Background to the research 
1.1.1 Urban population growth and access to adequate water supply 
Because of unprecedented population growth, the urban population of developing countries is 
expected to increase from the Year-2000 estimate of 2 billion to 3.9 billion by 2030. Urban 
population growth will account for virtually all of the growth in the world's population during 
this period (United Nations, 1999b). Official statistics (WHO/UNICEF, 2000) indicate that in 
the year 2000, 171 million urban dwellers in Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean 
(8% of the urban population) did not have access to some form of 'improved' water supply. 
However, a number of more detailed city studies presented in UN-HABITAT, (2003) suggest 
that a large proportion of the 'improved' water sources available to the remaining 92% of 
urban dwellers in these regions were inadequate in terms of quantity, quality and convenience 
to users. Table 1.1 compares the numbers and proportions of urban dwellers in these regions 
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lacking access to 'improved' and 'adequate' water supplies and indicates a much higher 
proportion without adequate water supply provision. 
Table 1.1 Lack of improved and adequate provision for water supply (2000) 
Region No. and proportion of urban dwellers Estimated No. and proportion of urban 
without Improved provision , dwellers without adequate provision • f-c-,..,----+--'---
1-':'A"'fr;::ic"a ___ t------";:44 million 15 ercent 100 - 150 million 
~As~ia~--~-r----~g~~~~~~L----1--~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
Latin America 
and 
Caribbean 
29 million (7 percent) 
c...:..To:..:t=al'------'-----1:.:.71 million (8 percent) 
80- 120 million (circa 20-30 percent) 
680- 970 million (circa 33- 48 percent) 
Sources: a WHOIIJN/CEF (2000) and 0 UN-HABITAT (2003) 
1.1.2 Water supply, health and poverty 
Improved health has remained one of the basic reasons for investment in water supply even 
though it has been difficult to measure the resulting health benefits. Experience however 
shows that improved water supply facilities without improved hygiene behaviour is unlikely to 
have an appreciable and lasting effect on health (WELL, 1998). 
Almedom et al., (1997) suggest that there are direct links between some improved hygiene 
practices and reductions in the incidence of diarrhoea! diseases but recognise that there is 
much to be learned about precisely how improved water supply, sanitation, hygiene promotion 
affect health. According to Cairncross (1990), access to adequate quantities of water is as 
important as access to uncontaminated water. This is because lack of sufficient water can 
promote transmission of potentially water borne diseases. Furthermore, where the cost of 
water is high, the money available to poor people for food purchases is reduced. 
Rural - urban migration and the transformation of rural settlements into towns and cities are 
important determinants of the high urban population growth expected in the next two decades 
(UNCHS, 1996). Although urban areas can offer significant prospects for prosperity for poor 
people (DFID, 2001b), there are continuing problems related to inadequate housing and basic 
facilities in many towns and cities (World Bank, 2003b). 
The United Nations, through its Human Development Index, provides a means of measuring 
development in terms of life expectancy, education, and standard of living (United Nations, 
2001 ). Access to basic services including water supply is recognised as an important 
determinant of human development (United Nations, 1999a). 
1.1.3 Trends in international private participation in infrastructure 
During the 70s and 80s, many countries adopted reform programmes to remedy poor 
performance within state owned enterprises without changing the ownership of the enterprises 
concerned. A growing realisation by governments of the unsustainable nature of these 
reforms helped fuel the subsequent drive towards private sector involvement (Kikeri et al., 
1992). Figure 1.1 below indicates a steady increase in investment flows associated with 
private sector initiatives for all infrastructure sectors in a range of developing countries from 
1990 to 2001. lt shows a steady increase in investment flows up to 1997 followed by a sharp 
decline to roughly half of the peak investment levels by 2001. Economic crises in several 
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developing regions. attempts by some governments to repudiate their contractual 
commitments, corporate issues affecting some major international investors and declining 
equity markets in industrial countries are suggested as reasons for the apparently reduced 
interest in infrastructure projects in developing countries in recent years (Harris, 2003). 
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Figure 1.1 Investment in infrastructure in developing countries (1990-2001) 
1.1.4 The research context 
Much of what we know about indigenous private operators in urban water supply in 
developing countries relates to their roles as informal service providers. The importance of the 
indigenous private sector in providing water services to the urban poor was first brought to 
light in the 80s through pioneering studies by Zaroff and Okun, (1984) and Whittington et al. 
(1988). More recently, research supported by the World Bank's Water and Sanitation 
Programme (WSP) (for example, Snell, 1998; Collignon and Vezina, 2000) has continued to 
document experiences in informal provision and resulted in a gradually increasing 
engagement with these service providers by governments and fund ing agencies. 
There is a growing realisation that significant numbers of poor urban dwellers live in small 
towns away from the main urban centres. Sustainable water supplies in these settlements 
pose particular challenges and therefore require appropriate management models. This has 
led to a number of recent and ongoing research programmes including those funded by DFID 
(Njiru and Sansom, 2002), WSP (Collignon et al., 2000) and USAID's Environmental Health 
Programme (Rosensweig, 2001 ). Though not exclusively focused on private sector 
management models, these research programmes examine the role of the indigenous private 
sector as a potential service provider. Vezina's (2002) report is one of only a small number of 
studies that addresses formal water supply provision by indigenous private sector operators in 
Africa . Recent work in Latin America includes documentation of experiences of domestic 
private operators in Columbia (Rivera, 2001) and Paraguay (Troyano, 1999). 
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This research is essentially concerned with examining a management model for water supply 
in low-income urban areas of developing countries . lt is therefore closely related to ongoing 
research on management of water supply in small towns as well as previous work on informal 
water service provision. As will be seen in subsequent chapters, an important theme within 
this thesis is that the successful integration of formal water supply businesses operating at the 
medium scale in low-income urban areas is likely to depend on both competitive and 
cooperative relationships with a variety of smaller-scale informal operators. 
1.2 Research aims and objectives 
The research aimed to assess the potential for the indigenous private sector, operating 
formally at the medium-scale, to contribute to sustainable provision of piped water supply in 
low-income urban areas of developing countries. In particular, the research examined the 
proposition that the competition that exists naturally in low-income urban areas can compel 
private operators to provide high quality services at competitive prices. 
More generally, the research sought to contribute to a greater understanding of the following 
aspects of private provision and operation of water supply in low-income urban areas at the 
medium scale:-
1. Appropriate contractual and regulatory arrangements 
2. Infrastructure design and operation 
3. Service levels available to customers 
4. Success factors and constraints in utility management 
5. Financial viability and financial management 
1.3 Justification for the research 
The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and their associated targets form the basis for 
international action aimed at reducing poverty and promoting human dignity and equality. The 
target relevant to water supply concerns the reduction by half the proportion of people without 
sustainable access to safe drinking water by 2015 (United Nations, 2000). The linkages 
between safe water supply, adequate sanitation and the eradication of poverty were 
subsequently taken into account and resulted in a similar target being set for basic sanitation 
(United Nations, 2002). Rapid urban population growth in developing countries makes the 
attainment of these targets all the more challenging and will require complementary efforts 
from international agencies, governments, civil society and the private sector {UNDP, 2003}. 
The growing realisation that the private sector means not just multinational water service 
companies has led to calls for a greater role for local entrepreneurs in urban water supply 
(UNDP, 2003: p10; DFID, 2001a: p 14; Winpenny, 2003: p 32}. 
The Karu-Mararaba concession was believed to be one of only a few such arrangements in 
sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere in the developing world . The scale of the concession was 
more substantial than that normally associated with informal service provision but at the same 
time was somewhat smaller than that of a major urban centre. The general absence of formal 
indigenous private water operators at this scale means that there have so far been few 
opportunities to examine the potential for this model of service provision. 
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1.4 Overview of research methodology 
This research was based on a case study methodology and employed both qualitative and 
quantitative primary data. Qualitative data covering a range of issues including the contractual 
framework, utilities management, and financial issues were obtained through in-depth 
interviews with representatives of the various parties to the concession listed below: 
(i) Nasarawa State Government (NSG)- the granting authority 
(ii) Nasarawa State Water Board (NSWB)- the regulator of the concession, 
(iii) Riveroaks Drake and Sweeney Ltd. (RDS)- the concession holder, 
(iv) Riveroaks Utilities Ltd. (RUL) - the Concession Operating Company Uointly owned by 
NSG and RDS) 
Shorter interviews with franchisees appointed by RUL to undertake reta il water sales at public 
taps and water vendors provided qualitative primary data on utility management aspects and 
service delivery. 
Quantitative primary data pertaining to service delivery were obtained through a broad-
spectrum survey of household water usage in the study area. An audit procedure carried out 
by the researcher yielded primary data on infrastructure design and operation. Secondary 
data were obtained from documentation provided by RUL, RDS and the infrastructure design 
consultants. The research methodology is described in detail in Chapter 3. 
1.5 Delimitations of scope and definition of terms 
This research focuses on piped water supply and does not consider other forms of private 
sector activity in water supply provision such as tankering. This thesis adopts the following 
definitions: 
Medium-scale water supply: an intermediate scale of water supply provision falling between 
the large-scale urban water supply operations undertaken by the public utilities and the small -
scale operations of informal providers. 
Private sector: commercial organisations operating on a profit-making basis . This does not 
include other non-state providers such as cooperatives and community organisations. 
Low-income urban area: the whole or part of a city, town or peri urban area with a high 
concentration of poor people. 
1.6 Structure of the thesis 
The thesis consists of nine chapters including this introductory chapter. Chapter 2 comprises 
a review of literature relevant to water supply in low-income urban areas that develops a 
framework for the analysis of study findings. Chapter 3 describes the methods and 
procedures employed in the acquisition and analysis of data from the Karu-Mararaba 
concession area in Nigeria. Chapters 4 to 7 present the study findings: Chapter 4 -
Concession framework; Chapter 5 - Infrastructure and service delivery; Chapter 6 - Utility 
Management and Chapter 7 - Financial aspects. Chapter 8 discusses the study findings within 
the context of the analytical framework and assesses their relevance to medium-scale water 
supply elsewhere in the developing world. Chapter 9 presents the conclusions of the study 
and suggestions for future research. 
5 
Chapter 2 
Literature review 
This chapter reviews the literature relating to urban water supply in low-income urban areas in 
developing countries. The main purpose of the review is to develop an analytical framework 
within which the findings of this study can be examined. The analytical framework is based on 
the view, widely supported in the management and organisational behaviour literature, that 
organisations are open interactive systems (for example, see Huczynski and Buchanan, 2001 : 
pp 35 - 37). Consequently, organisational performance needs to be understood in terms of the 
processes and outcomes that are generated within the organisation as well as those in the 
wider environment {Dawson, 1996; pp 264- 268). 
The chapter begins with a review of various modes of public and private provision of water 
supply (Section 2.1 ). An examination of the key principles and strategies for susta inable water 
supply follows in Section 2.2. Sections 2.3 to 2.5 provide the framework for the analysis of the 
internal business processes (Section 2.3, Planning; Section 2.4, Organisation; Section 2.5, 
Management). Sections 2.6 and 2.7 cons.ider external influences on medium-scale water 
supply organisations (Section 2.6, Business environment; Section 2.7, Regulation). Section 
2.8 reviews the water supply sector in Nigeria (the country in which the study was carried out) 
Section 2.9 brings together the key ideas from the literature review and presents a summary 
of the analytical framework for medium-scale water supply in low-income urban areas. 
2.1 Modes of water service provision 
This section reviews the activities of service providers in the public and private sectors. 
Section 2.1.1 reviews public water supply provision. Sections 2.1.2 to 2.1.4 review the 
activities of private sector providers at the large, medium and small scales and include a 
discussion of both formal and informal providers. Section 2.1.5 examines some alternatives to 
the pure private and public modes of service provision. 
2.1.1 Public sector provision 
Public water utilities serve most urban dwellers. Evidence from various performance reviews 
by the World Bank suggests that most public water utilities in developing countries are high -
cost, low quality service providers (Serageldin 1994 ). Performance data for Africa for 
example, show that public water util ities in much of sub-Saharan Africa have poor cost 
recovery mechanisms and are generally not serving large sections of their target populations 
{WUP, 2000; 2001; Estache and Kouassi, 2002). Cost recovery in the water sector is 
generally low (averaging about 30% of operating costs) compared with other infrastructure 
sectors {World Bank, 1994). Often people do not pay for water services either because 
service levels are low or because cost recovery mechanisms are inadequate. Water agencies 
therefore have insufficient revenue for system development and improvement leading to a 
vicious cycle of declining performance (DFID, 2001 a). Furthermore, there is resistance on the 
part of some public authorities to charging for water like a commodity {Winpenny, 1997). 
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There is considerable debate regarding whether private utilities are inherently more efficient 
than those that are privately owned and managed. Evidence from the USA and the Asia 
Pacific region showed no firm evidence of a systematic superiority of one form of utility 
ownership over the other (Estache and Rossi, 2002) whereas similar studies in Ch ile (Bitran 
and Valenzuela, 2003) and in Africa (Estache and Kouassi, 2002) showed inferior 
performance by public providers. Nickson (1997: p184) reports that public water utilities in a 
number of Southern African countries were improving their performance by using private 
sector best practice as the benchmark against which to measure improvements. 
2. 1.2 Large scale formal private sector provision 
The 1980s and 1990s saw a sustained move by governments in many countries to involve the 
private sector in the financing and management of urban water supply infrastruch:Jre. Dramatic 
increases in productivity within EMOS - the public water utility in Santiago, Chile resulted from 
the introduction of service contracts (ldelovitch and Ringskog, 1995; Rivera, 1996). Significant 
improvements in various operating indicators (quantity of water supplied, water quality, 
response time to customer complaints, meter installation, pipeline and sewer rehabilitation) 
were reported in Argentina, Mexico, Poland and Colombia (Rivera, 1996). 
Improved productive efficiency has also been noted in private sector experiences in Africa. 
Menard and Clarke (2000) report on the impressive performance of the water supply system 
in the lvorian capital, Abidjan, managed by a private sector operator since 1959 under a 
mixture of concession, lease and management contracts. Brook-Cowen (1999) and Brook and 
Locussol (2001) note limited improvements to water supply in the Guinean capital, Conakry, 
brought about by the lease contract. These included an increase in the proportion of the 
popu lation with access to safe water due partly to improved rehabilitation and maintenance. 
They also note the achievement of compliance with World Health Organisation (WHO) 
drinking water norms, modest increases in the number of house connections, increased 
metering for private and government customers and improved customer service. 
Weitz and Franceys (2003: pp 29-30) offer a behavioural explanation based on Lewin's (1951) 
force field analysis for the apparent ability of foreign private sector partners to bring about 
change in urban water supply. Lewin considers change to comprise three elements: Firstly, 
the unfreezing of the current situation; secondly, the transition to the new or desired state; and 
thirdly a refreezing to make the changes permanent. The theory also concerns the balance 
between the driving forces (pro change) and the restraining forces (against change). Weitz 
and Franceys contend that the process of transferring services to a foreign operator is 
powerful enough to unfreeze the existing si tuation and that the foreign element of the larger 
PSP initiatives has the advantage of being able to appeal above the level of national politics, 
where necessary, to help overcome the restraining forces. 
Compared with other infrastructure sectors in developing countries, the water sector has been 
the least attractive to international private investors, particularly in the low-income countries. 
Only 5% of investment associated with private sector initiatives in infrastructure in developing 
countries from 1990 to 2001 went to the water sector and of this, a substantial proportion 
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relates to large transactions in three countries outside the low-income bracket (Brazil, 
Argentina and Chile). The distribution of the total investment between low, lower middle and 
upper middle - income countries was roughly 10%, 30% and 60% respectively during this 
period (World Bank, 2003a). International private operators serve only a small proportion of 
the population of poor or emerging countries (Winpenny, 2003). 
2.1.3 Small-scale informal private sector provision 
Extent of informal water supply provision 
The extent of informal water service activity where there is no formal provision by the water 
utility or where the service is poor is considerable and represents a major component of 
service provision in these areas (Briscoe, 1996). Estimates of the proportion of the urban 
population served by the informal sector vary. Whittington et al. {1991) determine that in the 
city of Onitsha in Nigeria, the private water vending system had a turnover of about 24 times 
and 10 times that of the public water utility in the dry and wet seasons respectively. In Jakarta, 
Indonesia, total water sales by distributing vendors were estimated at $20 million per annum, 
almost twice the turnover of the formal water company (Lovei and Whittington, 1993). Briscoe 
and Garn (1994) point out that the aggregate investment in private wells by households in 
Tegucigalpa, Honduras is so large that it would be sufficient to double the number of deep 
wells to the city. Despite the huge scale of informal provision, it had been generally ignored by 
utilities, governments and external support agencies (Katko, 1991 ). 
Categories of informal providers 
A survey of 20 small-scale providers (water and sanitation) drawn from Africa, Asia and Latin 
America (Snell, 1998) and one of independent small-scale providers in 10 African countries 
(Collignon and Vezina, 2000) identify three main categories of small-scale water supply 
providers summarised in Table 2.1, below. 
Table 2.1 Main categories of informal water supply providers 
Provider type 
Permanent partners with 
water utilities whose water 
they distribute at kiosks or 
standpipes 
Selected characteristics 
Typically individually owned and run using family labour. Key 
constraints include having to rely on public water supply, which is 
often erratic. Informal payments are sometimes made to water util ity 
staff to facilitate hook-up to the water supply network. Infrastructure 
costs are met either entirely by the kiosk operator or sometimes 
through community contributions and in a few cases by donor funds. 
1-:-M:-o-:-b:-:-i le_w_a~t~e-r t:-ru- c-:-k-e-rs-. ---t-:::T:::-h-e-se-e-=xi~st:--:i~n -a-::11-:t:-he-co_u_n-:-tr-:-ies reviewed in one form or another and 
carters and water carriers are the most common form of informal provision. 
Resellers of home water Widespread in the majority of countries reviewed. The practice is 
often discouraQed by the water utilities. 
Source:....s:=::s'"'-'n.:.:.el;:-:1 (;.:.19""'9=-=8::-~;-==c:-o-:-::l/ig_n_o_n-an-d7~:-:e-:-z-:-ina.~(;-;:20:;;-;0:;-;;0)::-' 
The importance of informal provision 
Water delivered to the home by a water vendor, though not providing a level of service 
comparable to a house connection, represents a higher level of service than that available to 
many urban dwellers (Whittington et al., 1988). Reselling of water to neighbours is another 
valued source of water for many urban dwellers without a convenient supply (Katko, 1991 ). 
Howard et al. {1999) observe that water vending will continue to be an important source of 
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water for many urban dwellers where direct~connection piped supply coverage is low and 
where continuity of supply is problematic. The informal water supply and sanitation economy 
therefore has important implications for both coverage and sector policy development (Briscoe 
and Garn, 1994 ). Supporting the activities of water vendors and other informal providers, 
though controversial, is being advocated as a means of making affordable water available to 
poor urban dwellers, given the constraints of the formal water supply sector (Cairncross, 
1990; Collignon and Vezina 2000; DFID, 2002). Various measures designed to reduce water 
vendors' costs and hence lower their prices have been proposed (Zaroff and Okun, 1984; 
Forrest and lnce, 2001 ). In Jakarta, deregulation of the water market to permit reselling of 
water by households with private connections was shown to be equivalent to a costless 
expansion of the city's standpipe system. Furthermore, poor urban dwellers benefited in the 
form of money savings and increased consumption (Crane, 1994). 
2.1.4 Medium-scale private sector provision 
Pioneers who bring water services to low-income urban communities in advance of utility 
expansion are more common and operate at a more substantial scale in Latin America than in 
Africa. In Guatemala, Argentina and Philippines they have resulted from initial donor or NGO 
support or through the initiative of an individual. In Paraguay the 'aguateros' are an integral 
part of the supply system and are essentiall y medium-sized commercial utilities (Snell , 1998). 
Small privately run networks exist in some African cities where they are usually connected to 
the city network and often are taken over by the public authority in return for some 
compensation. In Uganda, Burkina Faso, Mali and Kenya small networks were found 
operating independently of the city network and are believed to be a new development in 
Africa (Collignon and Vezina, 2000). Mauritania (Collignon, 1999) and Uganda (Price, 2002; 
Vezina, 2002) are the only countries in Africa where the indigenous private sector is known to 
be involved in the management of distribution networks on a significant scale. Vezina (2002) 
review the operations of small and medium sized organisations providing water services at a 
more formal level in Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Tanzania and Uganda. The author concludes that 
such organisations present a viable option that could fill the middle ground between 
community-managed rural water supply delivery and the operations of large urban utilities. 
2.1.5 Other service delivery approaches in developing countries 
A range of alternative organisational models designed to guarantee the active involvement of 
representatives from local government and civil society can be applied depending on the 
particu lar technical , social, and economic needs of the low-income area concerned (Hardoy 
and Schusterman, 2000). Civil society has the potential to form communication channels from 
government to the people about service level choices and the roles of the different players 
including the private sector and government (DFID, 2001 a). A recent joint report by two 
international NGOs (Gutierrez et al., 2003) sees an enabled civil society engaging effectively 
in PSP processes by monitoring activities and generating information. Franceys (1995) 
identifies roles for a number of smaller scale PSP actors (community contractors, NGO 
partners and local suppliers) that could receive donor support with a view to increasing access 
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to the poor. Business Partners for Development (BPD) is working with eight tri-sector 
partnerships (government, private sector and civil society) worldwide on a pilot basis with a 
view to understanding whether such partnerships facil itate the delivery of water supplies to 
poor communities (Caplan and Jones, 2000). 
Successful alternatives to the private management of water supply do exist (Lobina and Hall, 
1999). The Cooperative de Servicios Publ icos "Santa Cruz" Ltda, (SAGUAPAC), in Bolivia is 
the only co-operative society in the world responsible for the delivery of water supply and 
sanitation services to a major urban centre. Reviews of its performance have been generally 
positive: Nickson (1998) concludes that SAGUAPAC's performance was high in terms of three 
basic criteria; efficiency, equity and effectiveness and suggests that the co-operative model is 
a viable reform alternative to privatisation. Fragano {2001) reviews the case of a community 
owned water board serving the small urban population of ltagua in Paraguay, concluding that 
its prospects for sustainably providing good quality services are excellent. 
2.2 Principles and strategies for sustainable water supply 
2.2.1 Principles 
The International Conference on Water and the Environment (ICWE) held in Dublin, in 1992 
resulted in the Dublin Statement and its four 'Guid ing Principles' (ICWE, 1992), summarised 
below. These principles continue to provide the basis for international consensus on water 
sector development (WELL, 1998). 
• Freshwater is a finite and vulnerable resource, essential to sustain life, development and 
the environment 
• Water development and management should be based on a participatory approach, 
involving users, planners and pol icy makers at all levels 
• Women play a central part in the provision, management and safeguarding of water 
• Water has an economic value in all its competing uses and should be recognised as an 
economic good 
The dawn of the 21 51 century provided a fresh impetus for re-examining the status of global 
water resources and rethinking long-term strategies for ensuring its sustainability. The World 
Water Council adopted a number of strategies in line with the Dublin principles for the 
development of the sector including stakeholder involvement and moving towards full-cost 
pricing of water (Cosgrove and Rijsberman, 2000). 
Participation by users in the provision and operation of water supply is consistent with the 
Dublin principle related to water management and development based on participatory 
approaches. Demand responsive approaches to water supply and the involvement of the 
private sector both follow from the principle that water has an economic value. Sections 2.2.2 
to 2.2.4 review these three strategies. 
2.2.2 User participation 
Peoples' participation in decision-making and local ownership of water supply facilities has 
become a central feature of the design and implementation of water supply projects 
particularly in the rural water supply sector (WELL, 1998). An analysis of 121 rural water 
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supply projects in 49 countries (Narayan, 1994) shows strong association between user 
participation and enhanced project performance. Carter et al. (1999}, recognise that there is 
little likelihood of rural development projects being sustainable without community 
participation. The authors however point out that community-based approaches depend on 
the strength of community spirit, which is increasingly under threat from modernising 
infl uences, such as increases in rural-urban drift, employment off the land, and materialism. 
Furthermore, these factors tend to weaken the traditional structures and values that make 
development projects sustainable. 
Moriarty et al. (2002) suggest that some small town populations can have a high proportion of 
transient inhabitants and lacK the homogeneous or cohesive community of rural areas and the 
more established towns. The authors conclude that the conventional community management 
models favoured in rural areas may therefore not be workable in all small towns. 
Cotton and Tayler (1993) cite potential benefits of community involvement in provision and 
maintenance of urban infrastructure. These can include (i) lower costs than through 
conventional approaches, (ii) good quality construction, (iii) high cost recovery, (iv) creation of 
local employment, and (v) general benefits to the local economy. The authors however point 
out this approach requires the creation of relevant secondary infrastructure by government, 
supportive roles on the part of professional staff and appropriate structures for ensuring 
effective community representation . 
Mitlin and Thompson (1995) point to some successes in the application of participatory 
research and development approaches in low-income urban areas. They however suggest 
that in order to be of lasting value they need (i) long-term commitment, (ii) significant 
investment of effort to enable less powerful individuals within communities to express their 
views, and (iii) fundamental changes to planning procedures within local governments to 
make them more responsive to community-based initiatives. 
2.2.3 Demand responsive approaches 
The principle that service level choices made by communities should prevail over 
recommendations made by outside experts is now an established design principle for rural 
water supply projects (Briscoe and de Ferranti, 1988). Garn (1990) points out that it is 
unrealistic to expect users to pay for services that they do not value as highly as the payments 
they are expected to make. The adoption of very specific minimum service levels or norms 
can be detrimental to a demand-responsive process based on willingness-to-pay and could 
lead to the rejection of some appropriate technical options (WELL, 1998). Deverill et al. (2002) 
develop guidelines for the design of projects to meet demand that recognise the validity of 
technical, economic and rights- based perspectives of demand. 
A 6-country study finds that employing demand-responsive approaches (ORA) at the 
community level significantly increases the likelihood of water system sustainability. However 
in order for consumer demand to effective ly guide investment programs, adequate flow of 
information to households, provisions for capacity-building at all levels and a re-orientation of 
the roles of supply agencies are necessary (Katz and Sara, 1998; Sara, 1999). Bos (2001) 
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identifies substantial gaps between engineers' roles in current approaches to water system 
planning and the ideal role within a demand responsive approach. The author makes 
recommendations that would result in increased adoption of ORA by engineers. A research 
programme (World Bank Water Research Team, 1993) identifies four different community 
types (from a demand point of view) and suggests appropriate demand estimation strategies 
for each community type. 
Three broad categories of demand assessment techniques are recognised in the literature for 
water supply and other infrastructure development: Broad-spectrum sample surveys or 
revealed preference surveys, contingent valuation methods and participatory appraisal 
methods (McGranahan et al., 1997). A number of studies of water demand based on 
contingent valuation techniques have sought to influence policy in a number of ways: The 
assumption that households would only be willing to pay a relatively small proportion of 
household income {less than 5%) has been shown not to be the case (McPhail, 1993; 
Whittington et al., 1991 ). Poor quality water supply systems based on a centralised low-
service level {for example, communal taps provided free or at low tariffs) lead to a "low-level 
equilibrium trap". This is because people are not willing to pay for what they see as 
unsatisfactory service. The result is that the financial resources required for operation and 
maintenance of the service are not generated and the quality of the service declines sti ll 
further. These systems can ratchet up to a higher-level equilibrium with many connectors, 
greater revenues to the utility and a resultant increase in quality and reliability of the service 
{Allaf et al., 1993; Singh et al., 1993). Wedgwood and Sansom (2003) propose a streamlined 
approach to the application of contingent valuation surveys to make them more readily usable 
in small towns. 
A review of demand assessment techniques (Parry-Jones, 1999) concludes that there is an 
absence of documented participatory demand assessment techn iques for urban water supply 
and that there is a need for an integrated approach that would optimise the use of available 
resources, expertise and community involvement in demand assessment. 
2.2.4 Private sector participation in urban water supply 
Rationale 
According to economic theory, goods exhibiting the following two characteristics are private 
goods: First, they are 'excludable', meaning that their provision can be limited to those wishing 
to pay for them. Secondly, they are 'rivalrous ', meaning that once provided to one person they 
automatically become unavailable to others (Lipsey and Chrystal, 1999: pp 288-291 ). The 
principle can be applied to water resources in general (Johnstone et al., 1999: p6) and to 
urban water supply (Nickson, 1997: p167) thus making the economic case for efficient 
rationing of water through prices and for the involvement of the private sector in its provision. 
Where the participation of the private sector involves foreign investment, this can have the 
benefit of filling the gaps between domestically available and desired levels of savings, foreign 
exchange, government revenue and human capital skills for economic growth and 
development {Todaro, 2000: pp 582- 583). A number of studies conducted during the 1980s 
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and 1990s (for example, Larch, 1988; Galal et al., 1992; Megginson et al., 1992} conclude 
that privatisation has also generally produced overall welfare benefits. 
Decisions by governments to involve the private sector in urban water supply are usually 
based on considerations of increased efficiency, improvements in public finance and the 
possibility of extending services to those depending on high-cost informal providers through 
full cost pricing to previously subsidised users (Nickson, 1997; p 168}. 
Arguments against private sector participation 
Arguments against the involvement of the private sector in the provision of public services in 
developing countries relate mainly to the activities of multinational corporations. The 
arguments have tended to reflect either philosophical and ideological concerns or economic 
considerations (Todaro, 2000; pp 583 -584 ). 
Farazmand ( 1999) typifies the ideologically based arguments. The author contends that the 
current trend towards privatisation is: 
• a setback for governments' economic policy roles 
• destroys the indigenous national basis of the economic system, and 
• turns developing countries into agents of transnational corporations 
The economic arguments (Todaro, 2000; p584) revolve around the tendency for large foreign 
investors to inh ibit the growth of indigenous entrepreneurship and cause revenue leakages 
through the practice of transfer pricing, and excessive investment allowances and subsidies 
granted by governments. 
A number of more specific arguments have been advanced relating to urban water supply: 
Private sector operators can use the threat of bankruptcy, abandonment or sale to an asset-
stripper to extract subsidies from government. This is particularly so in developing countries 
where there are few competitors able to take over the running of large systems at short notice 
(Cairncross, 1990). There is concern that private sector initiatives in the water sector, 
undertaken with international utility companies, are likely to focus mainly on larger cities in 
upper-middle income countries and therefore do not benefit the urban poor in low-income 
countries (Cairncross, 1990; Franceys, 1995). Hall (2001) provides additional arguments 
against private management of water supply stating that: 
• private sector management of water supply is the exception rather than the rule 
• there is a lack of genuine competition since there are only two dominant multinational 
water service companies both from the same country (France) 
• there is usually a difficulty in effectively regulating private sector operators 
A review of private sector initiatives in the water sector in Africa (Hall et al., 2002) raises other 
concerns including (i) lack of transparency in award procedures, (ii) labour unrest, (iii) 
unjustified financial support by funding agencies for private operators and (iv) a high rate of 
contract cancellations and withdrawals. 
Private sector participation options 
A range of contractual options is available through which governments can engage private 
sector partners. Table 2.2 shows the characteristics of the main options and reflects varying 
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allocations of responsibility between the public and private sector for various aspects of water 
supply (World Bank, 1997). 
Table 2.2 Private sector participation options 
Contractual 
Option 
Service contract 
Management 
contract 
Lease 
Concession 
Build-operate and 
transfer (BOT) 
Divestiture 
Asset 
ownership 
Private and 
public 
Private or 
(private & public) 
Operations & 
Maintenance 
Public & 
private 
Private 
Private 
Private 
Private 
Private 
Capital 
investment 
Private 
Private 
Commercial 
risk 
Shared 
Private 
Private 
Private 
Duration 
(years) 
1-2 
3-5 
8-1 5 
25-30 
20-30 
Indefinite 
Source: World Bank (1997) 
Guidance on the selection and design of Private Sector Participation (PSP) arrangements for 
the water supply and wastewater is contained in World Bank (1997}, which has become a 
standard work of reference for use by governments wishing to enter into such arrangements 
and for consultants engaged to design and implement PSP arrangements. 
Competition 
The natural monopoly characteristics of large urban water supply systems make it necessary 
to introduce competition "for the market'' when seeking to introduce the private sector into the 
sector (Ones, 1995). This, taken together with yardstick competition can serve as a 
reasonably effective substitute for "in the market" competition (World Bank, 2002). However 
the potential benefits of "for the market" competition can be negated by inherent weaknesses 
in the franchise system such as the existence of moral hazard, information asymmetry, first 
mover advantage, corruption and the high cost of bidding (Nickson, 1997). 
A related issue that might be relevant with respect to indigenous private sector at the medium 
scale is that many initiatives are likely to result from unsolicited proposals. According to 
Hodges (2003b ). governments often cite the following reasons to justify sole-source 
negotiations with a private-sector project promoter: 
• the project is too small or remote, or is too risky to attract private sector interest 
• organising a public tender may not be cost efficient for the government or the bidders 
• an emergency situation makes it desirable to save time by developing a negotiated project 
Hodges (2003a) argues that even where these conditions exist they should not necessarily 
justify eliminating competitive mechanisms to determine the final project developer. The 
author suggests that governments could either: 
• purchase the project concept and then award the project through a competitive bidding 
process in which no bidder has a predefined advantage, or 
• offer the original promoter a predefined advantage in a competitive bidding process 
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Private sector financing 
The typical project profile for a major private sector undertaking in water supply might 
comprise a large initial investment and a long payback period. In addition, the rate of return is 
likely to be modest (5% -10%) compared with other infrastructure sectors (toll roads- 15% to 
20%; power- 17% to 20%; telecommunications- 25% to 30%). The project could therefore be 
associated with high risk over a relatively long period (Winpenny, 2003). In the absence of 
indigenous loan and capital markets, that could provide credit to private operators, the 
availability of long-term financing at reasonable rates of interest remains a critical constraint 
on further private sector investments in the sector (Rivera, 1996). The majority of funds 
required to finance the backlog of water supply infrastructure must come from the residents 
themselves since no other source has the capacity to meet more than a small proportion of 
the funding requirements (Brookshire and Whittington, 1993). According to Briscoe (1996), the 
commonly held view in some developing countries, that private-sector investment can solve 
the financing challenge in urban water supply is often mistaken. 
Public sector capacity 
Inadequate capacity within the public sector is generally viewed as a significant constraint to 
the effective involvement of the private sector in water supply in developing countries (Harris, 
2003). Nickson and Franceys (2003: p12) note that introducing the private sector in water 
supply to remedy existing capacity constraints, gives rise to a requirement for even greater 
government capacity to enable it to deal with the more complex tasks of regulation. A study of 
outsourcing in water supply and health services in Ghana (Larbi, 1998) concludes that 
appropriate organisational and institutional conditions must exist for outsourcing to be 
effective. There is also concern that local civil servants could be subject to corrupting 
influences where they negotiate PSP arrangements with highly sophisticated and wealthy 
international companies (Gutierrez et al., 2003). 
Public private partnerships and the urban poor 
The recognition that private sector operators might be tempted for financial reasons to ignore 
low-income users has resulted in efforts to ensure that Public Private Partnership (PPP) 
contracts set down minimum standards for all customers and include regulatory requirements 
to protect the interests of lower income groups (DFID, 1999). Evidence from Pakistan, Kenya, 
South Africa, Argentina and Indonesia suggests that PPP arrangements are likely to succeed 
if there is a shared vision that takes account the needs and preferences of the poor, has 
effective communication channels, and includes formally agreed roles and responsibilities 
between the various partners (Sohail and Cotton, 2001 ). There must be a greater 
understanding on the part of policy makers and private sector operators of the needs of the 
poor in order to design appropriate frameworks for private provision (PPIAF and WSP, 2002). 
Weitz and Franceys (2003: pp 65-77) propose a framework within which government, external 
support agencies, civil society, communities and the private operator can work to deliver 
services effectively to the poor. lnocencio and Uy (2003) report on a rare example (in the 
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Philippines) that demonstrates the capacity of international private operators to serve the poor 
effectively. 
Approaches in small towns 
Smaller towns face particular problems of small scale and low local government capacity that 
would tend to inhibit interest from international private sector operators (World Bank, 1997). 
Possible solutions to this could include grouping several smaller towns into a single unit or 
even creating multi utilities that provide more than one utility service in order to bring scale 
economies into play. This would permit a move away from project financing to balance sheet 
financing (Haarmeyer and Mody, 1998). 
Franchising has been explored as a means through which the constrain ts faced by small 
towns in low-income countries could be addressed. Recent work (Tagg and Tyler, 2003; Van 
Ginniken et al., 2004) suggests that franchising can potentially reduce barriers for 
experienced operators and attract their involvement in less developed markets. The authors 
however note that poor franchisee performance and the possible lack of funds locally to 
finance the franchisor's royalty fees could be significant obstacles to the application of 
franchising in the water sector. 
Indigenous entrepreneurs 
Discussions regarding the private sector in water supply often take for granted the 
involvement of large multinational companies. Governments and water authorities should 
recognise the presence and potential role of small-scale water providers and other sections of 
the local private sector and provide a legal framework to encourage greater long-term 
investments by them (Winpenny, 2003}. Solo (1999) argues that once one accepts the notion 
that the real benefits of private sector participation arise from competition, rather than the 
mere presence of a private operator, it is logical to seek to develop the activ ities of ind igenous 
operators in low-income areas where competition exists . 
2.3 Business planning for indigenous private water supply 
Having reviewed the principles and strategies for sustainable urban water supply and the 
activities of the main classes of service provider, the development of the analytical framework 
now turns to business planning processes for indigenous private water supply at the medium 
scale in low-income urban areas. Accurate forecasting of the quantities of water that 
customers will buy is likely to be of critical importance for indigenous water businesses in low-
income urban areas. This will especially be the case because many of these businesses are 
unlikely to be subsidised by government. They will therefore have to absorb financial losses 
resulting from (a) over investment in infrastructure, or (b) lower than forecast sales volumes. 
This section examines the multiple factors that affect the water purchases in low-income 
urban areas, including service level, and the existence of multiple sources. The application of 
marketing and pricing strategies is also reviewed. 
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2.3.1 Assessing water usage in low-income urban areas 
Quantities of water used 
Broad-spectrum water usage surveys are one means of identifying the water sources used in 
an area and why. Simple frequencies and averages as well as other statistical analyses could 
help to establish patterns in uses of different water sources. Participatory assessment 
methods such as focus group discussions and mapping exercises can also provide detailed 
information on water usage (Howard, 2002; pp 89-106). 
The quantities of water required for consumption varies according to climate, lifestyle, culture, 
wealth and other factors (White et al. 1972). Other categories of water usage are "amenity 
use" (White et al., 1972) such as car washing and gardening and "productive use" (Thompson 
et al., 2001) which refers to various economic activities of importance to poor people such as 
animal watering, and small-scale construction . 
Howard and Bartram (2003) derive a figure of 7.5 1/c/d as an acceptable minimum 
requirement for consumption (cooking and drinking) that should meet the needs of most 
people. The authors also conclude that defining minimum recommended quantities for 
personal hygiene has limited practical use as the volumes used by households will depend on 
service level (distance and time to source), and other factors including cost and reliability of 
the source. Recommended minimum quantities vary widely. Gleick (1996) recommends 50 
1/c/d for adoption by the international community. WELL (1998) suggest 20 1/c/d as a min imum 
criterion but emphasise the significance of the distance to the source and service level. 
Water consumption varies according to the type and proximity of the water source. Typical 
values, reported in WELL (1998) are shown in Table 2.3, below. Howard and Bartram (2003) 
observe that by comparison with water consumption through in-house multiple taps, 
consumption from yard taps shows relatively little variation because this does not allow easy 
use of water-hungry devices and involves some physical effort in obtaining water. 
Table 2.3 Water consumption figures, Jinja, Uganda 
Type of supply Distance from home Range of consumption 
. {1/c/d) 
Communal water-point {well or stand post > 1000m 5- 15 
Communal water point (well or stand post) 250m - 1000m 10 - 30 
Villag_e well or communal stand post <250m 15-50 
Yard tap In com_pound 20 -80 
House connection - single tap In house 30 -80 
House connection - multiple tap In house 70 - 250 
Source, WELL (1998) 
Water consumption and service level 
Figure 2.1, below (Cairncross and Feachem, 1993) summarises the results of several studies 
of water usage in Africa and Asia. The point of relevance to water businesses is that 
consumption only begins to increase above a certain basic minimum when water is available 
within a few minutes return journey (about 5 minutes or less). Water businesses must 
therefore consider the trade-off between the investments required to reduce their customers ' 
journey times and the increased sales that are likely to result from the investment. 
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Figure 2.1 Water consumption and travel time 
The effects of price on water consumption and connection to water systems 
The relationship between the price of water and consumption will be of interest to water 
businesses. Consumption is believed to be moderately price - elastic in general but less so for 
low than for high - income groups (Bahl and Linn, 1992). The authors cite a number of studies 
in Africa , Asia and Latin America that estimate price elasticities in the range -0.1 to -0.6. 
Morris and Parry-Jones (1999) report elasticities between -0.1 and -0.4 based on a study of a 
water tariff increase in Jinja, Uganda. They also conclude that people were spending 10% of 
their income on water and had probably reached the limit of their affordability. On the other 
hand, Cairncross and Kinnear (1991) found that residents of two poor communities in 
Khartoum exhibited no decrease in water consumption despite spending very high proportions 
of their incomes on water. 
The number of people that are likely to connect to a water supply system will influence 
revenues for water businesses and technical system design in low-income urban areas. In 
contrast with water use, elasticity with respect to connection and access is believed to be 
higher among low-income groups. This is because they consume small quantities of water 
and can satisfy that demand from communal facilities or other sources. Many low-income 
urban dwellers will therefore decide not to connect on cost grounds (Bahl and Linn, 1992). 
Multiple sources 
The existence of multiple water sources, including free sources, in low-income areas adds to 
the complexity involved in assessing quantities that customers will purchased from any 
particular facility. For example, rainwater provides an excellent and cheap source of water in 
the peri-urban areas of many rapidly expanding towns and cities of Africa, Latin America and 
Asia. This is particularly so for low-income inhabitants who would otherwise use up a 
substantial proportion of their income buying water from informal water sellers (Gould and 
Nissen-Peterson, 1999). Although the practice is widespread, its application depends on the 
circumstances in a particular location (Howard et al., 2002). 
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Variation of water usage over time 
For water businesses operating at the medium scale in low-income urban areas, there is the 
added complication that significant changes can take place over time in water usage patterns: 
A recent study (Thompson et al. , 2000), compared water usage in East Africa with the findings 
of an earlier study (White et al., 1972) carried out 30 years previously. The study found that 
consumption by urban households with access to piped connections had decreased on 
average by 48% (from 124.4 1/c/d to 64.2 1/c/d) but had increased for those using off-plot 
sources by 58% (from 15.41/c/d to 24.31/c/d). The changes were attributed mainly to the 
collapse of the municipal piped water supply systems. Water conservation resulting from 
increased metering and higher household incomes are offered as possible additional 
explanations for the decrease in consumption among "piped" households and the increases in 
consumption by "unpiped" households respectively (Howard and Bartram, 2003). 
2.3.2 Planning water source locations in low-income urban areas 
In a water supply system where the majority of customers have an in-house water supply the 
problem of estimating consumption is relatively straightforward. In a low-income urban area 
however, where shared communal facilities outside the home comprise the predominant 
service level, estimation is much more complex. 
(Whittington et al., 1988; Mu et al., 1990) show that other things being equal, the probability 
that a household chooses a public tap (kiosk) for its water supply falls dramatically as the 
round trip travel time increases. Beyond a travel time of 30 minutes (500 metres), 75% of the 
households in Ukunda would choose to buy water from a vendor at 10 times the price charged 
at the kiosk and 25% would choose a free source of inferior quality. The results from Ukunda 
are summarised in Figure 2.2. 
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Figure 2.2 Probability of source choice vs. travel time, Ukunda, Kenya 
The work of Whittington et al. (1988) and Mu et al. (1990) represents the first application of 
discrete choice modelling to the prediction of households' choices of water sources in 
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developing countries. Mu et al. ( 1990) compare this method with the traditional multiple 
regression approaches and find that the latter produce results that are not entirely consistent 
with an economic interpretation of water use behaviour. Mu and Whittington's approach was 
based on an assumption that a household would choose a source independently of the 
quantity of water they intended to use from it. Further criticisms of the method are that it does 
not take account of: (i) how households use water and (ii ) the views and constraints faced by 
the households (Merret, 2002). Subsequent modelling by Madanat and Humplick (1990} 
addresses some of these limitations and explicitly attempts to include in-home storage, 
multiple source usage and differentiation in the use of sources. 
2.3.3 Marketing of water services 
Water is considered a merit good, meaning that it can benefit a consumer more than he or 
she realises (Nickson, 1997: p168). Consequently, governments and private companies might 
be justified in persuading people to switch to improved water supplies. The application of 
marketing principles by water utilities in developing countries is a relatively new development. 
The objective is to provide an approach through which water utilities can maximise the 
number of satisfied customers, attract new customers and improve the financial sustainability 
of utility operations through the resulting increased revenues (Njiru and Sansom, 2001 ). 
Innovative marketing approaches to serving the poor are increasingly being used in a number 
of locations (Sansom et al., 2003}. In Durban, Republic of South Africa, for example, the utility 
successfully offered a differentiated service to residents of an unplanned settlement resulting 
in 260,000 connections with full pressure. 4,000 connections with roof tanks (semi-pressure) 
and 4,000 low pressure connections through ground tanks (Njiru et al., 2001 ). A participatory 
methodology is proposed (Coates et al., 2001) that can assist utilities to think strategically 
about engagement with the urban poor and the subsequent customer-utility relationship. 
2.3.4 Pricing strategies for medium-scale water supply 
Water services provided by public monopoly utilities in developing countries have been 
generally priced below cost and been accompanied by substantial government subsidies 
(Briscoe, 1996). An international review of public sector water pricing (Dinar and 
Subramanian, 1997) shows that few countries attempt to recover the capital costs from users 
but that many are moving away from flat rate charging. Where increasing block tariffs and 
peak period surcharges are introduced to promote water conservation they can prove 
ineffective if the jumps in marginal prices between rate blocks are such that they affect most 
customers and not just the large water users (Agthe and Billings, 1997). 
Much of the literature regarding small scale water service provision in low-income urban areas 
in developing countries seems, with few exceptions (for example, Whittington et al., 1998), to 
subjectively assume overpricing on the part of service providers. Small-scale entrepreneurs in 
these areas will probably face some form of competi tion (Solo, 1999) and may therefore need 
to consider appropriate pricing strategies in order to survive in the market. There appears to 
be little literature on the subject. Microeconomic theory however, offers a range of pricing 
strategies that could be applied by small and medium-scale water supply providers depending 
20 
on the degree of market power they enjoy and the nature of the competitive environment (see 
for example Baye, 2000: pp 402-432; Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 2001 : pp 369-421 ). 
2.4 Business organisation and internal structure 
2.4. 1 Contracting out 
Contracting out tasks that cannot be handled efficiently in-house is good business practice. lt 
is also a relatively easy way to increase efficiency in water supply through the competition that 
results from the procurement process (London Economics, 1998). For water supply 
businesses or organisations, contracting out or outsourcing some functions can lead to 
benefits including reduced costs, improved quality, simpler management structures and 
reducing staff-management problems (Larbi, 1998; Sansom et al., 2002). 
Water supply businesses operating at the medium scale in urban areas will typically have 
opportunities for cooperation with a range of individuals and smaller businesses through a 
number of contractual arrangements. Guidance is available (World Bank, 1997; Sansom et 
al., 2002) on the preparation of service contracts and leasing arrangements for utilities 
wishing to enter into outsourcing arrangements. 
2.4.2 Franchising 
Roche et al. (2001) and Tagg and Tyler (2003) propose franchising as a new and untested 
business model for water supp ly that could promote the participation of private international or 
national franchisors in support roles to small town water operators in developing countries. 
Consequently, there is little empirical evidence in the literature on the subject. The following 
includes material from the general commercial franchising literature that focuses on some 
issues that might be relevant in water supply in low-income urban areas. 
Principal - Agent theory is often used to describe the nature of the franchisor - franchisee 
relationship in international franchising. This is due to the risk of opportunism and moral 
hazard resulting from the high degree of information asymmetry found in the retail sector. The 
theory suggests that power and control through stringent enforcement of franch ise contracts 
should rest with the franchisor. However, standards have sometimes been found difficult to 
maintain through this process (Quinn and Doherty, 2000). An alternative perspective 
(Exchange theory) emphasises the need for an appropriate balance between control by the 
franchisor and the franchisee's autonomy on the basis that excessive levels of franchiser 
control or of franchisee autonomy can be counterproductive (Pizanti and Lerner, 2003). 
Micro-economic explanations for franchising indicate that the nature and quality of the 
franchise relationship is linked to the franchiser's motivation to franchise: Where franchising is 
adopted to gain the benefits of the franchisee's local knowledge of an unknown market, 
relationsh ip building is critical since the strategy implies and relies on high relationship quality. 
Where franchising is adopted to address internal resource constraints, the relationship is likely 
to be of low quality and may only last as long as the resource constraint exists (Hopkinson 
and Hogarth-Scott, 1999). 
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The location and spacing of taps within a low-income urban area can have a significant effect 
on water pricing and competitive behaviour (Lovei and Whittington, 1993; Crane, 1994). Being 
independent businesses, both franchisor and franchisee will try to control the location of 
outlets to suit their respective interests. In commercial practice, decentralised location 
planning governed by the franchisee rather than the franchisor is more beneficial to the 
franchise where there is a comparatively low level of customer loyalty (Fock, 2001 ). 
Cultural differences are among the key factors leading to negative perceptions of support 
provided by an international franchisor since these differences limit the extent to which the 
franchiser's materials and methods are applicable to the local market (Quinn, 1999). 
2.4.3 Internal organisational structure 
Water suppliers at the medium scale in low-income urban areas will be working within 
competitive and probably unpredictable environments with a consequent requirement for 
flexibility in operating procedures and appropriate organisational design. Child (1984: p 242) 
identifies the following two broad approaches to organisational design to cope with changing 
circumstances: 
• approaches that seek to identify or recommend universal good practice for success 
• designs that suit specific contingent characteristics relevant to the organisation 's tasks and 
its political situation and consistent with its style and culture 
The work of Peters and Waterman (1982) based on a study 43 successful US corporations 
typifies the first approach - the "excellence school" - and prescribes eight attributes of 
excellence. These are based largely on developing a strong corporate culture but include 
recommendations for simple structures with few administrative layers. This prescriptive 
approach has been criticised mainly the grounds that conclusions cannot be generalised to all 
companies. Thomas (2003: pp 112 -116) summarises the arguments. 
The second approach, the contingency approach, developed initially by Burns and Stalker 
(1961 ), distinguishes between two ideal types of organisation, one mechanistic, adapted to 
relatively stable conditions, and the other 'organismic' (or organic) adapted to changing 
conditions. Mechanistic systems are characterised by tasks broken down into specialisms with 
each individual carrying out precisely defined tasks. Organic systems, on the other hand, 
involve flexible roles, increased delegation and less vertical control. Firms operate within a 
context of multiple contingencies that include task-efficiency, social, cultural and political 
phenomena. All are relevant to organisational design (Child 1984: pp 233 - 242). 
Weitz and Franceys (2003: pp 27 - 28) note that bulk water supply to a mass market involves 
a standardised technology and is best delivered through a mechanistic organisational 
structure; whereas water distribution to low-income urban areas requires a flexible and 
creative 'organic ' approach in order to take account of the unique needs in each 
neighbourhOod. The authors further suggest that since these particular human skills and 
attitudes are unlikely to be found within the traditional engineering-led, 'mechanistic' water 
utility, Public-Private-NGO-Community Partnerships are needed to achieve the required 
hybrid 'mechanical-organic' delivery systems. 
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2.5 Utility management 
2.5.1 Performance assessment 
A methodology for assessing performance of water and wastewater utilities (Cullivan et al., 
1988} was developed by the Water and Sanitation for Health project (WASH) in the form of a 
set of institutional assessment guidelines. T he guidelines are the outcome of research that 
identifies nine critical success factors described in Table 2.4 below, as highly significant in 
assessing the effectiveness of water and wastewater institutions. 
Table 2.4 Success factors for water and w astew ater institutions 
Success factor and 
(ranking of re lative Relevance to effective performance 
importance) 
Organisational The organisation's independence from government or regulators is necessary 
Autonomy to ensure that it can conduct its affairs and meet its responsibilities effectively. 
(1) Effective autonomy is characterised by the power to make decisions about 
budQets, revenues, staffinQ, infrastructural planninQ and orQanisational goals. 
Leadership To function effectively, an institution needs effective leadership at different 
(2) levels. Leadership is the ability to inspire others to understand, commit to and 
work towards the institution's mission and goes beyond proficiency in 
manaQement. 
Management and Management is organising people and resources to accomplish the work of the 
administrative institution. Effective management is characterised by the capacity to get the 
systems most of the human and other resources in a planned manner. The counterpart 
(3) to good management is the existence and use of key administrative systems. 
Commercial The degree to which actions in an institution are driven by cost effectiveness 
orientation and operating efficiency. 
(4) 
Customer orientation Organising and directing the services of the institution towards consumers. 
(4) Serving customers is seen as the primary function of all staff. Workable means 
exist whereby consumers can interact with the organisation. 
Technical capability The measure of the institution's competence in conducting the technical work 
(5) required through skilled qualified employees and outside specialists where 
appropriate. 
Developing and Activities directed towards recruitment of staff, providing skills to do the job and 
maintaining staff grow professionally. and providing adequate job satisfaction and wages and 
(5) benefits to retain competent staff. 
Organisational Observable values and norms that inform and guide everyday organisational 
culture activity. They are a powerful means for defining and justifying organisational 
(6) operations. An unhealthy corporate culture will often be resistant to change and 
will protect narrow Interests such as graft at the expense of organisational 
health. A positive culture means a clear sense of mission and identity. 
Interaction with The institution's capacity to positively and strategically influence those 
external institutions institutions that affect its ability to perform its essential functions. 
(6) 
Based on Culflvan et al. (1988) 
These success factors provide the basis for the study of management aspects in this study 
(see Section 3.3.4, Table 3.7). Sections 2 .5 .2 to 2 .5.4 examine leadership, national culture 
and financial management. 
2.5.2 Leadership 
Leadership in organisations is recognised as important. However, 'it remains one of the most 
confused and confusing areas in the whole field of management' (Thomas, 2003: p162) . 
Dawson (1996 : p 216} identifies the following critical aspects: 
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• leadership is not a characteristic of any individual in isolation but is played out in the 
relationships between leaders and followers 
• there can be various leaders, each leading on different aspects 
• leadership does not have to be synonymous with position in the managerial hierarchy 
Leadership theories are usually grouped under the broad headings shown in Table 2.5. 
Table 2.5 Leadersh ip theories 
Trait theories 
Style theories 
Contingency 
theories 
New 
perspectives 
Seek to Identify the distinguishing characteristics of successful leaders. Only about 5% 
of identified traits are common to the majority of studies. If reduced to a few commonly 
occurring ones they become necessary but not sufficient conditions. Despite these 
disadvantages, most managerial selection schemes work on a trait basis. 
Styles range from "autocratic" to "democratic". Employees will work more effectively for 
managers who employ certain styles of leadership. Increases in productivity have been 
found over all studies to be less than expected by advocates. 
Developed as a result of the shortcomings of style and trait approaches. Based on the 
concept adapting leadership style in a manner consistent with aspects of the context 
such as attributes of the work rou and nature of the task. 
The new leader - an indispensable visionary, coach and facilitator concerned with 
building a shared sense of purpose. 
The superleader - able to develop leadership capacity in others; reducing their 
dependence on formal leaders 
Sources: Handy (1993); Huczynski and Buchanan (2001) 
The relationship between leadership style and the business life cycle has been shown to be 
important. A newly starting business needs an innovating champion in the lead. Once into 
steady state, the need is for a leader that can run the business efficiently (Ciarke and Pratt. 
1985; Rodrigues, 1988 and Adizes, 1988: cited in Dawson, 1996, p 226). lt is also suggested 
(Badaracco, 2001) that many organisational problems are solved by the constant striving of 
those working away from the limelight rather than by those at the top . Furthermore, the author 
argues that this quiet leadership is practical, effective and sustainable. 
Much of the management literature takes it for granted that top leadership is indispensable if 
groups are to perform well. However, Kerr and Jermier (1978), cited in Rollinson and 
Broadfield (2002: pp 389-390) identify some circumstances in wh ich such leadership can be 
relatively unimportant. These are summarised in Table 2.6. 
Table 2.6 Substitutes for leadership 
Characteristics 
Of the subordinate 
Ability, experience, training and knowledge 
Need for inde endence, Professional orientation 
Of the task 
Unambiguous, No variation in method 
Provides own feedback 
Intrinsical! satis in 
Of the organisation 
Formalisation - explicit objectives, plans, job specifications 
Inflexibility - fixed rules and procedures 
Close-knit, cohesive work groups 
Organisational rewards that are not within leader's control 
Ph sical distance between su erior and subordinates 
Neutralises 
relationship-oriented 
leaders hi 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
Yes 
Neutralises 
task -oriented 
leadershi 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No Yes 
No Yes 
Yes Yes 
Yes Yes 
Yes Yes 
Adapted from Rollinson and Broadfield (2000: p390) 
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2.5.3 The significance of national culture on organisational behaviour 
The WASH guidelines are intended for worldwide application but recognise that the success 
factors will apply in different ways and have different relative importance in different parts of 
the world (Cullivan et al. 1988: p8}. Much of the theory of organ isational behaviour has been 
developed by workers in the industrialised word (mostly the USA) without due attention being 
paid to the variety of societies of which organisations form part. There is a struggle in many 
developing countries to reconci le traditional features of life with Western - derived models of 
management (Hickson and Pugh, 2001 ). Four cultural variables (power distance, uncertainty 
avoidance, masculinity, and individualism) rated on numerical scales for each country are 
identified by Hofstede (1980) that can be used to show how national cultures can influence 
the functioning of organisations. These are shown in table 2.7, below. 
Table 2.7 Hofstede's cultural variables 
Variable Definition - - ------- --------------- --l 
Power The extent to which a society accepts the fact that power in institutions is distributed 
distance unequally. In high power-distance cultures, power inequalities between people are 
accepted. Where power-distance is low, superiors and subordinates treat each other 
moreasequ=a~ls~·------------------------4 
Uncertainty The extent to which a society feels threatened by uncertain and unambiguous 
avoidance situations and tries to avoid these situations by creating greater career stability, 
establishing more formal rules, not tolerating deviant ideas and behaviours and 
believing in absolute truths and the attainment of expertise. 
~------4---~-lndividualism - The extent to which people derive their sense of identity from being individuals rather 
collectivism than as part of a group. 
--~~------~-~-------------4 Masculinity The extent to which the dominant values in society are masculine; i.e. assertiveness, 
the acquisition of money and material things, and not caring for others, the quality of 
life or people. 
Adapted from Hofstede (1980) and Rollinson and Broadfield, (2002) 
2.5.4 Financial management of small water utilities 
Existing guidelines for financial management of utilities in developing countries have been 
developed for large public sector utilities (WHO, 1994). A benchmarking initiative aimed at 
comparing the performance of African utilities is recently been developed but is also aimed at 
large utilities providing citywide services (WUP, 2001 and 2002). 
For medium-scale water supply, useful lessons may be learned from The United States of 
America where a significant proportion of the population in some states is served by small 
water supply systems. For example, in the State of Pennsylvania almost 90% of public water 
supply systems serve fewer than 3,300 people. Furthermore, this group of small systems is 
seen as problematic in the USA. This has led to a concerted effort to promote business-
planning principles among small water utilities (Cromwell, et al., 1997). Acceptable return on 
assets, current ratio, debt - equity ratio, operating ratio and cash flow coverage are presented 
as key financial indicators for "healthy" systems (Jordan et al. , 1997). 
The scope of medium scale water supply operations in urban areas will generally require the 
owners of these businesses to employ professional managers. This separation of ownership 
from management will bring into play the "principal-agent" problem. The problem relates to the 
conflicting interests of the principals (the owners of the business) and the agents (the 
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managers). The subject is covered in standard texts on business finance, management, and 
economics (see for example, Brealey and Myers, 2001 ; Baye, 2000; Begg et al. 1997). 
2.6 The business environment for indigenous water supply operators 
This section, 2.6, and Section 2.7 continue the development of the analytical framework for 
indigenous private water supply at the medium scale in low-income urban areas and examine 
factors external to indigenous water supply organisations. Section 2.6 reviews the 
organisation 's interaction with wider environment and considers the economy in general, the 
financial sector and the competitive environment. Section 2.7 is devoted to the regulation of 
private operators in urban water supply. lt includes a discussion of the particular challenges of 
regulating water supply businesses in low-income urban areas and approaches to the 
regulation of drinking water quality. 
2.6. 1 Macro economic considerations 
lt is generally accepted that investment in physical capital financed mainly through domestic 
savings is central to explanations for economic progress (Dornbusch and Fisher, 1994; Meier 
and Rauch, 2000). There is however, no f irm evidence that the provision of infrastructure 
necessarily precedes economic growth. Rather, economic growth appears to cause 
infrastructure development (Biomstrom et al. , 1996). 
With respect to water supply infrastructure, Stromberg and Walker (1992) demonstrate in a 
61-country study that countries with a per capita Gross National Product less than US$ 1 ,400, 
without exception, had not been able to achieve coverage rates above 70% during the 80s. 
The level of development and stability of a country's financial sector is thought to bear a 
strong relationship with the rate of economic growth (levine, 1997). A study using data from 
30 countries in sub-Saharan Africa finds a strong association between financial sector 
development and levels of investment (Ndikumana, 2000). Appropriate monetary and fiscal 
policies by governments are required in order to promote economic growth (McKinnon, 1986; 
reprinted in Meier and Rauch, 2000). However, sound economic policies on their own are not 
necessarily a guarantee for economic growth: Political instability, ethn ic division and 
corruption are strongly correlated with poor economic performance, particularly in Africa 
(Easterly and Levine, 1997). 
2.6.2 Access to finance 
The availability of long-term and low-interest finance is a major constraint for the development 
of indigenous business in developing countries (Eikan, 1988). For example, Nigeria's average 
inflation rate during the nineties was 36% (United Nations, 2001 ), and has remained at similar 
levels since (Financial Times, 2000). Some borrowers could become trapped in a situation 
where they are compelled to pay interest rates far above their repayment capacity (Mazes, 
1995). Small-scale operators must generally raise finance for investment from the informal 
sector because the formal banking sector will usually not lend to them. This has been found to 
apply even to those holding legitimate contracts with public authorities for the provision of 
various services. Family savings, savings clubs and contributions from households that would 
eventually benefit from the facilities are identified as the main sources of finance (Collignon 
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and Vezina, 2000). Interest rates charged by moneylenders in the informal sector are usually 
high, (sometimes exceeding 100% per month) although loans from these sources generally 
have short maturities rarely exceeding 6 months (Aryeetey, 1998). Monthly interest rates from 
four African countries are shown in Table 2 .8. 
Table 2.8 Some moneylenders' monthly interest rates {1992) 
Country 
Ghana 
Nigeria 
Tanzania 
Malawi 
Mean monthly Urban Rate 
(%) 
10 
19 
9 
47 
Mean monthly Rural Rate 
(%) 
8 
20 
6 .5 
50 
Source: Aryeeley, 1998 
Policies aimed at deepening formal financial markets in a number of African countries have 
had the effect of further restricting access to credit to small clients. Informal markets have 
however grown in response to demand from customers without access to formal finance. 
Expanding the role of the informal financial sector is seen as an effective medium- term 
solution to increase access by the broader population to financial services (Steel et al., 1997). 
2.6.3 Market conditions 
Indigenous operators in low-income urban areas are likely to face market conditions 
characterised by varying degrees of corruption , unpredictability and competition . Analysis of 
the activities of various agents within the municipal water supply system in Jakarta, Indonesia 
showed that almost 60% of the price paid by a household to a distributing vendor was 
available for appropriation by rent-extracting agents (the vendor, the tap manager, and utility 
staff). A key contributory factor was that the system was based on a limited number of house 
connections and public taps (Lovei and Whittington, 1993). lt was suspected that the owners 
of tanker trucks in Onitsha, Nigeria were earning extremely high rates of return on their cap·1tal 
investment but due to the short duration of their field studies were unable to offer a definitive 
explanation for the existence of such monopoly rents (Whittington et al., 1991 ). Water vending 
activities in Ukunda, Kenya on the other hand were found to be sufficiently competitive to 
keep vendor profits below rent-seeking levels (Whittington et al. , 1989). 
Competition is widespread at the low-income end of the water distribution activity and in 
Guatemala and Paraguay was shown to hold water prices down to a maximum of 1.4 times 
and 2.5 times the official utility price (Solo 1998). 
The occurrence of violent behaviour to defend local monopolies has been observed within the 
water business in situations where governance is weak (such as in Haiti) but is generally 
absent in well-ordered situations such as in Senegal and Mali (Coll ignon, 1999). 
2. 7 Regulation 
2. 7.1 Rationale 
Because of the monopoly characteristics of large urban water supply systems, regulation is 
necessary in order to ensure that consumers are protected against possible exploitative 
behaviour of water providers on the one hand and that the interests of investors are 
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safeguarded on the other (Kiein, 1996). Regulation is also required to ensure (i) equitable use 
and allocation of water resources, (ii) that the negative effects of pollution are addressed, and, 
(iii) that adequate service provision is guaranteed to the poor (Johnstone et al., 1999}. 
Regulation can however have adverse effects on economic growth, even in sectors 
considered natural monopolies. This is due to: (i) the often limited information available to 
regulators of the cost and demand structure of the industry, and (ii) the tendency for politicians 
to use regulation to achieve political rather than economic ends (Guasch and Hahn, 1999). 
2. 7.2 Regulatory models 
Regulation by independent bodies free from political and administrative government 
interference is seen by many as the ideal institutional model for utility sector reform in 
developing countries (World Bank, 2002; Smith, 1997a). Other systems of regulation do 
however exist. Tremolet and Browning (2002) identify three other models noting that these are 
in fact hybrids comprising elements of other models: 
• regulation by contract: regulation by a public body based on detailed contracts with a 
private water operator 
• self regulation : where a public service provider essentially regulates itself, and 
• partnership models: civil society intermediating between the private sector and consumers 
Lorrain (1991) identifies two distinct regulatory systems: 
(i) "global regulation" - regulation of private water companies by local politicians on the basis 
of political rather than technical criteria (the system that predominates in France), and 
(ii) "detailed control' - regulation by technocrats - (similar to the UK regulatory model) 
Regulation through asset holding companies set up to perform the functions of asset owner, 
regulator and promoter of public private initiatives has been implemented in a number of 
countries (Kerf, 2000). 
The progressive transformation of the politically controlled regulatory regimes now found in 
many countries into ones allowing a greater degree of regulatory independence accompanied 
by higher levels of technical competence remains a significant challenge (Smith, 1997b). A 
further problem that is of interest to both government and consumers is regulation of the 
regulators themselves {Munday, 1996). Greater accountability can be achieved through 
regulatory commissions comprising several members as opposed to the single regulator 
approach (Estache, 1997). In countries with limited regulatory expertise, multi-industry 
regulatory bodies could facilitate learning across industries, permit the sharing of scarce 
specialist human resources and reduce the risks of 'industry capture' (Smith, 1997a). The 
inclusion of consumer representatives on the boards of regulatory agencies has been rare but 
is now practised in Argentina (Nickson, 2001 b). 
2. 7.3 The limits and problems of regulation 
Lack of capacity and a tradition of independent public institutions in developing countries are 
factors limiting the sustained engagement by the private sector in the water supply and other 
infrastructure sectors (Harris, 2003). Independence of the regulatory function is considered a 
virtually unachievable ideal for developing countries (Rivera, 1996). Attempts to transfer 
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Western style managerial concepts say, to African countries, are likely to end in failure due to 
the particular political and social constraints on policymaking and management (Leonard, 
1987). There are many examples of the difficulties that have been encountered with all forms 
of regulation in developing countries: In Cartagena, Colombia, the independence of the 
regulatory body appears to have been jeopardised by a joint venture arrangement that was 
designed to overcome political resistance to PSP (Nickson, 2001a}. The asset-holding model 
is judged to have been unsuccessful in four West African countries due to a confusion of roles 
and lack of institutional capacity (Kerf, 2000). The dramatic collapse of a water supply 
concession in Bolivia was due largely to regulatory failure although political and social factors 
were also significant (Nickson and Vargas, 2002). A review of regulatory experiences in eight 
Latin American countries (Yepes, 2001) identified weak or non-existent regulatory systems, 
lack of political will to implement reform in some of the countries and a resistance to central 
government regulation by municipalities. 
2. 7.4 Regulation of small scale urban water supply 
The main focus of attention on regu lation thus far has been to stop utilities from abusing their 
monopoly power, but relatively little effort has gone into considering ways to reduce that 
power (Webb and Erhardt, 1998). There appears to be a gradual shift away from the notion 
that all urban water supply systems necessarily display monopoly characteristics. Large-scale 
monopoly water supply systems may be the most efficient alternative in high-income countries 
but these efficiencies are usually hard to replicate in many developing countries. 
Governments should therefore encourage a range of alternative providers (Solo, 1998). An 
important issue for regulation in low-income urban areas is to permit alternative providers to 
compete legitimately with main providers and with each other. Incentives could be offered for 
alternative providers to enter the formal sector and upgrade their services (Baker and 
Tremolet, 2000a). A flexible approach to monitoring the services of al ternative providers in 
low-income urban areas could be based on realistic quality objectives, introducing as much 
competition as possible into water supply networks and allowing a range of providers 
(including the main utility) to compete to provide services at prices that better reflect demand 
(Baker and Tremolet, 2000b). 
There are however likely to be problems of regulation at the sub-national level. Prud'homme 
(1995) suggests that there may sometimes be more opportunities for and fewer obstacles to 
corruption at the local government level than at the national level. 
2. 7.5 Water quality standards and surveillance 
As governments begin to adopt roles involving facilitation and regulation of the private sector, 
drinking water standards are now assuming a higher priority than previously was the case. 
Guidelines developed by the World Health Organisation (WHO, 1993; 2003) provide the basis 
for drinking water standards in many developing countries (lnce and Howard, 1999). The 
guidelines emphasise the advantages of adopting a risk-benefit approach to reflect the 
environmental, social, economic, and cultural context in each country. This ensures that 
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scarce resources are not diverted to developing standards and monitoring substances that are 
of relatively minor importance to public health (WHO, 2003). 
End-product testing of drinking-water is often complex, costly and limited in its capacity to give 
early warning of problems with safety of drinking-water. Preventive Water Safety Plans that 
encompass all steps in water protection from the catchment to the consumer are now 
recognised as the most effective means of consistently assuring drinking-water quality and 
protecting pubic health (WHO, 2004). Water Safety Plans are based on the Hazard Analysis 
and Critical Control Point (HACCP) risk management approach that has been used in the food 
manufacturing industry and tailored to the context of drinking-water (Davison et al., 2004 ). 
Surveillance of drinking-water quality is a key component of water safety planning. Through a 
process of continuous assessment and overview, it contributes to the protection of public 
health by promoting improvement of the quality, quantity, coverage, affordability and continuity 
of water supplies (WHO, 2004). Surveillance is complementary to , but does not replace, the 
quality control function of the water supplier (Howard, 2002). 
Small or community-managed urban water supply systems in developing countries routinely 
show contamination , and are a matter for general concern (Howard et al. , 1999). In such 
systems, it is important to have effective management to direct operation and maintenance 
activities and to respond rapidly to fa ilures in the water supply (Howard et al. , 2001 ). 
Surveillance can be used as a mechanism for collaboration between health agencies and 
water suppliers on improving water supply. Where the capacity of the water supply body is 
limited, well-designed surveillance programmes can be effective if geared more towards a 
supportive role rather than towards the enforcement of compliance (WHO, 2004 ). 
2.8 The Nigerian water supply sector 
This section (2.8) presents a review of Nigeria's water sector and includes a short section on 
the water supply framework with in Nasarawa State- the location of the case study. 
2.8.1 Urban population growth and water supply coverage in Nigeria 
Nigeria's population is estimated at 120 million. In 1950, only 10% of its population was urban. 
That proportion is currently about 45% and could exceed 60% by 2030 (United Nations, 
1999). In the late 1990s Nigeria's water sector planners identified small towns (settlements of 
5,000 to 20,000 inhabitants and peri urban areas with limited basic infrastructure) as a 
separate sector for water supply planning purposes. There are between 2000 and 3000 such 
settlements in Nigeria inhabited by 30 million to 40 million people (Stoveland Consult, 1998). 
WHO/UNICEF (2000) estimates that 81 % of urban dwellers in Nigeria had access to an 
'improved ' water supply in 2000. The National Water Supply and Sanitation Policy document 
(FMWR, 2000) however, considers small towns, and quotes a coverage figure of 48%. A 
survey of 37 Nigerian small towns (Stovelan d Consult, 1998) suggests that only 1 0% of those 
living in small towns had access to an adequate water supply. 
2.8.2 Nigerian water utility performance 
The performance of Nigerian state owned water enterprises is generally poor. The supply 
situation is characterised by old and non-functional infrastructure and high levels of leakage. 
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Cost recovery is low (40% on average, and less than 5% in some instances). There are large 
numbers of illegal connections, inadequate billing systems and ineffective procedures for 
collecting revenue . A work force audit indicated heavy overstaffing compounded by the fact 
that many staff lacked adequate qualifications (Hodges, 2001; WUP, 2002). 
2.8.3 Institutional and policy framework for urban water supply 
Nigeria's Federal Ministry of Water Resources is responsible for overall water sector policy 
development, coordination and financing . The delivery of urban water supply is the 
responsib ility of State Governments. Each of Nigeria's 36 states and the Federal Capital 
territory has established a public State Water Board or Corporation. These generally supply 
water to urban dwellers in the State Capital and the larger of the secondary towns. 
Nigeria's federal government has shown enthusiasm for divestiture of public enterprises since 
the eighties (Yakubu, 1997). Attempts to attract international water operators into Nigeria 
started in the mid-nineties with a PSP strategy study (Halcrow, 1998}. The general structure 
and language of Nigeria's 1999 constitution and water resources legislation such as the Water 
Resources Decree 101 of 1993 however suggest that involvement of the private sector in the 
delivery of water supply was not envisaged at the time of their drafting. 
The National Water Supply and Sanitation Policy (FMWR, 2000) sets a challenging reform 
agenda for the sector. Institutional autonomy, decentralisation, cost sharing, demand - driven 
approaches and private sector participation are identified as key reform elements. However, a 
formal evaluation of the national rural water supply and sanitation programme (Jawara et al., 
2001) concludes that major attitudinal shifts would be required on the part of organisations at 
all levels in order to translate policy into reality. The Urban Water Sector Reform Project 
supported by the World Bank (World Bank, 2001) has given the reform process a renewed 
impetus and includes the drafting of new enabling legislation. 
2.8.4 The Small Towns ' Water Supply and Sanitation Programme (STWSSP) 
In order to address the backlog of water supply and sanitation infrastructure provision in 
Nigeria's 2000-3000 small towns, Nigeria's Federal Government has recently embarked upon 
a Small Towns Water Supply and Sanitation Programme (STWSSP) supported by the World 
Bank and the European Union. The programme concept is based on community ownership 
and management. lt represents a radical departure from previous supply-led approaches and 
is in keeping with the reform oriented water and sanitation policy document (FMWRRD, 1998). 
2.8.5 Small-scale informal water provision in Nigeria 
In addition to the well-known study of water vending in Onitsha (Whittington et al., 1991}, 
others have addressed informal water supply provision in Nigeria. Studies in Kano (lliyas and 
Sani, 1999) and Bauchi and Akwa lbom States (Yves Bee Ltd. (2000) identify water kiosk 
operators and water vendors as the main informal service providers. These studies provide 
some evidence of engagement with informal operators by the authorities: In Kano some 
borehole operators registered with the State Water Board. In Bauchi, some kiosks were set up 
through the STWSSP. lliyas (1997) finds that water vendors in the city of Katsina obtain water 
mainly from the subsidised public supply and charge about 20 times the water board's tariff. 
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2.8.6 Water supply framework for Nasarawa State 
The Nasarawa State Water Board Edict, 1997, establishing the Nasarawa State Water Board 
makes provision for operation of water supply by public officers answerable to the 
Government. The law does not mention PSP arrangements for water supply. However, in 
1999, the newly elected civilian State Governor outlined a policy of engagement with the 
private sector as a means of reducing pressure on State Government resources (Newswatch, 
May 1999). The establishment of the Karu-Mararaba concession may be regarded as the 
implementation of that policy. 
2.9 Summary of the analytical framework 
This section brings together the key ideas from the review of literature that provide the 
analytical framework for private indigenous medium-scale water supply in low-income urban 
areas. Figure 2.3 gives a diagrammatic representation of the framework. 
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Figure 2.3 Summary analytical framework 
Figure 2.3 is a simplified representation of the interaction between an organisation and its 
environment. lt shows internal and external factors relevant to understanding the performance 
of medium-scale water supply organisations. ltshows that the external environment can have 
an influence on internal processes and vice versa. lt is also possible for internal processes to 
affect each other. Sections 2.9.1 to 2.9.5 outline the key ideas emerging from the literature. 
2.9.1 Opportunities for indigenous medium-scale private water supply 
The introductory chapter and Sections 2.1 and 2.2 provide the context for indigenous PSP in 
urban water supply in low-income urban areas. Rapid urban population growth (including the 
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growth of small towns' populations) is already creating opportunities for small-scale local 
entrepreneurs. Poor performance by public sector providers and a reduced enthusiasm by 
international private operators for involvement in developing country infrastructure would 
appear to offer scope for indigenous operators to provide services at an intermediate scale. 
2.9.2 Business planning 
Section 2.3 focuses on planning processes within medium-scale water businesses in low-
income urban areas. As with any business, planning will focus on a number of key questions: 
How much of the product wil l the customer buy, and at what price? What service options 
should be offered? The answers to these questions will be complicated by external factors, 
including customer preferences and the nature of physical environment (for example, whether 
there are alternative sources such as rainwater or wells). The key propositions arising from 
the literature are that: (i) customers will use more of the product if the service is convenient, 
and (ii) many will be prepared to pay more for this convenience. Related to this is the 
proposition from the review of demand responsive approaches in Section 2.2.3 that enhanced 
system sustainability results from service levels that are in line with customer preferences. 
2.9.3 Business structure and internal organisation 
Section 2.4 provides a framework for understanding effective approaches to organisation. 
Contingency theory suggests that management structures that give the organisation the 
capability to adapt to dynamic environments are likely to be appropriate. This is linked to the 
organisation's ability to form mutually beneficial relationships with external business partners. 
2.9.4 Management 
Section 2.5 considers factors that lead to effective management using the WASH institutional 
guidelines as a starting point. The management literature does however suggest that national 
culture can have a significant effect on appropriate management and leadership styles. 
2.9.5 External factors 
Section 2.6 considers the effects of political and economic factors in the wider environment 
that can effect can affect economic growth (and by implication the prospects for development 
of indigenous businesses). The impression gained from the literature is that these factors vary 
widely across countries. 
Section 2.7 examines regulation of the private sector. The literature confirms that this is a 
difficult issue even for major private sector initiatives at the national level supported by 
international financing agencies and specialist consultants. New thinking that takes into 
account the existence of service providers other than the main public utility, naturally 
occurring competition in low-income urban areas and the possibilities for cooperation with 
local service providers seem relevant to medium-scale water supply. 
2.9.6 The Nigerian Water Supply Sector 
The review of the Nigerian water supply sector mirrors the more general review undertaken in 
preceding sections. Rapid urban population growth, a poorly performing public water supply 
system, evolving policy development to enable engagement with the private sector and the 
prevalence of informal suppliers are found to be as relevant in Nigeria as elsewhere. 
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Chapter 3 
Research methodology 
This chapter concerns the methods used in carrying out this research . Section 3.1 describes 
and justifies the research strategy. Section 3.2 presents the research context (description, 
location and participants). Section 3.3 describes the instruments and procedures employed in 
the research. Section 3.4 explains the ways in which the data were analysed. Section 3.5 
assesses the reliability of the data. 
3.1 The research strategy 
This study employed a case study research strategy. In order to achieve the aims and 
objectives set out in Section 1.2, the researcher decided to conduct an in-depth study of the 
formation and ongoing operations of an indigenous water utility operating at the medium-scale 
under a concession arrangement in the Greater Karu area of Nasarawa State in Nigeria. A 
research strategy was required that would enable an understanding of the interactions 
between the various entities within the concession arrangement and provide a basis for 
contributing to existing knowledge of the activities of indigenous water supply operators at this 
scale. 
Yin (2003: pp13- 14) defines a case study as: 
'An empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real life 
context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not 
clearly evident' 
and, further states that: 
'the case study inquiry copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there will 
be many more variables of interest than data points, and as one result relies on multiple 
sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a triangulating fashion .. .. ' 
The definition by Robson (1993) emphasises use of the case study where the requirement is 
for the detailed, intensive knowledge about a single case or a small number of related cases. 
Apart from their use as a means of studying particular phenomena, case studies can be 
employed to develop general theoretical statements about social structure and processes 
(Seeker, 1970). 
Case studies can lead to 'analytic' generalisation as opposed to 'statistical' generalisation. 
Analytic generalisation is achieved through a process of replication whereby two or more 
cases support the same theory (Yin, 2003: pp 31-32). 
Yin (2003: pp 39-42) states that single case designs are justified when the case represents 
any one of the following : 
1. the critical case that meets all the conditions required to confirm, challenge or extend a 
theory 
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2. a representative or typical case, conclusions from which are assumed to be informative 
about the average situation or institution 
3. the longitudinal case where the concern is how certain conditions change over time 
4. an extreme or unique case that is worth documenting on account of its rarity 
5. the revelatory case that provides an opportunity to observe a phenomenon previously 
inaccessible to investigation 
The single case design used in this research was justified on the grounds that it represented a 
sufficiently rare instance of formal participation in urban water supply at the medium scale to 
be of interest to a researcher. The case study also had a revelatory character and 
represented an opportunity to generate hypotheses that could be tested in later studies or 
against other data (Yin, 2003: p 42). 
Case study research, which frequently relies on non-quantitative data, has often been faulted 
on the grounds of lack of representativeness and the extent to which conclusions reached can 
be generalised. The problem of bias introduced by subjectivity of the researcher and 
informants on whom the researcher relies has been linked to lack of rigour in the collection, 
and analysis of data (Hamel et al., 1993: p 23). However, properly conducted, the case study 
is now widely regarded as a legitimate and effective research strategy (Burton, 2000: pp 224 -
225). 
3.2 The research context 
3.2.1 The research location 
Figure 3.1 shows the study area (Karu - Mararaba), located just outside Nigeria's Federal 
Capital Territory (FCT), in Nasarawa State along the main road heading eastwards out of 
Abuja (Nigeria's new capital city) into Nasarawa State. The study area comprises the 
townships of Mararaba, Ado, and New Karu. These are unplanned and generally comprise 
low - grade informal housing with inadequate infrastructure. Official population figures are not 
available for the area. However, one estimate (Pell Frischmann, 2000) puts it at approximately 
200,000. The establishment of the FCT in the 80s and the rapid growth of Abuja provided 
employment for individuals and families from many parts of Nigeria. Housing available within 
FCT was generally unsuited to the low-income families that provided the labour for its 
development and the work force for the rapidly expanding capital city. Consequently, many of 
these families now live in townships similar to Karu-Mararaba. 
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Figure 3.1 Karu-Mararaba concession area 
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Inset taken from Pe/1 Frischmann (2000) 
3.2.2 Case study description 
Table 3.1 shows the various organisations and entities involved in the establishment and 
operation of the concession, and describes their respective roles within the concession. These 
organisations and entities defined the case study and provided the focus for data collection. 
Table 3.1 Participants in the concession 
Or anisation I entit 
Riveroaks Drake & Sweeney Ltd. 
(RDS) 
Riveroaks Utilities Limited, (RUL) 
Franchisees appointed by RUL 
Residents 
Water vendors 
Design and supervision 
consultants 
Characterisation 
Granting authority 
Concession holder 
Concession operator 
owned b RDS 
Regulator 
Agent/Customer of 
RUL 
Retail customer 
Bulk water customer 
and distributor 
Consultants 
Role within the concession area 
Equity partner 
- Capital financing 
- Construction of water supply facilities 
-Technical assistance to RUL 
Operation, maintenance and water 
sales 
Regulation and Asset Holding 
Retail sales to residents I bulk sales to 
water vendors 
Pa ment for water urchases 
Buying from franchisees and 
distributin to customers 
- Advice on technical design 
- Su ervision of construction 
Five data groups were selected for the case study, corresponding to the five objectives stated 
in Section 1.2. All of the eight participant groups mentioned in Table 3.1 above, contributed to 
the development of the case study by providing data for one or more of the five data groups. 
Table 3.2 below indicates the main data groups to which each participant group contributed 
and the chapter in the thesis where these data are presented. 
Table 3.2 Data groups and data sources 
Data groups 
Concession 
participants I 
Data sources 
1. Concession framework (Chapter 4) 
2. Infrastructure (Chapter 5) 
3. Service delivery (Chapter 5) 
4. Utility management (Chapter 6) 
5. Financial aspects (Chapter 7) 
3.2.3 Case study participants 
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Table 3.3 below lists the participants in the research, their roles within the case study and the 
dates and location of their contribution to the study. 
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Table 3.3 Research participants 
Organisation/ Participants Role in case study Date and location of 
entity participant actions 
Nasarawa State Director, Ministry of Interviewee NMWRRD office, Lafra-Government Water Resources 17/12/2002 
NSWB Legal secretary I adviser Interviewee NSWB office, Lafia - 17/12/2002 
RDS legal adviser Interviewee RDS office, Abuja - 19/12/2002 
Group General Manager Interviewee RDS office, Abuja- 19/1212002 
Interviewee, and 
General Manager Providing secondary RUL office, Karu- 16/12/2002 data on finance and 
RUL 
staffing 
Production and 
maintenance engineer Interviewee RUL office, Karu- 13/12/2002 
Secretary I Administrative Interviewee RUL office, Karu- 14/12/2002 
assistant 
Former General Manager Interviewee RUL office, Karu- 20/12/2002 
Franchisees 4 tap operators employed Interviewees 1 0/12/2002 - Karu concession by franchisees area 
Water vendors 4 water vendors interviewees 11/12/2002 - Karu concession 
area 
Residents 200 households Survey respondents 13-19 December 2002 
Provided secondary 
data on infrastructure 
Parkman Ltd. Parkman Staff members design and Prior to study 
documents relating to 
the concession 
3.3 Data collection instruments and procedures 
3.3.1 Data collection framework 
Primary data were acquired through interviews, a survey of water usage and an audit of water 
supply infrastructure. Secondary data comprised documentation provided by the concession 
parties, design consultants and RUL. Table 3.4 summarises the methods used for each data 
group. A schedule of data collected for the study is presented in Appendix 1. 
Table 3.4 Summary of data types and methods 
Data t es and methods 
Data group Primar 
1. Concession 
framework 
• Interviews with representatives of 
the concession parties 
2. Infrastructure • 
provision and • 
operation 
3. Utility management • 
• 
4. Service delivery • 
• 
• 
5. Finance 
Audit by researcher 
Interviews with RDS and RUL 
staff 
Interview with RDS and RUL 
staff 
Interviews with tap operators 
em lo ed b franchisees 
Interviews with RUL staff 
Second a 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Review of documentation 
Review of design information 
Review of RUL operating 
records 
Review of RUL operating 
records 
Analysis of audited accounts, 
revenue & ex enditure records 
3.3.2 Overview of research instruments and their development 
The research instruments used in this research were developed from recognised procedures 
that have been used in previous research . Where this was not possible, research instruments 
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and procedures were developed by the research. Table 3.5 summarises the research 
instruments and their sources. 
Table 3.5 Research instruments and their development 
These research instruments and procedures are discussed in Sections 3.3.3 to 3.3.8. 
3.3.3 Topic focused interviews (Concession framework) 
Data were collected through topic-focused interviews with one representative each from the 
Nasarawa State Government (the grantor). the Nasarawa State Water Board (the regulator), 
and the RDS the concession holder. All three interviewees had detailed knowledge of the 
arrangements, having been involved in establishing and operating the arrangements from 
their inception in 1999. The topic guide for the interviews was developed from checklists 
suggested by (World Bank, 1997, pp 2-18). In the absence of a detailed written concession 
agreement, this provided a good basis for the interviews and ensured that all important 
aspects of the concession were covered. The topic guide is presented in Table 3.6. 
Table 3.6 Concession framework interview guide 
ower to review 
ran tor 
5. Regulation of the concession 
Regulatory arrangements I exclusivity & competition I Tariff regulation I Renegotiation I Allocation of 
liabilities and res onsibilities I Risk mana ement I Performance measurement and re ortin 
7. Success factors and constraints 
Source; World Bank (1997) 
The same topic guide was used for all three interviews thereby ensuring that the perspectives 
of all three organisations could be obtained and compared. The interviewees also had an 
opportunity to give their own opinions regarding the successes and constraints faced over the 
period of the concession. The interviews lasted approximately one hour each, and were 
recorded. 
3.3.4 Topic focused interviews- (utility management) 
Data on the management processes and arrangements within RDS and RUL were obtained 
through topic-focused interviews with three individuals within RUL, the concession operating 
company one staff member of RDS the parent company and the first general manager of RUL 
who had worked for the company from its inception in early 2000 to late 2001 . The topic guide 
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was based on the nine parameters identified in Cullivan et at., (1988) and is presented as 
Table 3.7. 
Table 3. 7 RUL staff interview guide 
General 
Effective factors I constraints I organisation 
1. Organisati onal autonomy 
Goal setting and policy I Strategy development I Long-term planning I Budgeting/ tariff setting/ control of 
revenue/ staffing levels I Employment, dismissal , promotion of staff I staff salary and benefits I 
Determination of organisational structure 
2. Leadership 
Provide sense of mission - role model I operational knowledge 1 Competence and interest I Listening 
and instructing I Balance between future vision and day-to-day operations I Integrity I problem solving 
environment 
3. Management and administration 
Management skills and capabilities I Roles and responsibilities/ Mission of RU-RDS I clear 
responsibilities/ Delegation/ Goals and priorities I Departmental and organisational objectives/ 
Accountability/ Follow through on task assignments I Performance measurement I Teamwork I 
manaQement and admin systems 
4. Commercial orientation 
Balances revenue and expenditure/ Requires financial feasibility for projects I cost effectiveness I 
monitors eXQ_enditures cm_ainst budQet I consumer orientation I tariff structure I Financial records 
5. Customer orientation 
Customer service orientation I customer interaction/ Measures to educate customers about services I 
Efforts to invite customer_particjpation I Level of com_Qiaints 
6. Technical capability 
Sound technical decisions I Efficient project completion I Develops technical staff 
7. Developing and maintaining staff 
Training I Management development I Staff incentives I recruitment and dismissal procedures I Morale I 
Feedback on job performance 
8. Organisational culture 
Team spirit: I sense of ownership 
9. Interactions with external organisations 
Key external influences I Strategies formulated to influence policies of external bodies I Programs 
developed to influence p_ublic I Man(lgement ability_ to adajlt creative I'{ to obstacles 
Adapted from Cullivan et al. (1988) 
An evaluation team comprising at least two persons normally conducts an assessment. The 
procedures would normally involve interviews, observation, various interactive processes with 
staff and management and culminate in the rating of performance against given indicators. 
For this study, the emphasis was placed on obtaining information only through interviews. 
The interviews enabled the viewpoints of the parent company (RDS) and the operating 
company (RUL) to be obtained and compared . The interview with the former general manager 
provided information on management processes over the first 18 months of the concession 
arrangement and enabled some comparisons with the management regime in place at the 
time the field investigations were carried out. 
The same interview guide was used for all interviewees although for some, certain sections 
were omitted in line with their job descriptions. For example, one interviewee from the 
administration department was not asked about technical issues. The interviews were 
recorded and varied in length from one hour to one and three quarter hours. 
3.3.5 Semi structured interview - franchisees 
Data on the water selling operations by franchisees were obtained through short semi-
structured interviews with a tap operator at one randomly selected franchised selling point in 
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each of RUL's four business areas (There were fifteen selling points in operation). All 
interviews were conducted with the franchisee's tap operator. 
The interviews were conducted by the researcher without any RUL staff being present in 
order to prevent the tap operator becoming inhibited from speaking freely about the quality of 
service being provided by RUL. lt was made clear to the tap operator that the study was not 
being conducted for or controlled by RUL. The interviews lasted approximately 15 minutes 
each and were not recorded. The interview guide is presented in Table 3. 8. 
Table 3.8 Franchisee interview guide 
General information 
- How long have you been working here? - compensation (salary or commission) 
- Franchisee or employee? - What happens when you are ill? 
~---:-· F_a=-c'-"il-'-it .c:.e.;:...s ...., (IN_o:....:..of_t.;:...a""'p:s'-'-'...:.c..:..ov-'-'e-re.;:...d:.....;:...sh-'-'e;...;;d'-'-, ..c..m...:.e..:..:te'-r.L.-) ______ - ~O-"'-p1enin times I closin times 
Customers (residents, vendors) 
Quality of service (regularity, quality,) 
What affects your sales most? Positive and negative 
Competition (if any) from nearby commercial borehole owners 
Dry season operation (queues, availability of water) 
Wet season operation (access, location, pricing, competition) 
How can RUL improve its service to you ------------------------~ 
3.3.6 Semi structured interview- water vendors 
The objective of the interviews was to obtain insights into how water vendors fitted into the 
concession operations rather than to study water vending practices per se. The interviews 
were based on the procedure conducted by {Whittington et al., 1991) under broadly similar 
conditions in Eastern Nigeria. Four co-operative and willing water vendors were approached 
within the area and interviewed by the researcher. The interviews lasted approximately 20 
minutes each. The topics discussed with water vendors are presented in Table 3.9. 
Table 3.9 Water vendor interview guide 
1. General information 
age, occupation(s) leng_th of time as a water vendor 
2. Sources of water 
sources used, prices at various sources, preferences of customers, water vendor's view about RUL's 
water 
3. General sales and pricing information 
volumes. Q_rices charged, locations of sales 
4. Specific transactions 
observation of specific transactions 
3.3. 7 Broad spectrum water usage survey 
Primary data on water usage and water services were obtained through a water usage survey 
of 200 households within the concession area. The questionnaire follows the general form 
suggested by Howard (2002: pp 215 - 220) but with the following adaptations:-
• Preliminary investigations indicated that there was a significant seasonal variation in water 
sales by RUL. The questionnaire was therefore divided into two parts; dry season and wet 
season. 
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• lt was evident that rainwater and water vendors were significant sources of water for 
many residents. These were therefore classed as source choices. 
• Respondents were asked to rank their main sources of water (up to three) in order of 
volume used. 
In order to avoid bias, the enumerators were instructed not to make special mention of the 
RUL water supply service except at the end of the interview when respondents were asked to 
comment on RUL's seNices. The questionnaire is presented in Appendix 2. 
The sample size was chosen to enable the calculation of proportions with a maximum error of 
10% at the 95% confidence level. An assumed population of 15,000 and an average 
household size of approximately 10, gave 1,500 as the total number of households. 
The confidence interval is given approximately by the formula: 
4xP¥} 
Where, 
"n" is the sample size and "p" is the proportion being calculated, and 
p == 50% gives the maximum confidence interval of 14%, i.e. a maximum error of ±7% 
Since there was no adequate sampling frame for the selection of a simple random sample, a 
stratified random sample was drawn based on distance from RUL selling points (Nichols, 
2000) . Three distance ranges were chosen; 0-100m, 100-200m, and > 200m. Households 
located more than 1 km from the RUL network were not included. The number of households 
to be surveyed in each stratum was assessed by estimating the proportion of households 
located with in the respective distance ranges. This was achieved by conducting a rough count 
in all four business areas, Ado, Mararaba 1, Mararaba 2, and Mararaba 3. Since the scale of 
the operations was similar in all four of RUL's business areas, samples of equal size were 
drawn from each of these four areas. Table 3.10 shows the result of the exercise. 
Table 3.10 Number of households surveyed within each distance range 
Distan ce from RUL taps 
RUL Business area 0-100m 1 OOm -200m >200m 
Ado 5 30 15 
Mararaba 1 30 15 5 
Mararaba 2 5 30 15 
Mararaba 3 25 15 10 
Total 65 90 45 
Four enumerators were selected from a number of applicants. All four were graduates of local 
universities and lived in or close to the area. Two had previously been involved in surveys for 
federal government water supply programmes. They were trained over a period of two days. A 
valuable aspect of their training comprised the translation of the questionnaire into Hausa (the 
predominant local language in the area) by two of the enumerators in the absence of the other 
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two, its translation back into English by the other two, and a detailed discussion of the 
differences in the original and translated versions with all four. The training exercise included 
pre-testing the questionnaire in five households. As a result, some minor amendments were 
made including adopting the term "water hawker" rather than "water vendor'' because the 
latter is often used to refer to those selling from boreholes and water kiosks. 
Spot checks were carried out during each day of fieldwork and meetings held with 
enumerators at the end of each day to review the day's work, assess progress and plan for 
the foJJowing day's work. 
3.3.8 Struc tured observation -Infrastructure audit 
Primary data on the operation of infrastructure were obtained through an audit of RUL's water 
supply infrastructure. The audit comprised a structured comparison by the researcher of the 
original design assumptions and current performance of all the water production facilities, 
storage tanks, distribution network and sales points. 
3.3.9 Secondary data 
Infrastructure design and operation 
Data on infrastructure design were obtained through a review of the design consuJtant's main 
planning and design assumptions (population, per capita consumption , borehole production 
and distribution system capacity) . 
A report prepared two months prior to the field data col lection by a joint RDS/RUL technical 
operations committee provided information on the operation and maintenance of water supply 
installations. 
Financial and payroll data 
Financial data provided by RUL comprised the following: 
• audited accounts for the period from inception in March 2000 to end June 2001 (16 
months) 
• daily revenue records from March 2000 to end October 2002 
• monthly expenditure and sales summaries for the period March 2000 to end October 2002 
• debtors lists 
• payroll and personnel records 
3.4 Data analysis 
3.4. 1 Analysis of interview data 
Transcripts of the recorded interviews are near - verbatim accounts and reflect each 
substantive question and response but generally omit uncompleted sentences, hesitations, 
gestures and tone. Interview responses are numbered consecutively and references to 
specific responses are prefixed with the interview number as indicated in Table 3.11 . 
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Table 3.11 Schedule of interview transcripts 
Concession framework 
Interview No. 
{Response Nos.) 
CF1 (1- 93) 
CF2 (94 - 149) 
CF3 {150 - 246} 
Interviewee 
Director. Nasarawa State 
Ministry of Water Resources 
and Rural Development 
Secretary and Legal Adviser. 
NSWB 
Legal Adviser. RDS 
UM5 (830 - 91 0) 
ement 
Interviewee 
Administrative officer, RUL 
Former General Manager. 
RUL 
The absence of a written agreement made it necessary to establish what the concession 
parties had in mind in establishing and operating the concession agreement. Both parties had 
performed substantial and fundamental actions, suggesting that a contractual agreement 
could be assumed to exist between them (McKendrick. 2000). The analysis focused on the 
interpretation of statements made by concession parties. Where the interviewees reinforced a 
particular point, this was taken to represent the current state of affairs and therefore reflected 
what a written agreement might have been based on. Similarly, conflicting accounts on the 
same point were taken as representing areas where there were ongoing or potential problems 
The analysis of the interview data obtained from the staff of RDS, RUL and franchisees 
focused primarily on describing and explaining the utility management framework. The 
analysis was undertaken for each of the nine discussion areas with statements from 
interviewees being compared for evidence of reinforcement or conflict. A high degree of 
reinforcement was taken as establishing the state of affairs at the time. Conflicting views were 
not necessarily viewed as implying false statements but rather were viewed within the context 
of the speakers' positions within the organisation. 
3.4. 2 Analysis of water usage survey data 
Data from the water usage survey were processed using a relational database programme -
Microsoft Access 2000. Data were analysed under the following headings: 
Source use and usage: 
1. sources used by residents and its variation according to distance from the RUL tap 
2. reasons for using particular sources 
3. what water from various sources is used for 
Consumption 
4. per capita consumptions from various sources 
Cost of water: 
5. price of water from various sources 
RUL Services: 
6. awareness by residents of RUL as a company 
7. improvements sought in RUL service by residents 
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The analysis comprised computation of averages and frequencies and statistical inference 
using Chi square (x.\ Separate analyses were carried out for the wet and dry seasons. 
3.4.3 Analysis of financial and payroll data 
The audited financial statements for the first sixteen months of operation were combined with 
the underlying accounting information to produce analyses of costs and revenues. Monthly 
revenue and expenditure data were used to analyse cash flows for the period from inception 
in March 2000 to October 2002. Time series analysis was carried out to analyse for trends in 
monthly revenue and cost data over the period of operation . 
In the absence of audited accounts covering the period July 2001 - October 2002, RUL's 
expenditure summaries were used to analyse financial operations for this period. lt was 
necessary to verify these data in order to ensure that they were complete and consistent with 
the expenditures contained in the audited accounts . The verification was carried out with the 
RUL accountant. For each item, any variance between the amount recorded in RUL's systems 
and the amount showing in the audited accounts was investigated. Table 3.12 gives examples 
of large variances and provides explanations for the variances. 
Table 3.12 Verification of RUL cost data (March 2000- June 2001) 
Expenditure Amount Amount Explanation of variance 
Item recorded in shown in 
RUL books accounts 
(N) (N) 
Exam_Q_Ies of Items initially paid for directly bv RDS but not recorded by RUL 
Salaries & 4,967,356 6,005,443 At start of operations some staff salaries and the costs 
wages of a management consultant were paid directly by 
RDS 
Bank charges 952,048 1,851,876 For first 12 months of operations bank charges were 
paid directly by RDS 
Motor vehicle 197,170 257,110 Initial vehicle registration and insurance costs paid 
expenses directly by RDS 
Local transport 152,860 250,380 Accounts include amounts paid for directly by RDS at 
the start of operations 
Professional - 50,000 
fees Paid directly by RDS but not recorded by RUL staff 
Audit fee - 120,000 
ExamQies of Items treated as capital expenditure 
Office expenses 654,453 115,196 Purchase of office furniture and equipment were 
treated as capital expenditure. 
Distribution 337,91 218,253 Cost of meters and house connections treated as system capital expenditure. 
Examples of reclassified items 
expenditure classified as miscellaneous is either 
Miscellaneous 466,878 27,570 allocated to other expenditure heads or placed under a 
new cateQory- General Expenses 
Further clarifications regarding expenditure were provided by RUL accounting staff as follows: 
• The item shown as "borehole drilling" in the RUL expenditure records relate to a borehole 
drilling contract undertaken by RUL for an outside client. 
• The item "RUL" relates to consultancy fees paid by RUL to RDS for general advisory 
services performed by RDS staff. 
• The item "Transfers to head office" refer to cash transfers made to the RDS bank account 
for use by RDS, the parent company. 
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All differences between the figures appearing in the audited accounts and those recorded by 
RUL's accounting staff were the result of one of three reasons: 
• Capitalisation of some items of expenditure 
• Items paid for by RDS directly but charged to the RUL profit and loss account 
• Reclassification of cost items 
The audited accounts do not give a breakdown of the income. An independent check of the 
income figure was therefore made by taking into account cash receipts from water supply 
activities, debtors and other income. This calculation is shown in Table 3.13. The 
independently calculated income figure agrees closely with that stated in the audited 
accounts. 
Table 3.13 Calculation of income for March 2000- end June 2001 
Item Notes 
Summation of monthly cash Cash receipts from water supply activities recei ts 
1--D-e-bt-o-rs---------------+-::See folio 2 of audited accounts 
Earnings from other activities 
Nasarawa State Water Board- Consultancy 
Spring water development consultancy 
Spring development consultancy 
Total earnings 
See schedule of income from 
other activities provided by RUL 
Amount 
N '000 
10,11 0 
415 
1,048 
300 
150 
11,873 
An unusual definition of gross profit has been used in the audited accounts (turnover minus 
closing stock) as opposed to the more usual definition of "turnover minus cost of sales" 
(Mclaney, & Atrill, 2001 ). However, the value of unused stock is small in comparison to 
overall costs and revenues but has been correctly subtracted from the profit and loss 
statement. 
Employment records covering the period from the inception of operations in 2000 to 
December 2002 were analysed in order to obtain a picture of staff turnover. 
3.5 Data reliability 
3. 5. 1 Interview data 
A substantial proportion of the data came from interviews. They have the advantage of 
focusing on the topic of interest, and providing insights into perceived causal inferences. Yin 
(2003: pp 86-87) however, cites four areas of weakness in the technique. 
• Poorly constructed questions 
• response bias 
• inaccuracies due to poor recall, and 
• reflexivity (interviewees giving responses that they believe the interviewer wants to hear) 
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Interview design: As far as was possible, the interview guides were developed or adapted 
from methods that had been tested previously. 
Response bias and reflexivity 
Prior to this study, the researcher had been involved through his employer in providing 
management support to the concession operating company. Furthermore, the researcher's 
employer, in a joint venture with the concession operator had provided consultancy services 
to the Nasarawa State Government. While this was advantageous in terms of providing easy 
access to data, there was the risk that it could have resulted in bias. For example, staff of the 
concession operating company might have been inhibited in their responses for fear that 
these might be reported to the owners and senior managers. Personnel within government on 
the other hand could have framed their responses in such a way as to send "messages" to the 
concession company. 
The researcher endeavoured to remain aware of these potential sources of bias throughout 
the research and in the subsequent analysis of the results. The overaff impression gained was 
that aff respondents had been reasonably frank and accurate in their answers. Furthermore, 
the disclosure of information by all parties was comprehensive. 
Inaccuracies due to poor recollection 
The events that formed part of this research were contemporary. There was therefore a low 
risk of biased results due to poor recaff on the part of interviewees. Furthermore, the research 
design allowed for two forms of triangulation: first , each interview was administered to a 
minimum of three participants in a similar format, allowing answers to be compared. Secondly, 
other evidence (for example, the survey and financial data) provided indirect confirmation on 
some matters referred to by interviewees. 
3.5.2 Water usage survey 
The broad-spectrum survey approach used in this study was consistent with the objective of 
achieving a rapid overall assessment of water usage in the study area rather than gaining 
detailed information on any particular issue (Howard, 2002: p 91 ). The procedures employed 
in developing the survey questionnaire and in conducting the survey are described in full in 
Section 3.3.4. 
The data from a survey of this type would be expected to be limited in their precision: 
First, the quantities of water that households reported that they collected daily are considered 
to have limited accuracy since they were based mainly on households reporting the number of 
containers they used daily from particular sources and estimates of the sizes of the 
containers. Further inconsistencies could have arisen from the fact that some households 
might have reported amounts collected from a source each time they visited the source, even 
where this was not daily. 
A second area of potential bias relates to the water prices reported by households. lt is likely 
that households might not have reported prices on a consistent basis. For example, some 
residents might have stated the highest price they had paid, while others might have stated 
current prices. 
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Thirdly, because the survey was conducted during the dry season, data pertaining to the dry 
season are believed to be comparatively more reliable than wet season data. 
For the reasons cited above, data from a water usage survey of this type can be only 
regarded as providing a broad indication of water usage. 
3.5.3 Infrastructure audit 
The infrastructure audit provided data through a process of structured observation by the 
researcher. The method is generally regarded as reliable but can be affected by subject error. 
time error and observer effects (Saunders et al., 1997: pp 199- 204 ). 
Observer effects (the process whereby the observer's observation of behaviour changes the 
nature of the behaviour) were negligible s1nce the subjects of the observation were inanimate. 
Subject error refers to the observation of subjects that may not be typical of the population 
under study. This source of bias was eliminated by observing all of the installations 1n the 
study area. 
Bias resulting from time error {errors resulting from observing the subject at times that provide 
untypical results} was possible since the audit represents a snapshot taken of infrastructure 
performance over a short period. This source of bias was reduced by taking into account 
operations reports covering a longer period of time (See Appendix 3). 
3.5.4 Secondary data 
The most frequent concerns regarding secondary data are that (i) they are often generated for 
a purpose that does not match the need of a particular researcher and, (ii) particularly In the 
case of organisations' records, may deliberately be recorded inaccurately (Saunders et al., 
1997: p 169 - 180). The secondary data used 1n th1s research were all specific to the Karu 
concess1on operations. The problem of bias from deliberate distortion of the data may 
however have existed. The procedures used to venfy financial data (described earlier m lh1s 
chapter), taken together with the internal audit procedures of the orgamsation, ensured that 
bias resulting from this was reduced. 
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Chapter 4 
Concession framework - (findings) 
This chapter presents the study findings concerning the status of the concession framework 
for the Karu - Mararaba area. The data presented comprise evidence from interviews with 
representatives of the parties to the concession (the Nasarawa State Ministry of Water 
Resources and Rural Development, representing the Nasarawa State Government, RDS, the 
concession holder and NSWB, the regulatory body). Relevant data from interviews with staff 
of RDS and RUL on utility management is also presented. Transcripts of these interviews are 
available from the Water, Engineering and Development Centre (WEDC), Loughborough 
University. Section 4.1 presents the background to the concession. Section 4.2 describes the 
roles of the three organisations. Section 4.3 defines the object and scope of the concession. 
Section 4 .4 describes the regulatory framework. Section 4 .5 examines the perceptions of risk 
by the three parties. The chapter concludes by reporting the views of the parties on the 
successes and constraints of the concession framework in Section 4.6. 
4.1 Background to the concession 
4.1. 1 Reasons for the Karu - Mararaba concession 
On assuming office in mid-1999, the Nasarawa State Government regarded the Karu -
Mararaba concession as a means of providing a water supply to sections of its population 
without a formal water supply. lt sought to do so in a way that would limit the impact on its 
financial resources (CF1 : 2 & 7). 
The preferred role for the private sector was one in which it would make infrastructure 
investments in areas where there was no water supply infrastructure rather than taking over 
and managing existing systems (CF1 : 2, 31 and 68). The following extract from the interview 
with the Director of Water Resources illustrates the importance attached by the government to 
this strategy. 
CF1 -2: The most significant aspect of the whole arrangement is that the private sector is 
coming in to do everything with its own money ... not we investing and handing over to him. 
4. 1.2 Establishment of the concession 
The State Government established the concession following a study by its Economic 
Development Consultant and the recommendation of a particular private company to operate 
the concession. There was therefore no competition for the opportunity, as remarked upon by 
the representative of the Ministry of Water Resources in the following frank but tactful reply: 
CF1- 8: Competition was not allowed here, which would have been important . ... I 'm not 
saying it was bad but it was a negotiated kind of thing. The consultant identified a good 
company and proposed it to government and it was accepted 
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The key events leading to the start of the operations are presented in Table 4.1 . These events 
are described in responses CF1 : 2 - 5 and 8. Dates were obtained from correspondence and 
reports made available to the design consultant. 
Table 4.1 Key events leading to the concession operations 
Event Date 
Proj)_osal to Nasarawa State Government QY RDS_ ---J-J'"""u'""1...._19""'9'-9----- ------ --i 
Acceptance of proposal by Nasarawa State Letter from Secretary to State Government 
Government dated 271h Jul 1999 
Appointment of Infrastructure design and supervision August 1999 
consultants 
Design and construction and commissioning of 
facilities, including acquisition of land 
Issue of abstraction licence 
Start of water supply operations 
August 1999 - end February 2000 
March 2000 
March 2000 
Source: Parkman Ltd. Correspondence file 
Table 4.1 indicates that the establishment of the concession including the design, construction 
and commissioning of the water supply infrastructure was achieved over a period of 8 months. 
4.2 The parties 
4.2.1 The grantor 
The concession was granted by the Nasarawa State Government in July 1999. There was 
some confusion as to who precisely was the grantor. Government's functions as grantor were 
passed to the Nasarawa State Water Board. The Ministry of Water Resources and Rural 
Development was created after the granting of the concession and subsequently took over the 
responsibility for supervising the activities of NSWB. However, the law had not yet been 
amended to reflect I his ( CF 1: 9 -15 ). 
The letter to RDS approving the concession came from the Secretary to the State 
Government. The letter referred to discussions with the Office of the Governor and conveyed 
the approval of the Governor (copy of letter in Parkman Ltd. correspondence file). 
The grantor's primary role in the concession was to facilitate the acquisition of land on which 
the facilities were to be sited. The grantor would take over the facilities at the end of the 
concession period (CF1: 65; CF2: 112 and 113) . 
4.2.2 The concessionaire 
A joint limited liability concession company Riveroaks Utilities Limited (RUl) was set up with 
RDS owning majority (85%) shares and the Nasarawa State Government (15%). The 
government was represented on the Board of Directors the concession operating company by 
the General Manager of the NSWB (CF3: 168 -171 ). RDS (the private majority shareholder in 
the concession operating company) financed and constructed the water supply infrastructure. 
RDS, the concession holder saw the involvement of government in the concession operating 
company as a means of securing government assistance in gaining access to land, offering it 
some measure of protection from adverse government action and securing government's 
financial participation in investment (CF3: 172). 
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4.2.3 The regulator 
The Nasarawa State Water Board in addition to its functions as grantor on behalf of the 
government was also designated as regulator of the concession arrangement (CF2: 114). The 
regulator however saw its membership of the board of the joint company as a means through 
which government could influence the policies of the concessionaire and provide a 
mechanism for reporting by the concession operating company (CF2: 124 ). 
4.3 Object and scope of the concession 
4.3.1 The concession agreement 
Correspondence and documentation copied to the design consultant (Parkman, Ltd.) show 
that approval for the concession was in the form of a letter from the Nasarawa State 
Government dated 271h July 1999. They also show that an abstraction licence was issued by 
the Nasarawa State Water Board, which permitted RUL to abstract a total of 152,000 m3 per 
year at a rate not exceeding 415 m3 per day. The licence was valid for three years and would 
need to be renewed upon expiry (CF2: 103 and CF3: 192). 
There was no formally drawn up concession contract between RDS and the Government. 
Conflicting reasons were given for this . Both the Ministry and the NSWB agreed that there had 
been some element of 'taking things for granted'. The Ministry also made the suggestion as 
shown in the following quote that the private operator might have felt that the lack of a 
contract would be to its commercial advantage. 
CF1- 37: ... maybe they too felt that it would seNe as soft ground for them so they didn't 
pursue it. 
NSWB blamed the private operator for delaying documents relevant to the establishment of a 
contract. 
CF2- 142: ... We have finished our own part and we are just waiting for them to avail us 
some documents. 
The private operator on the other hand blamed the delay on the Ministry and the Water Board, 
as shown below: 
CF3-194: . .. lfwe were to draft the agreement we would have done it long ago . .. We've met 
them on several occasions to see if the agreement was ready, but to date no. I think it has 
to do with the workings of the public sector. 
4.3.2 The area and limits of the concession 
Definition of area 
The concession is defined as Karu - Mararaba and environs. lt comprises a number of towns 
(Karu, Mararaba, Ado and Masaka) that have sprung up on the outskirts of Abuja - Nigeria's 
Federal Capital. The population of the area was uncertain. An estimate from a recent master 
planning study for the area (Pell Frischmann, 2000) put it at approximately 200,000. 
Exclusivity 
All parties agreed that the intention was to grant RDS the exclusive right to operate in the 
concession area. However, because the concession operating company was only serving a 
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fraction of the area, they all also agreed that it was unreasonable to stop existing borehole 
operators from operating in the area (CF1 : 25; CF2: 101; CF3: 185). The following statement 
made by the representative of the private operator shows that the concession holder accepted 
this situation. 
CF3 (185) : "Certainly it would be difficult for us considering the financial implication to be 
able to cover the whole area. So we cannot exclude other participants ... " 
Potential impact of government water supply programmes 
The Federal Government of Nigeria was implementing two major national programmes (Small 
Towns Water Supply and Sanitation Programme, and the Community-Based Urban 
Upgrading Programme) aimed at improving urban water supply and sanitation services. Both 
are eo-financed by the World Bank and could intervene in the Karu - Mararaba area. All 
parties welcomed these programmes but viewed their potential impact differently. 
The State Government was optimistic that RUL's activities would not be adversely affected by 
these programmes if they were to be implemented in the area because the operational model 
adopted in Karu -Mararaba was close to the Small Towns programme concept and was in line 
with the Federal Government's thinking (CF1 : 29 and 30). 
RDS however took a more cautious line, realising that under some circumstances its 
operations could be adversely affected, particularly if these programmes were to provide pipe 
borne water and house connections to the area on an extensive scale (CF3: 188}. RDS had 
however had discussions with the agencies concerned and hoped that they might seek to 
replicate what RDS had achieved (CF3: 189). 
4.3.3 Duration and termination 
The expected duration of the concession was not clear. The Ministry and the State Water 
Board respectively put forward 20 years and 99 years . RDS however envisaged an 
unspecified duration longer than the 3-year licence period (CF1 : 16; CF2: 103; and CF3: 192). 
The understanding of the parties was that at the end of the concession period all assets would 
be handed back although the details had not been determined. The concept of making 
allowances for undepreciated assets was also accepted by the parties (CF1 : 38 and 39; CF2: 
1 05 ). In a response on this matter, the representative of NSWB drew a distinction between the 
treatment of moveable and fixed assets at termination and also alluded to compensation in 
the event of early termination by one party (CF2: 1 05). 
4.4 Regulation 
4.4.1 Technical aspects 
Regulation of technical aspects such as water quality and matters covered under the 
abstraction licence were the functions of NSWB - the Regulator. According to the State Water 
law, NSWB was responsible not only for water service delivery but also for water resource 
management (CF1 : 56; CF3: 161 ). 
4.4.2 Competition 
RUL had accepted that it would have to compete with informal borehole operators in view of 
its inability to service the requirements of the concession area. RUL had agreed with the 
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authorities that these operators within the concession area would be regulated by RUL 
through sub-concessions granted by RUL. These operators were considered illegal. The sub-
concessions would provide a mechanism for formalising their operations. Through these 
arrangements, RDS was effectively being given the authority to regulate its competitors. 
Government and the regulator had promised to protect the concession operator from the 
activities of competitors. On two occasions, NSWB had even asked other water sellers not to 
lower their prices too far below those of RUL (CF, 25 - 28}. Independent operators were 
however not being notified by the authorities that they should register with RUL {CF3: 186-
187). 
The RDS legal adviser emphasised health and safety issues in making the case for regulation 
of competing borehole operators by the concessionaire (CF 1: 57; CF2: 101 and CF3: 182 and 
183). Other RDS and RUL personnel however, highlighted strong competitive pressure as a 
major factor affecting their operations. As the responses from three RDS/RUL staff show, RUL 
had been forced to lower its prices in order to stay in the market. 
UM2-465: ... presently a lot of people are coming into the business so there is competition. 
So what we have just done to be able to stay in the market, we tried to lower our price to be 
able to attract our customers that have gone away to other areas because of high prices. 
UM3- 665: .. .. we realised that our competitors are trying to beat us hands down, in a 
manner that would make them to carry the bulk of the consumers ..... . You do not have to 
wait and say "why are we selling at 12 or 13 kobo per here"? Where we can bring it down 
and have the whole of Karu, that will be good for us. 
UM4 - 769: .... . people saw that we were selling water in an organised way and makeshift 
water sellers sprang up and this has an adverse effect on the income of the company ... 
4.4.3 Tariff regulation 
The government saw the regulation of the tariff as a political issue. rt was determining 
NSWB's tariff and believed that since the concessionaire was carrying out a function that 
ordinarily would have been NSWB's responsibility, it should also have political control over the 
private operator's tariffs (CF1 : 56 and 60; CF2: 116). 
However, the concession operator seemed able to raise and lower its tariffs without prior 
permission. The government and the regulator knew that this is going on (CF1 : 88 and CF2: 
115) but appeared to have "turned a blind eye" as the following illustrates: 
CF2 - 115: . . .. we know that they have had cause to review their tariffs but not to our 
knowledge. Ordinarily, as I said, being stakeholders we ought to have been informed 
through meetings. Our GM is supposed to be a director. 
Although the RDS legal adviser gave vague and guarded responses on this issue, suggesting 
that RDS had never exceeded the limit set by government and would seek permission for 
increases (RDS, 209 - 211 ), the following response by the Group General Manager confirmed 
that in practice RDS had considerable freedom to change !ts tariffs. 
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Question: But are you free to change the tariff up or down as you see fit? 
UM4 -779: Yes, we do that. I told you there has not been any government interference. 
What we do as a matter of courtesy, when we effect these changes we just write to 
government and they have not objected to any of the things we have done. 
This response also suggests that the State Government might have given approval for tariff 
changes, without reference to NSWB, the regulatory agency. 
4.4.4 Performance measurement and reporting 
There were no set performance targets because a written agreement had not been prepared. 
The concessionaire's obligations were therefore only vaguely defined . The general of 
responses on this issue (CF1 : 42 - 44; CF2: 106-1 07) reflect this. 
There were two alternative mechanisms for reporting performance. The first was through an 
arms length procedure whereby the concession operator would make periodic reports to the 
regulator and would also be subject to inspection and audit by the regulator (CF2: 127 -128). 
The second involved the concessionaire providing information through Board meetings of the 
joint operating company of which the NSWB was a member (CF1 : 5). 
The representative of the Ministry believed however that NSWB's membership of the Board of 
Directors of the concession operating company would compromise its independence as 
regulator (CF1 : 74-76 and 84). 
There was little or no reporting through either mechanism. Routine reports had not been 
received by the regulator, nor had board meetings been held. The representatives of the 
Ministry and NSWB stated that on the only occasion that RDS had submitted a report, this 
had been motivated by its wish to seek an increase in government's equity participation 
rather than by the requirement to submit routine reports (CF1 : 78; CF2: 126). 
A further complaint by the Ministry and NSWB was that RDS/RUL had sent correspondence 
and reports on a number of issues direct to the Office of the Governor rather than channelled 
them through the Regulator or the Board of the joint concession operating company (CF1: 54 
and CF2: 148). 
4.4.5 Dispute resolution 
Since the regulator was expected to perform the role of grantor on behalf of the government, 
his ability to adjudicate on disputes would have been limited particularly in cases of serious 
disagreement (CF2: 114). However, all parties were famil iar with and had confidence in the 
dispute resolution provisions of Nasarawa State Law and gave consistent descriptions of the 
procedure (CF1 : 85; CF2: 114; CF3: 234). 
4.5 Risks 
4.5.1 Technical risk 
The concession was for an area that had no previous conventional water supply 
infrastructure. The concession holder had financed and constructed the infrastructure, had full 
responsibility for operation and maintenance and assumed all technical risks . The following 
response by the representative of the Ministry of Water Resources to a question regarding 
who would bear the risk of poor construction makes this point particularly clear: 
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CF1:-66: In this case it may not be a big issue because they will construct, manage it and 
own it. So, if it is bad it is yours for that period, so you will suffer because for that 20 years 
you are constructing it and owning it and using it to render service. 
4.5.2 Financial risk 
The concession holder, RDS, considered the risk of non-payment by customers to be low 
(CF3: 235 and 236). The findings presented in Section 7.2.3 confirm that RUL had been able 
to collect a high proportion of the revenue from sales of water. RDS however considered that 
the seasonal variation in sales and the recovery of its capital investment in the long term 
represented greater risks (CF3: 192). 
4.5.3 Political risk 
The perception of political risk differed significantly between the government and the private 
sector partner. On the particular issue of whether the concession would be adversely affected 
by an incoming government from a different political party there were contrasting views. The 
representative of the government believed the risk to be low in view of the clear need for 
adequate water supply (CF1: 18). RDS on the other hand saw this as one of its biggest risks 
especially since a written contract had not been established (CF3: 233 - 234 ). 
4.5.4 Regulatory risk 
Both the government and the concessionaire emphasised technical aspects when referring to 
the regulator's knowledge and skill. The government however admitted that there was a lack 
of business management skills within NSWB required for effective regulation (CF1: 71 ; CF3: 
184-185). The government also recognised that funds had not been allocated for regu latory 
activities and that effective regulation depended more on co-operation of the concession 
operator rather than on actions initiated by the regulator. 
The following exchange between the researcher and the regulator indicates that the 
regulator's perception of the financial status of the concession operations was based on 
casual observation rather than an objective analysis of financial reports. 
You say they are making profit or breaking even, what of the loan component? 
CF2 (136): ... we assume that with the kind of business they are doing now, they should be 
able to repay their loan. 
Did they submit financial projections to you at the start? 
CF2 (137) : No 
So how can you determine that? 
CF2 (138): We don't have access to their documents but from what I see I know they are 
doing brisk business. When you pass there, you see jerry cans and a sea of heads. 
You were just saying that you felt that financially it has been a success. 
CF2 (139): Yes that is my candid opinion. 
Consequently, the regulator was under the impression that the concession was a profitable 
venture whereas the data presented in Chapter 7 show that it was suffering financial losses. 
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4.6 Successes and constraints 
4.6.1 Successes 
All three parties believed the concession arrangement had been a success from the service 
delivery and operational point of view. Responses by the government and NSWB focused on 
the positive impact of the concession on the community and the administrative efficiency of 
the operations (CF1 : 88; CF2: 140). RDS pointed to the franchising of its retail operations as a 
particular success (CF3: 244 and 246). The government however regarded the fact that the 
Karu-Mararaba concession had resulted in a new water supply to the community without it 
having to invest any of its own funds as the main success {CF1 : 88). 
4.6.2 Constraints 
The government believed that it could not apply the Karu-Mararaba concession model to 
many other parts of Nasarawa State for reasons linked to affordability. The success of the 
model in Karu-Mararaba was believed to be due to relatively high affordability resulting from 
the fact that many residents had jobs within the Federal Capital Territory (CF1 : 89 and 90). 
Both the Ministry and NSWB cited ongoing problems of communication with the private 
partner as a second constraint. The private operator, RUL had made a number of important 
decisions such as restructuring without informing the regulator through the Board of Directors 
of the joint company (CF1 : 93; CF2: 109, 149). 
The regulator stated that from a contractual point of view the concession had been a failure. In 
the following, he referred to it as a "blind concession". 
CF2-141 : Contractually I think both parties have failed .... We cannot just be operating 
blindly. That is why I called it a blind concession. .. There is nothing legally on the ground to 
say that this is a document that spells out the rules and regulations guiding the concession. 
RDS however viewed constraints from the risk point of view. They feared that if a new 
government came to power, this could affect their interests adversely particularly since there 
was no written agreement CF3: 245). 
The financial burden associated with assuming all of the investment responsibil ity was seen 
by RDS as a major constraint. They had been trying without success to persuade the 
government to share the investment burden. The following comments by the Group General 
Manager focused on the lack of suitable finance for long-term investment, and indicated that 
RDS would be more interested in leasing arrangements in the future . 
UM4- 820: ... the only other alternative is for government to take over the company . ... They 
can take over and pay us and RUL can now operate it for them ..... 
UM4- 823 ... the financial institutions are interested in short-term lending and interest rates 
are not favourable to long-term developments. So, we are in a Catch-22 situation. . . ..... If 
you look at the balance sheet of the company and you look at what we are paying to the 
banks in interest, ... if we were in trading we would have been bankrupt and gone 
RDS also cited the unregulated activities of independent operators as a further constraint 
(CF3: 242). 
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Chapter 5 
Infrastructure and services- (findings) 
Section 5.1 of this chapter presents the findings relating to the design, construction and 
operation of infrastructure in the concession area. Sections 5.2 to 5.5 present the findings of a 
household survey of water usage. Section 5.2 examines the sources that households used 
and how the water was used. Section 5.3 provides estimates of per capita amounts of water 
collected from various water sources. Section 5.4 deals with the water prices in the area. 
Section 5.5 gauges residents' awareness of and attitudes towards the services of RUL. 
Section 5.6 presents the findings from interviews with water vendors operating in the area. 
5.1 Infrastructure 
5. 1. 1 Description 
The new water supply infrastructure in the Karu - Mararaba concession comprised four 
separate water supply systems {Ado, Mararaba 1, 2 and 3) supplied from groundwater. Each 
system consisted of 2 or 3 boreholes connected to an overhead storage tank that supplied 4 
or 5 selling points (water kiosks). The distribution system comprised a total of 5.8 km of 50 
mm and 63 mm diameter upvc pipelines. There were 28 customers supplied through private 
connections. The main elements of the water supply infrastructure installed in the Karu-
Mararaba concession area are summarised in Table 5 .1 below. 
Table 5.1 Main infrastructure elements 
Ado Mararaba 1 Mararaba 2 Mararaba 3 
Number 3 3 2 2 
Average depth (m) 60 40 40 40 
Boreholes Grundfos submersible SP5A-12 SP8A-10 SP8A-10 SPBA-10 pumps 
Yield 1.2 2.0 2.0 2.5 (Litres per second) 
Generators 
Lister 12Kva Number 1 1 1 1 
Steel storage Capacity (cubic metres) 50m3 50m3 50m3 100m3 
tanks Height (metres) 10 m 10 m 10 m 10 m 
uP VC Length 800m 2500 m 2,000 m 500m 
Pipelines Diameter (millimetres) 50 mm 50 mm 50 mm 63 mm 
Selling Number 4 5 4 4 points 
5.1.2 Design assumptions 
The water supply infrastructure in the Karu - Mararaba concession area was designed to meet 
an average demand of 20 litres per capita per day (1/c/d) for an estimated population of 17,500 
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persons (350m3/day).The combined yield of the 10 boreholes was 7.8 litres per second (1/s). 
With 12 hours pumping per day, the system was capable of delivering 340 m3/day. The 
combined elevated storage in the concession area was 250m3 , representing several hours' 
storage. The system was designed to deliver water to 17 sell ing points through 50 mm 
diameter pipelines at Ado, Mararaba 1 and 2, and through 63 mm diameter pipelines at 
Mararaba 3. 
5.1.3 Implementation 
On the award of the concession in July 1999, RUL appointed a UK consulting firm (Parkman 
Ltd .) to advise on design and construction of the infrastructure. The firm subsequently carried 
out a pre-feasib ility study outl ining the technical options. RUL decided to proceed based on 
this and appointed the consulting firm to prepare designs and subsequently supervise the 
construction of the works. 
RUL obtained quotes from two prominent Nigerian civil engineering and drilling contractors 
based on bills of quantities and negotiated with one gu ided by the cost estimates provided by 
the engineering adviser. The records indicate that RUL purchased generators, pipeline 
material and supplied these to the contractor for installation . 
The construction of the works was supervised by consulting firm Parkman over a period of 3 
months. The contractor's responsibility extended over a 1-year post-construction defects 
liability period. 
5. 1.4 Infrastructure audit 
The results of the infrastructure audit conducted by the researcher in December 2002 are 
summarised in Table 5.2 . Relevant comments drawn from interviews with RUL staff and a 
report of the technical committee responsible for RUL's operations (see Appendix 3) are 
included in the remarks column. 
Table 5.2 Results of infrastructure audit (December 2002) 
No No. No. in Remarks In service operation 
Generators 4 4 4 All four generators were operational and had been modified to suit the local conditions 
Boreholes 10 10 8 2 borehole pumps were awaiting replacement. 
Storage tanks 4 4 4 Operating normally 
The diameter of the pipelines was inadequate 
uPVC all all had resulted in the restriction of flow to one Pipelines selling point. Two other selling points did not 
receive water during periods of high demand. 
Two roadside selling points had been 
demolished as a result of the upgrading of the 
Selling points Abuja - Keffi highway. A further 2 selling points 17 15 11 at Ado were not in operation at the time of the 
audit due to lack of water supply from RUL 
resulting from a lack of fuel for running !he 
standby generator. 
Production facilities (boreholes, pumps and standby generators) and storage tanks were 
found to be in service, and functioning according to design assumptions. Problems with 
production capacity were to do with lack of operational funding and delays to repairs. 
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There was however a considerable variance between design assumptions and actual 
operation of the distribution system. The pipeline diameter was found to be inadequate to 
deliver water to the selling points located furthest away from the storage tank at Mararaba 2. 
Secondly, two selling points were not in operation because of the upgrading of the Abuja to 
Keffi highway. 
The findings of this audit, conducted by the researcher, broadly confirmed the content of a 
report prepared by RUL's and RDS's technical operations committee (see Appendix 3) dated 
two months prior to the audit. The audit also reflected some of the opinions expressed by 
households through the water usage survey (see Section 5.5). In addition, the report of the 
technical operations committee indicated the following: 
1. RUL's engineering staff had undertaken a systematic analysis of the various operational 
problems being experienced within the water supply system 
2. the structure and level of detail of the report suggests a systematic approach to 
operational planning by RUL staff 
3. RUL's staff were aware of the measures required to remedy various problems but did not 
have sufficient funds to implement these measures 
5.2 Source use and usage 
5.2.1 Water sources used 
Figure 5.1 below, shows the extent of multiple source use within the Karu-Mararaba 
concession area. 
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Figure 5.1 Extent of multiple source use (Wet and dry seasons) 
Figure 5.1 shows the use of multiple sources was practiced by most residents: 
1. Multiple source use was more extensive during the rainy season than the dry season 
2. The proportion of residents using only one source of water was 7% in the wet season and 
18% in the dry season 
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3. Approximately two thirds of households used three or more sources during the wet 
season. About one third of households use three or more sources during the dry season. 
Figure 5.2 below shows the proportion of residents within each distance range using particular 
water sources in the wet and dry seasons and its variation with distance from RUL's taps. 
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Figure 5.2 Water sources used (wet and dry seasons} 
Figure 5.2 shows the following: 
1. The proportion of residents using sources requiring payment (RUL's and other sellers taps 
and water vendors } was lower in the rainy season than in the dry season irrespective of 
their location in relation to RUL's taps 
2. In both the wet and dry seasons, the use of RUL's taps by households tended to decrease 
the further away a household was located from the tap 
3. Use of water vendors increased the further way a household was located from an RUL tap 
in both wet and dry season 
4. A high proportion of residents were using rainwater during the wet season irrespective of 
the location of the household in relation to RUL's taps. However, the proportion using 
rainwater appeared to increase with distance away from RUL's tap . 
5. The proportion of people using private wells was approximately {60%) during the dry and 
wet seasons. 
6. The proportion of people using other sellers was less than the proportion using RUL's 
facilities but was significant. 
5.2.2 Ranking of water sources 
The questionnaire asked residents to rank the use of water by volume. The responses are 
summarised in figure 5.3 below: 
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Figure 5.3 Ranking of water sources 
Figure 5.3 shows the following: 
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1. During the wet season, rainwater was the most used main source. 
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2. During the dry season, more households used water vendors their first or second source 
than any other source including RUL's taps. 
5.2.3 Reasons for using sources 
Table 5.3 below shows the reasons given for using water sources during the wet and dry 
season. Water availability and source proximity were the most frequently given reasons. Only 
a relatively small number of residents stated price as a reason . However, given the large 
numbers of residents using free sources (rainwater and private wells) in both the wet and dry 
seasons, this result does not necessarily mean that price was an unimportant consideration . 
Table 5.3 Reasons given for using water sources 
Reason Dry season Wet season 
Nearness 119 146 
Always Available 125 132 
Quality 105 100 
Only Source 61 37 
Price 15 18 
Other reasons 40 44 
Total No of responses 465 477 
5.2.4 Uses of water 
Survey respondents were asked to state all the uses to which they put the water from each of 
the sources they used in the wet and dry seasons. For each source cited by each household, 
the data were grouped into two usage class-es: (i) cooking and drinking and (ii) all other uses, 
and 
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two source categories: (i) free sources and (ii) sources requiring payment. 
Th is enabled the responses from each household to be classified as follows: 
• potable use- (cooking and drinking only, or both c ooking and drinking and other uses) 
• non potable use- (other uses only) 
The results are summarised in Table 5.4. 
Table 5.4 Different iation in uses of water from diffe rent sources 
Wet season Dry season 
Uses of water Sources of water 
Sources requiring Free 
payment sources 
Cooking and drinking 37 (56%) 141 (47%) 
Other uses 29 (44%) 158 (53%) 
Table 5.4 indicates that in both wet and dry seasons 
cooking and drinking than free sources and also used 
than paid sources. The data were analysed using th 
residents used paid sources more for 
free sources more for non potable uses 
e Chi-square (l ) statistic to determine 
type of water use and the source of 
tionships would be found . 
whether there was a significant relationship between 
water. The null hypotheses were that no significant rela 
For the wet season no significant relationship was fo und at the 95% significance level (/ = 
1.72, p = 0.190, df = 1). 
For the dry season, the result was significant at the 9 5% level of significance (l = 4.89, p = 
0.027, df = 1 ). 
Appendix 4 explains the Chi Squared statistic. 
5.3 Water consumption 
Residents were asked the number and size of contain ers they used for water collection from 
nts collected from each source are various sources. The average and range of amou 
presented in Table 5.5 for the wet and dry seasons. 
Table 5.5 Average per capita water collected from s ources 
Average colle ction 1/cld, and 
(range of per capita amoun 
Source Wet Season 
RUL Connection 45 (6-83) 
Rainwater 22 (1-80) 
Tanker 19 (4-33) 
Private Well 16 (1-100) 
RUL Tap 16(1-80) 
Water Hawker 14 (1-53) 
Other Seller's Tap 11 (2-33) 
River or Stream 3(2-10) 
Neighbour's Tap -
Other sources 17 
The results indicate generally higher per capita coli 
rainwater and private wells than from RUL taps, water 
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ts collected b households 
Dry Season 
45 (6-83) 
27 (3-166) 
18 (2-100) 
15 (1-160) 
13( 1-160) 
15 ( 2-83) 
9 (4-20) 
20-
ection from RUL house connections, 
vendors and other sources. The wide 
range of per capita collection amounts reflects different behaviours in households. For 
example, one household might use a particular source for cooking and drinking only, whereas 
another might use it for all its needs. These figures therefore do not represent daily 
consumption but rather; give a general indication of amounts collected from sources. As 
discussed in Section 3.5.2, their accuracy is limited and they may be subject to bias. 
54 Water prices 
Table 5.6 shows the average prices stated by residents for water from various sources. The 
prices were computed from the amounts paid for water in containers of a certain size. The 
prices shown for the RUL connection are the standard prices quoted by RUL. 
Table 5.6 Average water prices (Wet and dry seasons) 
Dry Season Wet season 
Mean Standard Error Mean Standard Error 
N/litre Nllitre N/litre N/litre 
Water Hawker 
RUL tap 
Other seller's Tap 
RUL Connection 
0.98 
0.76 
0.82 
0.20 
0.050 (n = 154) 0.65 0.023 (n = 99) 
---+---------+------------~ 
0.060 (n = 97) 0.61 0.034 (n = 71 ) 
---+---------+------------~ 0.109 (n =15) 0.67 0.123 (n = 8) 
~-+---------+------~--~~ 
0.20 
These results show that prices for each source were generally higher in the dry season than 
in the wet season. The results could however be biased. Residents were asked to state a 
single price and it is not certain that all respondents stated prices on the same bas is. For 
example, some residents might have stated the highest price they had paid, while others 
might have stated current prices. lt is expected that prices stated for the wet season would be 
less reliable due to poor recall , since the survey was carried out during the dry season. 
5.5 RUL Services 
Residents were asked whether they had heard of the company name RUL, RU Water, RU or 
Riveroaks . The results are presented in Table 5.7 below. 
Table 5.7 Residents' awareness of RUL prior to survey 
Distance of household 
from RUL tap Aware Not aware No res on se 
0-100 m 15% 72% 12% 
100-200 m 9% 70% 21 % 
>200 m 9% 77% 14% 
Whole sample 11% 72% 17% 
Table 5.7 shows that only 11% of the all residents had heard of RUL's company name despite 
many of them using RUL's facili ties regularly. Those living within 1 OOm of the facilities appear 
to have had slightly more awareness (15%) compared to 9% for those living more than 100m 
away from the facilities. 72% stated that they had not heard of the company name while 17% 
either did not respond or were not sufficiently clear to place them in either category. 
Residents were then asked how they thought RUL could improve its services. Table 5.8 below 
gives the proportion of residents within the given distance ranges giving particular responses. 
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Table 5.8 Improvements sought in RUL services 
%within each distance range 
No of 
Improvement sought responses 0-100 m 100-200 m >200 m 
More boreholes 117 55% 61 % 61 % 
House connections 107 48% 56% 59% 
More selling points 94 51% 47% 43% 
Lower _price 109 55% 55% 55% 
Better quality water 99 60% 47% 41 % 
Stay open till later in the eveninQ 45 25% 21 % 23% 
Open earlier in the morning 26 9% 17% 11 % 
Less queues at selling points 24 12% 12% 11 % 
Increased water availability and access (more boreholes, house connections and more selling 
points) accounted for 51 % of the total number of responses given. Improvements related to 
management of RUL's selling points (hours of opening, and queuing times) were less 
prominent and accounted for only 15% of the responses. The differences in the proportions of 
residents suggesting particular improvements across the three distance ranges were small. 
5.6 Use of water vendors 
Table 5.9 below shows the reasons given by residents for using water vendors. 
Table 5.9 Reasons for use of water vendors 
Distance from RUL tap Total % of all 
100 -200 m >200 m 
number of residents giving 
0-100 m responses response 
Hawkers are convenient 74% 70% 84% 147 (74%) 
Water points are far away 22% 54% 71 % 93 (47%) 
Poor quality sources 40% 28% 50% 73 (37%) 
Lack of assistance 23% 30% 30% 55 (28%) 
Restricted access (long 26% 26% 18% 48 (24%) queues)_ 
No other source 11 % 10% 11 % 21 (11 %) 
Health problems 2% 5% 7% 8 (4%) 
Other reasons 4% 2% 2% 6 (3%) 
Table 5.9 shows that a high proportion of residents valued the convenience offered by water 
vendors. Of those citing distance from RUL taps as a reason, the proportion increased as 
distance from RUL taps increased. More than one third of residents stated that they used 
water vendors because of quality reasons. 
All four vendors said that they found RUL's taps conveniently located with high availability. 
Three said that RUL's water was expensive. One rated the quality of RUL's water as "very 
good", and the other two as "fair". All four water vendors used RUL's selling points although 
three also brought water into the area from the neighbouring Federal Capital. 
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Chapter 6 
Utility management- (findings) 
This chapter concerns the utility management aspects of the Karu - Mararaba concession, 
focusing on management of the concession operating company, RUL. lt presents findings 
from five in-depth interviews with RDS and RUL staff and documents provided by RUL. 
Transcripts of these interviews are available from WEDC, Loughborough University. The eight 
sections of this chapter broadly fo llow the structure of the utility management interview guide, 
which was developed from the WASH guidelines for institutional assessment. 
6.1 Organisation 
6. 1. 1 Corporate structure 
Following the granting of the Karu - Mararaba concession, RDS formed a concession 
operating company (RUL) in which RDS and the Nasarawa State Government held 85% and 
15% equity shares respectively. The concession framework is described in Sections 4.1 and 
4.2. Figure 6.1 shows the organisational structure of RDS and RUL. The shaded and un-
shaded blocks refer to positions within RUL the concession operating company and RDS, (the 
parent company) respectively. 
RDS & RUL Board of Directors 
• Managing Director (RDS) 
• Executive Director (RDS) 
·General Manager (RDS Group) 
Group Professional Staff Group professional associates 
• Legal adviser Accountant I auditor 
· Engineer· Associate consultants 
• Administration Manager 
Other RU L Activities • RUL General manager 
Support Staff 
·Secretary 
·Cleaner 
Production Engineer• Accountant 
I Electrician ~ HPiumber 11 Meter Reader w--" .. Clerl< I 
12 No. Security ~ H 8 No. Operators I 
Guards 
Figure 6.1 RDS I RUL organisational structure 
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The organogram was developed from interview responses by the Group General Manager -
RDS, and the General Manager, Production Engineer and Secretary of RUL (CF2: 447 to 454; 
CF3 -706 and CF4, 771, 795 and 798). Additional information from RUL's staff records was 
also used. 
At the time of the field investigations, RUL employed 19 permanent staff and 3 graduates on 
attachment through the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC). The scheme posts new 
university and polytechnic graduates to companies and government organisations for one 
year. One student from a local polytechnic was also on a 3-month attachment with RUL. 
RUL's office was located in the Karu area. Day-to-day management of RUL's operations was 
the responsibility of its General Manager. He reported to the RDS Group General Manager 
based in Abuja, some 10 miles away. RUL's General Manager was supported by two 
department heads, a Production Engineer and the Accountant. The Production Engineer was 
primarily responsible for water production and maintenance. The accountant was responsible 
for keeping books of accounts, producing weekly and monthly reports and dealing with 
franchisees. The Secretary was responsible for routine administration, with the General 
Manager having overall administrative responsibility. 
RUL had access to the services of professionals within RDS, particularly the Group Engineer 
and Legal Adviser. RDS and RUL had set up a management committee comprising the RDS 
Group Engineer and RUL's General Manager and Production Engineer. 
6.1.2 Franchising of retail water sales 
Rationale 
During the first year of RUL's operations, all water-selling operations were undertaken by its 
employees. RUL's staff records show that during this period RUL employed up to 44 staff in 
six departments. RUL and RDS became concerned about staff costs and the management 
effort involved in supervising retail water sales. The following extract from the interview with 
the RDS Group General Manager illustrates these concerns: 
UM4- 808: .... We found out that the staffing level was becoming unwieldy, control was 
becoming difficult and we decided to franchise it to locals within the area. 
Further motivation for reorganisation was provided by financial losses being incurred by RUL's 
own staff and poor service to customers caused by their unwillingness to provide services 
very early in the morning and late in the evening. The General Manager at the time estimated 
that revenue collected was always 10% - 15% below expected collections (UM5: 855- 857). 
Franchising framework 
RUL entered into franchise arrangements starting in February 2001 with individuals and 
business people for each of its fifteen selling points. Table 6.1 below, summarises the main 
elements of the standard franchise agreement. 
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Table 6.1 Main elements of franchise agreement 
Purpose: 
RUL, the owner and operator of Karu Water Supply Scheme has established a good reputation and 
goodwill in the business and wishes to appoint vendors to take over and manage its vending 
operations. RUL grants the franchises the non -exclusive right and license to operate the business at 
a specified water selling point for a period of 1 year subject to satisfactory performance. 
RUL main responsibilities: 
-
to supply water regularly to the water selling points 
- to provide each vending point with a covered shed and other necessary facilities for the proper 
dispensing and vending of water. 
- to provide the franchises with initial training for O&M of the facilities at the selling point 
- to allow the Franchisee to operate the business using RUL's name 
- to provide reasonable assistance I advice in connection with the operation of the business 
Franchisee's main responsibilities:-
- to sell water (supplied by RUL) at the water selling point to consumers 
- to engage all staff required for the successful operation of the business. 
- to maintain the selling point in good condition and immediately report faults to RUL 
-
to ensure that its personnel render competent and courteous service to customers. 
Tariffs and Payment 
RUL supplies water to the franchisee at rates specified in writing. Franchisees are required to sell to 
customers at a specified tariff that can only be chanQed upon written notification by RUL 
Implications for RUL 
The franchising arrangements caused a major reorganisation within RUL starting in January 
2001. Taken together with retrenchment to reduce staff costs, the reorganisation resulted in a 
55% reduction in staff numbers over 2 years. The staff records show that the reorganisation 
involved making 18 staff directly involved in water retailing activities (cashiers and vending 
personnel) and two others (the commercial officer and the administrative officer) redundant 
between January and October 2001 . Figure 6.2 shows the numbers of permanent staff 
employed by RUL from inception to the end of December 2002. 
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Figure 6.2 RUL staff numbers (February 2000 to December 2002) 
The reorganisation resulted in merging the jobs of some staff. For example, the jobs of 
Secretary and Administrative Officer were combined. The Production and Maintenance 
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engineer was carrying out some of the functions previously undertaken by the former 
Commercial Officer. The comments made by the Group General Manager shown below 
indicate that these decisions were taken mainly in order to reduce costs. 
UM4-784: .. .. we had to even down-size some few months back. For a company like that 
you don 't need a personnel manager per se. You have a very good accountant that is 
trained in admin. These are some of the things that we recently carried out for cost saving 
measures 
The following extract from the interview with the Secretary I Administrative Officer indicates a 
positive view regarding the reorganisation and the resulting expansion of some staff roles. 
UM1-410: I feel quite happy working here despite the monetary aspect ... I combine the 
work of admin officer and secretary. The challenge is there .. .it has broadened my 
professional scope. 
The changes did however result in an uneven distribution of work among personnel. One staff 
member, the Production and Maintenance Engineer, quoted below, expressed the view that 
following the changes, little had been done to address this. 
UM2- 653 .. . People were laid off and we stopped there. Nothing was done to reorganise to 
make sure that everyone knows the role he or she is supposed to play . . ... You will see 
someone doing a whole job and another person almost doing nothing. 
The franchisee viewpoint 
The interviews with one tap operator employed by a franchisee from each of RUL's four 
business areas showed the following: 
All the tap operators interviewed were employees of the franchise holder. They all stated that 
they were not able to reduce their prices in response to similar actions by their competitors 
because they would first need to obtain the permission of the franchise holder and that this 
sometimes took time. 
Two tap operators' salaries were related to the volume of sales. In one case, it was calculated 
as 30% of the franchisee's profit. In another, it was based on a fixed salary of ~.000 for the 
dry season and N2,000 for the wet season. In the other two cases, the salaries were fixed . 
None of the tap operators complained about the quality of RUL's water. All four however 
indicated that it was not always supplied by RUL. At Ado and Mararaba 1, the franchisees had 
not received water from RUL during the 2 days before the interview. At Mararaba 3, the tap 
operator stated that because of low supply reliability, water vendors sometimes chose to buy 
their water elsewhere. 
One tap operator cited the poor state of the access road as a major constraint as this 
discouraged water vendors from buying from him during the wet season. 
6.2 Organisational autonomy 
6.2.1 Autonomy from government 
RDS and RUL were independent from government in terms of establishing budgets, 
controlling their revenue, determining staffing levels, recruiting staff, determining staff pay and 
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making day-to-day operational decisions. The following extract from the interview with the 
Group General Manager of RDS illustrates this point clearly. 
UM3- 770: .... There is no government hand in it completely . .... as to running the company, 
the government has no input. 
The findings presented in Chapter 4 showed that the single area in which the State 
government sought political control was tariff setting. However, it was established in Section 
4.4.3 that in practice RDS and RUL had considerable freedom to change tariffs without 
seeking prior permission from the Government. lt was also shown in Section 4.2.3 that the 
State Government and the regulatory body had sought to influence operational policy through 
their membership of the board of directors of RUL. However, there had been little opportunity 
to achieve this (Section 4.4.4 ). 
The interview responses on issues of organisational autonomy were predominantly in relation 
to RUL's autonomy from its parent company, RDS. The findings presented in subsequent 
sections are therefore largely concerned with this aspect of autonomy. 
6.2.2 Retention and control of revenues 
The evidence presented in Chapter 7, suggests that the revenues earned by RUL were 
generally speaking retained in dedicated RUL bank accounts and applied directly to the 
running of the business. Several interview responses confirmed this. However, in Section 
7.2.4 it was shown that the owners of the business withdrew substantial amounts from RUL's 
account on several occasions over a six-month period in 2002. 
RUL's management however was found to have hardly any control over the disbursement of 
funds. The General Manager normally had to make a request to RDS for the release of funds 
for each item of expenditure. The previous General Manager however appears to have had 
considerably more control over spending following an initial period at the start of operations in 
2000 when he too was also subject to similar controls . After a few months, he was able to 
agree a procedure whereby each month he negotiated a budget allocation to cover 
operational expenses for next month. 
The following extracts from the interviews with the previous and incumbent General Managers 
illustrate the contrasting degree of control they had over operational expenditure. 
UM5-834: .. . a monthly budget, which had to be approved before the month started. So, if I 
got that approval, all the money that was required for the operation was already entered. I 
didn't have to go back. 
UM3-667: .. ... I write to the group GM, request for funds for purchase of diesel ..... .If it is 
OK with him he says so, if it is not maybe he reduces .. .. .. so the onus is on him to 
approve. I don 't have that power. 
6.2.3 Goal setting and policy development 
RUL's goals and policies were set at different levels. Overall policy for the RDS group 
including RUL is the responsibility of the RDS Board of Directors (UM4:772). The Board of 
Directors for RUL, which as was discussed in Section 4.2, includes a member representing 
the Nasarawa State Government, had responsibility for RUL policy development. A joint 
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RDS/RUL committee comprising RUL's General Manager and Production Engineer and an 
engineer from RDS was found to be responsible for developing RUL's operational policy (see 
UM2: 462 and 463). During the tenure of the previous General Manager, it appears that he 
was responsible for determining operational policy as illustrated in the following : 
UMS-837: So as far as operation was concerned, they gave me 100% backing- "Go ahead 
and do whatever you feel is necessary to do; go ahead and do W' 
6.2.4 Strategy development and implementation 
Budgeting 
RUL's senior employees (General Manager, Production Engineer, and Accountant) had not 
been involved in establishing an annual budget and were not working to a budget (UM2: 473 
and UM3: 588). The main constraint appeared to be lack of control over finance. Senior staff 
within RUL suggested that a budget, even if it were to be established, would be of little value 
so long as they did not control the funds to implement it. The following two statements by 
RUL's General Manager and Secretary respectively illustrate this . 
UM4-717: But as long as we do not have the money, even where we have a budget they 
would consider us as not serious. 
UM1-366: Everybody knows in personnel we need staffs but what is the need of monitoring 
a budget when you know that there is no money to finance it 
Staffing and organisation 
RUL had some autonomy on staffing issues. All of the RUL staff interviewed stated that 
employment decisions were normally taken by RUL management but with final approval from 
RDS. Senior staff however would be recruited by RDS. RUL's management had autonomy 
over discipline of junior staff although final decisions on dismissal had to be referred to RDS. 
Pay levels were set by RDS at the commencement of operations with predetermined upper 
limits on salaries for various categories of staff. RUL's management, at their discretion, could 
not offer higher salaries to particularly well qualified job applicants without reference to RDS. 
RUL's management was also not able to give additional rewards to, or promote existing staff. 
Technical operations 
RUL was autonomous as regards conducting technical operations. There was no evidence 
that that RDS sought to influence this except through the joint committee. Lack of financial 
autonomy, however, severely affected RUL's ability to maintain a consistently high level of 
technical performance. A report by the technical committee (Appendix 3) illustrates this. 
Tariff setting 
RUL's franchisees were in competition with other water sellers within the concession area. 
Because franchisees needed to lower their prices in response to their competitors' pricing 
actions, RUL in turn was required to lower its tariff. RUL's staff were free to propose tariff 
changes but would need approval from RDS to implement the changes. 
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6.3 Leadership and organisational culture 
6.3.1 Leadership 
Table 6.2 below presents the broad range of responses given by the five interviewees 
regarding their understanding of leadership, who provided it and their assessment of the 
effectiveness of leadership within RUL and RDS. 
Table 6.2 Range of interview responses on leadership 
Interviewee Leadership characteristics Who provides leadership? Effectiveness 
of leadershiE_ 
Secretary, RUL - Gets along with subordinates Current GM Average 
-Works hard 
- Must have a broad knowledge 
- must be seen in the field by 
workers 
- provides a conducive atmosphere 
Production - Gives direction Cited previous GM and a Low 
Engineer, RUL - Someone you can look up to particular director of RDS 
- Is honest and fair who had been absent for 
-Action man some time through illness. 
-Motivator 
-Technically competent Acknowledged that current 
- being seen in the field GM was a good listener and 
was supportive 
General - Does not need broad knowledge The "reporting officer'' (i.e. Medium 
Manager, RUL but must delegate to subordinates superior) 
- Must be seen in the field by 
workers 
Group General Not asked - Group MD - but stressed -
Manager, RDS importance of collective 
leadership within RDS. 
- Joint committee for RUL 
Former General - Experience I knowledge Himself (when he was GM) -
manager, RUL - Initiative I taking responsibility 
- being seen in the field 
Table 6.2 indicates that RUL staff did not rate current leadership as high although one person 
cited the previous general manager as having provided motivation and encouragement to staff 
during his tenure. Another employee working directly under the current general manager cited 
him as providing good leadership but also rated the overall leadership as average. Within 
RDS however the emphasis appeared to be on collective leadership rather than on any 
particular individual (UM4: 793 -794). 
6.3.2 Organisational culture 
Transparency and openness to change 
The large volume of documentary and interview data gathered was indicative of a high degree 
of transparency within RDS and RUL. The researcher is unable to recall an occasion when 
information on any aspect of the operations was withheld . Furthermore there was evidence 
that RDS was keen for outside organisations (for example, the Federal Government, and 
multilateral development agencies) to become involved in its activities and was therefore 
prepared to disclose information. The following extract from the interview with the previous 
GM illustrates this: 
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You mean you disclosed? 
UM5-901: We disclosed what we were doing, yes. 
Everything? 
UM5-902: Everything. We gave a lot of in formation to these people so that they could look 
at it, analyse, because if you are asking somebody to come in he should at least be 
attracted by what you are doing. If I don't know what you are doing I cannot come in. 
The reorganisation undertaken in 2001 and continued in 2002 indicated that the organisation 
was also open to change. 
Employment and dismissal policies 
The staff records indicate that a significant number of staff were dismissed in addition to staff 
made redundant through reorganisation . This suggests that in general workers left the 
organisation either because of their non-performance, or the organisation's need to reduce 
costs. The interview evidence also suggests that workers were generally employed on merit 
(UM1: 427 and 428; UM2: 653). 
Hierarchy 
A number of interview responses indicated that hierarchical relationships were important. For 
example, in the following extract, RUL's General Manager referring to the Group General 
Manager suggests that there was an acceptance of formal hierarchical structures. 
UM3-687: We are now reporting to the group GM. He is the head. Whatever decision he 
decides to take, /look on to him, not minding whether he has any input into that decision or 
not. But as long as he is my reporting officer he is the one I will be reporting to. 
Other interview responses including those that stressed collective leadership also indicated 
the importance of the head of the organisation (see UM1-462 and UM4-793 and 794). 
Culture differences between RUL and RDS 
it was possible to discern that the cultures within RDS and RUL were different. The following 
remark by the Group General Manager at RDS shows that the parent company viewed RUL 
(operating company) as a different type of organisational entity. 
UM4-791: ... the parent company ..... is a multi-disciplinary consultancy firm .. .. In 
consultancy businesses the productivity is of the mind, of the brain, so there is no way we 
can say we are using the same salary structure for a consultancy firm and a water selling 
company which basically, apart from the management and the engineer is manned by 
semi-skilled people. 
Responses from RUL staff tended to indicate that notwithstanding good personal relationships 
among some individuals in the two organisations, there was limited interpersonal contact 
between personnel from the two organisations (UM 1: 434 and 435). Some of RUL's staff saw 
the parent company as having only short-term monetary objectives and not caring about how 
RUL (the operating company) went about meeting those objectives (UM2: 521 to 523 and 
530). 
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6.4 Management and administration systems 
6.4. 1 Commercial systems 
RUL's relations with customers were generally based on written contracts. The relations with 
the franchisees were governed by a standard contract (see Section 3.2.3), as were relations 
with customers with direct house connections. Tariffs schedules for franchisees and domestic 
customers were in a written form. 
RUL's staff did not handle cash from water sales. Franchisees and other customers paid their 
bills directly into nominated bank accounts and were then required to provide evidence of 
payment to RUL's staff by producing a bank receipt (UM3: 675) 
RUL billed franchisees and domestic customers based on metered consumption. Complaints 
about the services from residents and water vendors were generally made through 
franchisees. RUL interacted with consumers mainly through their franchisees with whom they 
had meetings from time to time. These meetings appeared to focus on pricing matters with 
RUL putting pressure on franchisees to keep their prices low. The Production and 
Maintenance Engineer handled complaints from RUL's customers with house connections. 
6.4.2 Accounting 
RUL had access to the services of the group accountant who in addition to assisting RUL with 
the preparation of its annual accounts, carried out quarterly audits of RUL operations on 
behalf of the RDS Group. RUL's accounting staff kept records of revenues and expenditures 
and produced annual accounts that were subject to audit. RUL's accounting records were 
summarised on spreadsheets. The audited accounts for the period ending 301h June 2001 
were published in October 2001 . Accounts for the subsequent twelve month period were 
being prepared at the time of field data collection. 
6.4.3 Budgeting 
None of the current staff interviewed had been involved in the preparation and implementation 
of an annual budget. Interview responses indicated that all expenditure, with the exception of 
staff salaries and bank interest payments were carried out on an ad hoc basis depending on 
agreement of RDS to specific requests from the RUL management. The system of monthly 
budgeting in place during the tenure of the previous general manager had been discontinued. 
6.4.4 Management information 
RUL's accountant prepared monthly accounting reports. These appeared to be mainly for the 
benefit of RDS rather than for internal planning by RUL's management. For example, the 
production and maintenance engineer stated that he did not normally see RUL's monthly 
reports financial reports, nor had he seen the audited annual accounts. 
The quarterly reports of the visi ting auditor had been important in informing major 
management decisions. They were responsible for pressing the case for reorganisation as 
well as for the setting up spending controls as shown in the following two extracts from the 
interviews with the General Manager and Group General Manager. 
UM3-664: He {the auditor} realised that we were spending so much money on maintenance 
of equipment and they thought that maybe a lot of money was being drained out of the 
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system wUhout justification .. ... That was what informed ... the parent company to set up a 
committee that would be in charge of running the place technically. 
UM4- 789: From his {the auditor's} report, we saw that there were lapses and overlaps in 
functions. . .. We had to really sit down and look at the function of each and every individual 
staff in that company and looked at whether he was required or not. 
Reports from the technical department were prepared on an episodic basis in relation to 
specific problems such as breakdowns that required management action. 
6.4.5 Personnel recruitment 
Staff recruitment systems were found to be simple and were explained consistently by 
interviewees. The procedure involved advertising by word of mouth, inviting applications and 
calling selected applicants for interview. Once a prospective employee was identified, he or 
she was engaged on one-month probation in order to test their practical skills. A formal letter 
of offer would be made subject to satisfactory performance during this period. The probation 
period enabled prospective employees to learn what was expected of them. 
Job descriptions were not normally written down, although there was conflicting evidence on 
this point. A system of incentives did not exist for RUL's management or staff. 
6.4.6 Procurement 
Routine procurement procedures were simple. Each head of department was responsible for 
purchasing for the respective department and specialists within the department were involved 
in purchasing activities. In the case of the technical department, the Production Engineer 
would accompany either the electrician or the plumber on the basis that they had specialist 
knowledge of the equipment or materials required. 
6.5 Developing and maintaining staff 
6.5.1 Training and staff development 
Training opportun ities for RUL's staff were limited to on-the-job training provided by 
managers. The former General Manager did however participate in a seminar organised by 
the Water Utilities Partnership (WUP) held in Abidjan. 
6.5.2 Salaries and allowances 
All three RUL staff interviewed stated in strong terms that they considered their pay was low 
compared to salaries and allowances paid to public sector workers doing the similar jobs 
(UM1 : 400-417; UM2: 501-508; UM3:756-758). 
Employment with RUL was not pensionable and did not offer the long-term security that jobs 
in the public sector offered. The former General Manager and the Group General Manager 
stated that they had established the salary structure in order to attract staff and had attempted 
to make the salary structure competitive compared with salaries offered by public sector 
workers and other private companies . 
All three stated that they would either leave the company if another opportunity presented 
itself. The following response by the former General Manager suggests that the lack of job 
security was one reason for staff resignations . 
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While you were the GM, did you have many staff leaving, resigning? 
UM5-890: Yes, one or two occasions ..... as we progressed, the staff that had the 
qualifications they felt that they wanted a better security so they kept on trying. Some of 
them got employment but not many anyway. 
Within RDS however, pay, conditions and opportunities appeared to be considerably better 
and it seemed less likely that staff and directors within RDS would seek to move to the public 
sector. The point was made emphatically by the former General Manager in the following 
extract: 
Can I just ask, in your opinion, the people who own the business now, would they 
think of going to the public sector? 
UM5- 896: No, no no. I don 't think they will go to the public sector to work. No no no 
because they have already established themselves .. . 
The interview responses of the RUL staff were made in strong terms and may have genuinely 
reflected their views regarding their remuneration. However, the statements are also to be 
viewed with some caution since there is a possibility that they may have overstated their case 
in the hope that the researcher would make representations to RDS on their behalf. 
6.5.3 Other incentives 
RUL management was unable at its own discretion to offer incentives to its staff for good 
performance. RUL's management itself did not receive incentive payments. The former 
General Manager however said that a number of incentives were made available to staff 
during his tenure including gifts at Christmas and Muslim feasts. The GM referred to a 
Christmas bonus paid to staff in 2001 . Table A5.3, Appendix 5, provides confirmation of this 
as the staff welfare figure (additional to salaries) for December 2001 was considerably higher 
than the general level of expenditure on that item and appears equivalent to approximately 
50% of the monthly wage bill. 
6.5.4 Staff morale 
All three RUL staff interviewed stated that staff morale was low due primarily to inadequate 
pay and conditions of employment. The previous General Manager however stated that it was 
high during the period he was in charge. The previous General Manager's assertion, while 
accurately reflecting the way he perceived staff morale, should be regarded with caution 
particularly in view of the large number of redundancies during his tenure. There was 
however, some evidence from current staff to support the view that morale might have been 
high while he was General Manager (see UM2: 514 and 517). 
6.5.5 Staff turnover 
Figure 6.3 below shows the numbers of staff leaving for particular reasons from the start of 
operations in March 2000 to December 2002. 
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Figure 6.3 Reasons for Staff leaving RUL (March 2000 - December 2002) 
Figure 6.3 shows that of the 51 staff that left RUL during this period, 9 (18%) did so 
voluntarily. There is no evidence to suggest that the rate of resignations was higher during the 
tenure of either General Manager. The staff records indicate that resignations occurred at a 
constant rate (roughly 4 per year) during the period. 
6.6 Technical capability 
RUL's Production and Maintenance Engineer had a good grasp of technical issues related to 
the operation and maintenance of RUL's water supply system. In interview responses he 
demonstrated that on several occasions he had gone beyond rout ine operation and 
maintenance tasks and had adapted generators in order to improve their performance under 
conditions found in Central Nigeria (UM2: 633-635). The timely provision of funds to carry out 
routine maintenance and repairs rather than lack of technical capability was found to be the 
main limiting factor to technical performance (see Appendix 3). 
6. 7 Customer orientation 
Prior to the franchising arrangements, RUL's staff were involved in direct retail sales to 
residents of the concession area and water vendors. During this period, RUL viewed the water 
vendors as RUL's main customers and made a particular effort to interact with them and 
respond to their needs (UM5:879-885). 
Following the franchising arrangements, RUL became a bulk water seller to fifteen 
franchisees but continued retail sales to a small number of customers with house connections. 
Table 6.3 below presents responses from three current senior employees within RDS and 
RUL regarding whom they saw as RUL's customers and the status of franchisees. 
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Table 6.3 Views regarding customers and franchisees 
interviewee 
Production and 
Maintenance Engineer 
(RUL) 
General Manager 
(RUL) 
Group General 
Manager (RDS) 
View regarding who are RUL's View regarding status of 
customers franchisees 
The cart pushers, .... consumers The franchisees, they link. I would 
who have water connected to their not really call them a customer, 
house and people that just come to because they are not the final 
the various outlets to buy water.'---t--=co::.:.n.:.::s:.::u.:..:.m:..:::e.:....r.:::of:....:t::..;.h.:;.e..:.:w:..:::a::.;:te.:..:.r.:..... -=------:~--1 
Our main customers I think are Do you consider the franchisees 
those that consume our product or as customers or as agents? 
water on a daily basis. They are our agents ..... . 
You don't view them as 
customers? 
No 
. . . The direct customers are the .. the franchisees are the ones I 
residents of Karu and Mararaba would call the front office ... They 
are the direct link to the customer 
Table 6.3 shows that RUL and ROS personnel viewed the residents of the area and vendors 
as their primary customers despite not having a direct transactional relationship with this 
group. The franchisees to which over 90% of sales are made were variously referred to as 
RUL's 'front office', 'agents' and the 'link to customers' rather than as customers . 
6.8 Interaction with external organisations 
6.8.1 Nasarawa State Government and Nasarawa State Water Board 
All interviewees viewed the Nasarawa State Government as RUL's most important external 
contact. lt was shown in Chapter 4 that ROS referred matters relating to the concession to the 
office of the Executive Governor rather than to NSWB. RUL however regarded NSWB as an 
important external contact because of its control of abstraction licences. 
6.8.2 Federal Agencies and the World Bank 
ROS had recognised the potential for future work through two major Federal Government 
water supply initiatives {The STWSSP and the Community-Based Urban Upgrading Project) 
both funded by the World Bank. RDS had been proactive in seeking to influence the Federal 
Ministry of Water Resources and the World Bank as shown below: 
UM4 813: ..... we have been liaising with the Federal Ministry of Water Resources, The 
World Bank I Federal Ministry of Water Resources Small Town 's Water Schemes. We've 
been telling them what we've been doing .... because if it succeeds in a place it can 
succeed anywhere 
UM4-829 Yes we have been trying to set up a maintenance unit. We have recently been 
given mechanical works at the Karu Site and services scheme . . .. These are opportunities 
that we are looking at. Probably the parent company became a loss leader but it gives out 
other opportunities. 
The upgrading of the main road through the concession area from a two-lane road to a dual 
carriageway was shown in Chapter 5 to have significantly affected RUL's operations. RUL had 
tried to pursue compensation from the contractors. At the time of these interviews, RUL had 
received no compensation. 
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Chapter 7 
Financial aspects - (findings) 
This chapter concerns the financial performance of the concession at Karu-Mararaba during 
the 32-month period, March 2000 to October 2002, and includes a comparison of the initial 
financial projections with actual financial performance. 
7.1 Review of accounting data 
RUL's first audited accounts cover the 16-month period from commencement {1st March 2000) 
to 30th June 2001 . The accounts are presented in full in Appendix A5.1 . Audited accounts for 
July 2001 to June 2002 were being prepared at the time of data collection but were not 
available. The accounts were developed from RUL's accounting records, which were 
subjected to quarterly reviews by an auditor as discussed in Section 6.4.2. The data 
verification described in Chapter 3 showed that RUL's accounting records provided a 
reasonable basis for the preparation of the audited accounts. There was evidence of improved 
recording of financial transactions by RUL staff: In 2001, a distinction was made between 
capital and recurrent expenditure whereas in 2000 no entries were made for capital items. 
7.2 RUL financial performance 2000- 2002 
7.2.1 Income statement 
A summary of the audited income statement for the period 1st March 2000 to 30th June and 
the author's forecast income statement for July 2001 to June 2002 are shown in Table 7.1 . 
Table 7.1 Summary income statement 2000/01 and forecast for 2001 /02 
N 'OOO 
2000/2001 (audited) 2001 /2002 (forecast) 
Earnings 11 ,782 10,677 
Expenditure 
Staff costs 6,231 3,859 
Other administrative costs 935 830 
Direct operational costs 2,323 2,198 
Bank charges 1,852 2,283 
Subtotal (cash expenses) 11,341 9,169 
Surplus /(Def icit) before depreciation 441 1,508 
Depreciation 5,456 3,754 
Profit I (loss) after depreciation (5,015) (2,246) 
Accumulated profit I (loss) (5,015) (7,261) 
The following assumptions were made in arriving at the forecast: 
1. Earnings were calculated as the sum of (a) cash receipts (see Appendix A5.5) and {b) the 
average of debtors at 30th June 2001 {W-415,000, see folio 2 of Audited accounts, 
Appendix A5.1) and November 2002 (W566,816, see Section 7.2.3 below) 
2. the item 'other administrative costs' includes an allowance of W250,000 for audit and 
professional fees 
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3. the depreciation figure was determined from depreciation factors given in audited 
accounts plus an allowance of ~117,000 relating to capital items acquired in 2001 /02 
Table 7.1 shows that for the first 16 months of operation RUL made an operating loss of W5.0 
million and a cash surplus of ~0.44 million. The forecast for 2001/02 was prepared on a 
prudent basis and gave a similar picture with a net surplus projected for 2001/02 based on 
cash expenses and a net loss when depreciation was taken into account. 
7.2.2 Balance sheet 
Table 7.2 shows the summary balance sheet for the period March 2000 to June 2001 . 
Table 7.2 Summary audited balance sheet March 2000- June 2001 
N '000 ~----------------------------------~ 
Employment of Funds 
Fixed Assets 34, 006 
Current Assets 1, 085 
Less: Current Liabilities 10, 420 
Net Current Assets (9, 335) 
Pre-operational Expenses 176 
24, 848 
Funds employed 
Share Capital 1. 000 
RDS 28, 862 
Profit and Loss Account (5, 015 
24, 848 
The balance sheet shows that RDS made a capital grant of ~28.8 million to RUL to offset the 
bank loans. However, RUL still had a loan liability of approximately N1 0 mill ion, indicating that 
the N1 .8 paid in bank charges from March 2000 to June 2001 had merely serviced the interest 
on the outstanding loans and made little impression on the principal amount outstanding. 
7.2.3 Collection performance 
RUL's accounts for 2000/2001 show that on 301h June 2001 RUL's customers owed ~15,000 
in unpaid bills (see Appendix A5.1; Note 3 to the accounts) . Compared with water sales of 
N10.525 million, this is equivalent to a collection rate of 96%. The debtor position in 
December 2002 is summarised in Table 7 .3. This shows that over the period from inception to 
December 2002, the overall cash collection rate was 97%. 
Table 7.3 Water supply debtors (December, 2002) 
Business Franchised selling points 
House conn 
Amount Amount 
area outstanding Sales outstanding 
(N) (N) (N) 
Ado 55,167 159,138 
Mararaba 1 41,091 134,484 
Mararaba 2 16,119 10 921 
Mararaba 3 93,630 56,269 
Total 
actions 
Sales 
(N) 
1,680,000 
Total 
Amount 
Outstanding 
N 
206,007 17,598,000 360,812 
~------~~----~--~~~--~----~---L-
588,819 19,278,000 
Source, RUL accounting records 
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There was however a marked difference between collections from the franchised selling 
points and from customers with house connections. 7.3 shows that the cash collection rate for 
customers with house connections was 78% compared with a collection rate of 99% for the 
franchised selling points. 
7.2.4 Cash flows 
Figure 7.1 shows RUL's monthly cumulative cash flow. lt takes into account all cash expenses 
and receipts recorded by RUL's accounting staff, including minor capital expenditure 
undertaken by RUL and transfers made from RUL to the parent company RDS. This analysis 
does not purport to reflect RUL's actual bank balance but rather gives an indication of the 
overall balance of cash revenue over expenditure during the period. 
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Figure 7.1 RUL Cash f low (March 2000- October 2002) 
Figure 7.1 shows that RUL's cash flow exhibits a seasonal pattern mirroring the pattern of 
sales. For the majority of the period, cash flow was negative. Maximum negative cash flow 
occurred during the rainy season (October, in 2000 and 2001) and September in 2002. The 
most favourable cash flow positions occurred at the peak of the dry season. The 12-month 
moving average in figure 7.1 indicates a generally improving cash flow position throughout 
2001 and during the first half of 2002. During the period May - September 2002, substantial 
cash transfers were made from RUL to the parent company. Figure 7.1 shows that had these 
transfers not taken place the net cash flow position in October 2002 would have been 
W250,000 (positive) as opposed to the actual figure of W1 .8 million (negative). 
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7.3 Costs 
7.3. 1 Distribution of total costs 
Figure 7.2 shows the distribution of RUL's costs as a percentage of total costs over the period 
March 2000 to June 2002. 
Direct operational 
costs 
15% 
Other 
administrati~ 
costs 
6% 
Staff costs 
34% 
Bank charges 
14% 
Figure 7.2 Distribution of RUL total costs (March 2000- June 2002) 
Depreciation comprises a large component (31 %) of RUL's total costs This means that the 
total revenue required to meet total costs is 1.45 times that required to meet cash costs. 
Figure 7.2 also shows that staffing is the largest cost item. Financing costs are substantial 
(14%) and were comparable to direct operational costs (15%). The financing charges relate to 
only approximately one quarter of the asset value as a substantial proportion of the loans 
taken to finance the infrastructure were liquidated by RDS, the parent company. 
7.3.2 Distribution of cash expenditure 
Table 7.4 shows the distribution of costs expressed as percentages of cash expenses for the 
period March 2000 to June 2002. Individual expenditure items are presented in subsequent 
sections. 
Table 7.4 Distribution of cash expenditure 
Cost Item 
7.3.3 Staff costs 
March 2000 -June 2001 
audited 
Amount 
(000 N) 
6 231 
1,852 
2,323 
935 
11 ,341 
%of cash 
ex ense 
55% 
16% 
20% 
8% 
July 2001 -June 2002 
Forecasts 
Amount % of cash 
(000 N) expense 
3,859 42% 
2,283 25% 
2,198 24% 
830 9% 
9,170 
In both periods staff costs were the largest expenditure item - 55% of cash costs in 2000/01 
and 42% in 2001/02. However, the average monthly staff cost decreased from W389,000 in 
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2000/01 to ~322,000 in 2001/02. Taking the salary figure for September 2002 (~241, 000 , 
see Appendix A5.4) and adding ~20,000 to this (the average amount expended on other staff 
related costs -welfare, medical and PAYE) gives a total staff cost of approximately ~261 ,000 
for September 2002. This indicates that by late 2002 overall staff costs had decreased by 
about 20% compared with the general level during 2001/02. 
7.3.4 Financing charges 
From Table 7.4 it can be calculated that average monthly financing costs increased 
significantly from W115,000 per month in 2000/01 to ~190 ,000 per month in 2001 /02. Figure 
7.3 shows the monthly bank interest payments made between January 2001 and September 
2002. 
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Figure 7.3 RUL monthly bank charges (January 2001 to September 2002) 
In the absence of precise details regarding the loan amounts, interest rates, the dates on 
which loans were incurred and dates on which principal amounts were paid off it is not 
possible to categorically determine the composition of bank charges. However, Figure 7.3 
indicates that financing costs were generally higher during the rainy season (May - October). 
This suggests that during the wet season when sales were low, RUL was borrowing more in 
order to finance recurrent operating expenditure. 
7.3.5 Depreciation 
The cost of purchasing the fixed assets is stated in the audited accounts at W39.5 million 
(Appendix A5.1) financed mainly through short-term commercial bank loans. A small but 
significant proportion of RUL's revenue was applied to capital expenditure in 2001 . The 
annual costs of the capital assets charged to the profit and loss account are determined 
through annual depreciation charges calculated on the basis shown in Table 7.5 and shows 
that annual depreciation charge in 2000/2001 was ~3 .63 million. 
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Table 7.5 RUL capital asset depreciation schedule 
Item Depreciation Asset Initial asset Annual depreciation factor life value W w 
Motor vehicle 25% 4 years 1,650,000 412,500 
Machinery and Equipment 10% 10 years 29,722,590 2,972,259 
Office Furniture and Fittings 20% 5 years 974,325 194,865 
Bill Boards etc 50% 2 years 114,940 57,470 
Land nil 7,000,000 nil 
Total 39,461,855 3,637,094 
7.3.6 Direct operational costs 
Figure 7.4 below shows monthly expenditures on direct costs (fuel and lubricants) from March 
2000 to October 2002. These costs would be expected to vary according to the level of output 
and therefore exhibit a seasonal pattern in line with sales. 
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Figure 7.4 Expenditure on fuel and lubricants (March 2000 - October 2002} 
Expenditure between June and October 2002 appears significantly lower than previous wet 
season periods. Table 7.6 below compares the expenditures in 2000, 2001 and 2002, and 
shows the 2002 expenditure was 35% below the expenditure levels in 2000 and 2001 . 
Table 7.6 Expenditure on fuel and lubricants (June- October, 2000 -2002) 
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7.4 Tariffs and revenues 
7.4.1 Tariffs 
RUL's water tariffs expressed in W per litre are summarised in Figure 7.5. Franchisees bought 
bulk water from RUL based on their metered consumption at a rate of W0.18 per litre. The 
prices at which the franchisees could sell water to the public were regulated by RUL. These 
could only be changed upon written notification by RUL. 
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The tariff offered progressive discounts for increasing quantities bought. lt was intended to 
encourage water vendors to use RUL's facilities. Further discounts were also offered during 
the wet season to customers buying 10 or more jerry cans (usually vendors). The tariff 
charged to franchisees was lowered during the wet season to W0.15 I litre. The tariff charged 
to franchisees was set at a level that would provide them with a 20% margin on sales. 
7.4.2 Total revenue 
Figure 7.6 below shows RUL's total monthly water supply cash receipts for the period March 
2000 to October 2002. RUL's revenue is derived from four business areas (Ado, Mararaba 1, 
2 and 3). The Mararaba 3 business area was opened in April 2001 . 
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Figure 7.6 Month ly revenue (March 2000 - October 2002) 
Figure 7.6 shows that RUL's revenue was seasonal. Revenues generally increased steadily 
each month from October reaching a peak in March and declined again each month from 
March reaching a minimum between July and September. 
The 12-month moving average shows that RUL's average annual revenue increased stead ily 
during 2001 from N500,000 after the first year of operations and by early to mid 2002 had 
levelled off at approximately N835,000. The average annual revenue dropped for four 
consecutive months from N850,000 in June 2002 to N800,000 in October 2002. The revenue 
levels in the individual business areas are presented in the next section. 
7.4.3 Revenue generation in individual business areas 
In March 2000, RUL commissioned three business areas (Ado, Mararaba 1 and Mararaba 2). 
A fourth business area (Mararaba 3) was commissioned in April 2001 . Figure 7.7 compares 
the total revenues from the three business areas that had been in operation from the start of 
the concession operations in order to obtain an unbiased comparison of revenue generation 
performance. Monthly revenue summaries are presented in Append ix 5, Table A5.5 
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Figure 7.7 Total monthly revenues· Ado, Mararaba 1 and 2 (2000-2002) 
Figure 7.7 shows that during 2002, revenue generated at these three business areas was 
significantly lower than in 2001. Average monthly revenue during January - May 2002 was 
21 % lower than for the corresponding period in 2001 . Revenue generated between June and 
October 2002 was 32% and 15% lower than for corresponding periods in 2001 and 2000 
respectively. 
Figure 7.8, below, shows the revenues generated within the four individual business areas in 
2000, 2001 and 2002. 
86 
Ado Mararaba 1 
500.000 500,000 
400,000 400,000 
f f 
'; 300.000 '; 300,000 
~ ~ 
Ql Ql 
:I :I J ~ 200,000 c: 200,000 Ql ~ ~ 0::: 0::: 
100,000 100.000 
c: ... >. :; c. > c ... > :; c. > al al tll Q) ~ al ~ ::2 ..., tll tll ..., Q) ..., ::2 Cl) ..., ::2 ::2 Cl) 
Mararaba 2 Mararaba 3 
500,000 500,000 
400,000 ~'\ 400,000 ~ 300,000 ~ 300.000 ---~ ~ 
r-JJ 
Ql Ql :I 
c: :I ~ 200,000 ~ 200,000 
> 
0::: Ql 0::: 
100,000 100,000 
c: ... >. :; c. > c: m :; c. ~ al tll tll Q) ~ >. ::2 ..., tll al Q) ..., ::2 Cl) ..., ::2 ::2 ..., Cl) 
1~ 2000 --- 2001 2~ 
Figure 7.8 Revenues- Ado, Mararaba 1, 2 and 3 (2000-2002) 
A visual inspection of Figure 7.8 shows that revenue generated at Ado and Mararaba 1 in 
2002 was significantly lower than in 2001 during most months. In both business areas, 
revenues during September 2002 were almost negligible. At Mararaba 2 however revenue 
generation in 2002 remained at generally similar levels to 2001 . Revenues for Mararaba 3, 
commtss1oned in April 2001 , were substantially higher in 2002 than for corresponding months 
in 2001 . 
The commissioning of Mararaba 3 had not resulted in an overall increase in revenue as 
originally expected. 
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7.4.4 Revenue from private connections 
Figure 7.9 shows the monthly revenue collected from customers with private connections 
between December 2000 when the first private connections were installed and October 2002. 
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Figure 7.9 Revenue from private Connections (December 2000- October 2002) 
Figure 7.9 suggests that revenues from private connections did not follow the strongly 
seasonal pattern observed with revenues from communal taps. Higher than normal revenues 
in excess of N100,000 were recorded in March, August and December 2001 and were 
reported by RUL staff to be due to the collection of arrears from previous months and the 
payment of deposits and connection fees . The 12-month moving average and visual 
inspection of the revenue graph suggest declining revenue collection during the latter months 
of 2002. 
7.5 Comparison of initial forecasts with actual performance 
7.5.1 Revenue forecasts 
Table 7.7 below summarises the calculation by the design consultants, Parkman, of water 
production, sales and demand for the Karu concession in September 1999 following a pre-
feasibility study. The projections envisaged an average monthly revenue of W2.08 million. 
Actual average monthly revenue over the first 32 months of operation was N0.67 million (32% 
of the forecast amount). 
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Table 7.7 Projected sales of water from 16 standpipes 
Water production 
Each borehole yielding 50 1/minute at 
85% utilisation 8 X 50 X 60 X 0.85 = 20.4 m3/hr 
Water sales 
Assuming 80% of water produced is 
m3/day sold Volume sold/12 hr day = 195.84 
Assuming water sold at 7W/ 20 litres i.e. 
W350 per m3 . Daily revenue = 68,544 W /day 
Revenue over 36 months 75.1 million w 
Monthly average revenue 2.08 million N I Month 
Demand estimated at 201/c/day 
Assuming 35,000 existing population 35,000 X 20 X 0.5 = 350m3/day 
_(_but only 50% reached) then demand is 
Assumina vendor sells water at W7.00 earns W1 .00 per 20 litres sold 
Source: calculatiOns by Parkman Ltd. Des1gn consultants 
7.5.2 Cost projections 
Table 7.8 compares the projected and actual costs of establishing and running the 
concession. 
Table 7.8 Capital and operating cost projections 
Item 
Construction and su erv1s1on 
Other Establishment costs 
Subtotal 
Actual cost 
N million 
(32 months) 
39.5 
39.5 
17.5 
4.4 
61.4 
Actual and projected capital costs were broadly similar. There were however significant 
differences in the operating and financing costs. Financing costs are lower than in itially 
assumed because RUL's parent company liquidated a substantial proportion of the loan used 
to finance the infrastructure. Operating costs appeared to have been underestimated. 
7.5.3 Overall cash balance 
Table 7.9 compares the overall forecast and actual cash balances. 
Table 7.9 Overall cash balance (2000- 2002) 
Forecast (36 months) 
Nmillion 
75.1 
66.3 
8.8 
Actual (32 months) 
N million 
21 .5 
61.4 
39.9 
The forecasts envisaged a return of ~8.8 million (12% on turnover) to the shareholders. 
Instead they absorbed a cash deficit of close to fl*40 million representing approximately the 
original value of the fixed assets . 
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Chapter 8 
Discussion 
This chapter presents a discussion of the findings. Sections 8.1 to 8.4 discuss the study 
findings following broadly the order in which they are presented in Chapters 4 to 7. A key 
feature of the following discussion is the analysis of the study findings in the context of the 
analytical framework developed in Chapter 2. 
8.1 The contractual framework 
8.1.1 Initiating PSP arrangements with indigenous operators 
The findings reported in Sections 4.1 and 4.2 indicate that the arrangements came into being 
through a negotiated agreement with a single project promoter (RDS). The speed with which 
the project proposal was accepted by Government, taken together with the fact that the civil 
servants - State Water Board and Ministry - were not consulted, suggests that RDS had 
strong political connections within the State Government. There was also the suggestion that 
following national elections in 1999, there was a political requirement to "do something" 
quickly in the Karu - Mararaba area. This is a familiar reason often given by governments for 
entering into a sole source negotiation (Hodges, 2003b). 
This absence of competition for the market is a matter of some concern for medium-scale 
water supply, since the existence of small water supply monopolies operating without any 
competition , based on agreements struck with local politicians, could be very damaging to the 
populations of small towns and marginal urban areas. The discussion that follows addresses 
the issue of institutional capacity in relation to the initiation of indigenous PSP initiatives. 
it has been noted (for example, Nickson, 1997) that high levels of capacity are required to 
implement and oversee procurement activities related to the outsourcing of water supply 
functions. Furthermore, as was the case in the Karu-Mararaba concession, the oversight 
function and technical expertise sometimes provided by national government departments, 
assisted by international funding agencies and specialist consultants in large-scale PSP 
initiatives was not present. Such expertise, often found to be lacking at national level, is likely 
to be in even shorter supply at sub-national government levels (Prud'homme, 1995) where 
medium-scale operators are likely to be active. 
One solution could be to transfer decision making to the central level where relatively higher 
levels of capacity might be found. However, centralisation of procurement functions has been 
found to be associated with (i) lack of incentive on the part of local level-institutions to ensure 
contract performance and quality of service delivery and (ii) the possibility that central 
agencies may have no real incentive to be cost-conscious and ensure contract performance 
(Larbi, 1998). The extent to which decisions on outsourcing of water supply at the medium 
scale should be centralised or decentralised will require careful consideration in order to 
optimise the advantages of central-level capacity and local-level ownership. 
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The concession parties failed to conclude a written concession contract after almost three 
years. In interview responses on this issue, reported in Section 4.3, both sides blamed the 
other. Bearing in mind that RDS proposed the concession, and that they had the most to lose 
from the absence of a written contract, one would have expected them to put forward a draft. 
That they failed to do so is surprising when one considers that RUL had executed detailed 
written contracts with franchisees (Section 6.1.2} and customers (Section 6.4.1 ). One could 
conclude that the absence of a written concession contract was a result of lack of capacity. 
More generally, it is plausible that lack of capacity on the part of governments (particu larly at 
the sub-national levels} and small and medium sized water supply enterprises would pose a 
constraint to developing PSP arrangements. 
The degree of seriousness of concerns regarding lack of competition "for the markef' may 
depend on the nature of the water market. The findings presented in Section 4.4.2 ind icate 
that there was competition between RUL and other service providers in the Karu-Mararaba 
concession area. Where competition "in the market" is present, it has been argued (for 
example, Solo, 1998; 1999; Tremolet and Browning, 2000b} that the absence of competition 
"for the market" is potentially of less concern. The issue of competition in urban water supply 
in low-income areas is taken up again in Sections 8.1.3 and 8.3.5. 
8.1.2 The contractual framework 
Section 4.6.1 showed that the Nasarawa State Government regarded the Karu-Mararaba 
concession as a success because it had resulted in a water supply system for some 15,000 
people without any investment by government. In Section 4.5.1, the government's 
representative also made it clear that the whole of the technical risk lay with the 
concessionaire. The concession model has been found to be popular with governments for 
these reasons (Nickson, 1997). Section 4.6.2 showed that RDS on the other hand, was 
disillusioned with the concession model, and had been seeking to persuade the government 
to either share the investment burden or convert the arrangements into a lease. The reasons 
stated for the disillusionment appear to be mainly financial. The financial viabil ity of the 
concession model is discussed in Section 8.4.1. 
8.1.3 Regulation 
Regulatory arrangements 
The regulatory arrangements described in Sections 4.2.3 and 4.4 for the Karu-Mararaba 
concession comprised two distinct and possibly contrad ictory elements. NSWB was 
designated as "Regulator" and asset holder. At the same time, NSWB represented the State 
Government as shareholder on the board of the joint Concession Operating Company (RUL). 
The creation of the joint company appeared to have attractions for both parties (Sections 4.2.2 
and 4.2.3}. Responses from the concessionaire's representative indicated that this offered 
them some form of protection and would increase the likelihood of government participating 
financially. The government on the other hand believed that the joint venture arrangements 
would make regulation easier. Judging from experience elsewhere, the danger here was that 
the government would become a 'sleeping partner' (for example, Nickson, 2001a} in the joint 
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venture arrangements. The result in the Karu-Mararaba concession was that there was 
neither arms length regulation nor regulation through the joint venture. 
Regulatory capacity 
The findings presented in Chapter 4 showed that according to the State Government 
representative, NSWB, lacked resources and the necessary regulatory skills . Consequently, 
NSWB undertook hardly any independent regulatory activity during the three-year period. The 
practice of appointing the public water supply body that is itself in difficulty, to undertake the 
regulatory functions has been shown elsewhere to be generally ineffective (for example, Kerf, 
2000). The alternative of contracting-in someone with the required skills would have been 
impractical and probably not cost-effective given the limited scope of this single concession. 
The constraints on effective regulation imposed by lack of institutional capacity and political 
considerations at national level will also be present at the sub-national levels of government 
and sometimes in a more exaggerated form. The various debates and dilemmas of regulation 
(for example, independence versus accountability; cost versus effectiveness) will also be 
applicable. This presents us with something of a conundrum: Precluding any dealings with the 
private sector because there is a perceived lack of capacity to engage with it, does not allow 
the required capacity to be developed. There is evidence in the literature to suggest that 
developing the necessary capacities takes time (for example Smith, 1997b; Yepes, 2001) and 
that the ideal of the independent regulator is perhaps unachievable for many developing 
countries (Rivera, 1996). There is therefore a need to explore pragmatic approaches to the 
regulation of small and medium-scale water operators that take into account the limited 
resources and capacity that will usually exist at the sub-national government level. 
Developing new approaches to regulation 
There is already some useful new thinking on regulat ion that recognises the role of the small-
scale provider and considers possibilities for varying the price - quality mix (Baker and 
Tremolet, 2000a; 2000b). The involvement of civil society in tri-sector approaches (Tremolet 
and Browning, 2002; Gutierrez, 2003) may also provide some solutions. 
The risk-benefit and risk management approaches now adopted in the assurance of water 
quality (Davison et al., 2004; WHO, 2004) could also prove useful if applied to regulation in 
general. This would ensure that scarce resources are used to best effect. The surveillance 
approach to drinking water quality recognises the value of cooperating with water suppliers 
where their capacity is limited (Howard, 2002; WHO, 2004). The traditional view that the 
authorities must adopt an enforcement stance, while valid in itself, will usually fail because 
government's capacity to adopt that role is not sufficiently developed. Approaches that focus 
more on enabling rather than enforcement and, are more closely related to the provision and 
improvement of the water supply itself might prove to be more sustainable and provide more 
benefits to the general population. In the Karu-Mararaba concession, a greater focus by the 
authorities on enabling issues such as: 
(i) increasing the density of the tap network to promote access to the service, and 
(ii) improving the state of access roads to enable better access to water points by vendors, 
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might have been of greater benefit to residents than attempts at detailed technical monitoring 
of the operator's activities. 
The competition that exists in the water markets in low-income urban areas provides 
opportunities for the authorities to pursue such approaches. One could argue that the single 
most important achievement of the authorities in the Karu - Mararaba concession was the 
resu lt of an enabling action rather than one of active enforcement. By declining to enforce the 
exclusivity provisions requested by the concession holder, the NSWB enabled effective 
competition at least in the retail segment of the market (Section 4.3.2) . The result was that 
despite acknowledged regulatory weaknesses, prices remained stable and in some instances 
were being reduced (Section 4.4.2). 
The enabling role of government may however only be valid when some form of competition 
exists in the market. Where it does not exist, the challenge will be to enable competition as 
was done in Karu-Mararaba. Enforcement is also important. Where market forces are weak, 
the authorities will need to ensure that prices remain reasonable. Rather than concern 
themselves with detailed price setting, simple approaches such as setting and enforcing 
compliance with broad price ranges might be appropriate. This flexibility is particularly 
important since prices may need to rise and fall in accordance with seasonal factors as was 
the case in the Karu-Mararaba concession area (Section 7.4.1 ). 
8.2 Infrastructure and service delivery 
8.2.1 Infrastructure development 
The data relating to the speed of construction (Section 4.1.2} and the cost of construction 
(Appendix 3) appear to suggest that the implementation of the Karu-Mararaba facility was 
both speedy and cost effective: 
As shown in Section 4.1.2 that the Karu-Mararaba facility was constructed and commissioned 
in six months. The construction of similar water supply schemes in six towns through Nigeria's 
STWSSP, provide a basis for comparison with construction times in the public sector. Here, 
the schemes originally scheduled for completion six months, have taken over a year to 
complete. The delays were caused mainly by administrative bottlenecks and the consequent 
late disbursements to contractors. 
The per capita cost of the facilities based on a construction cost of N39.5 million and a served 
population of 17,500 equates to N 2,257. This is close to the mean per capita construction 
cost shown in Table 8.1 for six recently completed STWSSP schemes of broadly similar size 
and type. 
Table 8.1 STWSSP (Nigeria) per capita construction costs 
Town Capital cost Population Per capit a cost (000 N} N/cat= ita 
Dan Dume 47,161 26,750 1,76 3 
Dan Musa 34,678 15,750 2,20 2 
Danja 44,959 23,500 1,91 3 
Doko 33,211 11 ,800 2,81 4 
Riiau 54,252 18,420 2,94 5 
Wawa 32,425 19,750 1,64 2 
Source, Federal Programme Coordinating Unit. STWSSP 
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8.2.2 The Infrastructure design and operation 
Design of the infrastructure at Karu-Mararaba was based on demand assumptions that 
subsequently proved to be inaccurate. Specifically, the per capita demand estimate of 201/c/d 
appears to have been an overestimate. The extent to which other sources would be used by 
residents was also underestimated by the designers. 11 may well be that the actual water 
consumption in individual households exceeded 20/c/d. However, as demonstrated in Section 
5.2.4 differentiation in the use of sources appeared to have resulted in lower volumes being 
drawn from RUL's water supply system than predicted. 
The sizing and operation of the production and storage facilities appeared generally 
satisfactory. Most of the operational problems reported were related to distribution aspects. 
First, a number of RUL's prime selling points were either demolished or relocated as a result 
of the highway upgrading. This may have been one of the most significant factors contributing 
to the decrease in RUL's sales during 2002. 
A second factor relates to the density of tap network. Assuming a population of 17,500, the 
design tap density was 750 persons per tap. This was three times the generally accepted limit 
of 250 persons per tap (IRC, 1979). The primary effect of this was that a large number of 
households would be located too far from the tap to make RUL's taps the water source of 
choice. As shown in Section 5.2.2, only 8% and 21% of residents regarded them as their first 
source in the wet and dry seasons respectively. The data presented in Tables 5.3 and 5.9 
provide further confirmation since they show that convenience or distance influenced the 
choice of a water source more than other factors such as overcrowding. 
A third problem with the distribution system was that the pipeline diameter was inadequate to 
deliver water to selling points located on the extremities of the network. RUL appears to have 
learned a lesson from this and increased the pipe diameter in the Mararaba 3 businesses 
area to 63 mm. 
Inadequate network design and external factors affecting the operation of water distribution 
outlets such as the disruption caused by the highway construction and the poor state of 
access roads in the rainy season appear to have had a significant impact on operations. 
Production on the other hand seems to have been affected more by the internal management 
factors related to lack of operational autonomy rather than by technical factors. 
8.2.3 Water usage and service levels 
The water usage patterns observed in the Karu-Mararaba conform broadly to those observed 
elsewhere. The increasing use of water vendors by households depending on how far they 
were located from a tap (Section 5.2.) confirmed the work of Whittington et al. (1988). The 
higher rate of water collection from water sources located in the home or from water services 
brought to the home (Section 5.3) was broadly similar to the consumption pattern put forward 
by Cairncross and Feachem (1993). lt is emphasised again that the association may not be a 
strong one due to possible bias in results (see Section 3.5.2). The extensive use of rainwater 
by urban dwellers in many developing countries when it is available (Gould and Nissen-
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Peterssen, 1999), is confirmed by the findings presented in Section 5.2. The results presented 
in Section 5.2.4 demonstrate that residents differentiated between sources depending on the 
use intended for water as has been reported elsewhere (Howard et al., 2002). 
In Section 5.2.1, it was shown that 70% of households residing within 100 metres of an RUL 
tap were using water vendors. Section 5.6 showed that a similar proportion of residents within 
1 OOm of an RUL tap cited convenience as a reason for using water vendors. This suggests 
that the majority of residents living in relative proximity to an RUL tap were prepared to pay a 
higher monetary amount for the convenience of having water brought to their home. This is 
consistent with the findings of Whittington et al. (1988) and raises the question of whether the 
level of service offered by RUL was adequate. The answer would appear to be "No" 
particularly since it was shown in Section 5.5 that almost half of the residents living within 
1 OOm of an RUL tap cited the provision of a private connection as a desired improvement to 
RUL's service. 
RUL's system essentially comprised communal taps with only a small fraction of households, 
(approximately 2%), having a private connection. lt is argued here that RUL could have 
derived significantly greater revenues by providing a service level that was more in line with 
what users desired. Since revenue from private connections was shown in Section 7.5.4 not 
to fluctuate seasonally, an increased number of private connections would have had the 
additional benefit of smoothing out the seasonal fluctuations in RUL's revenue (see Section 
7.3.4). The findings of Singh et al. (1993) and Altaf et al. (1993) are relevant as they suggest 
that water supply systems in which the service level is lower than that desired by users are 
associated with low revenues and the consequent risk of descending into a cycle of decline. 
8.3 Utility management 
8.3. 1 Organisational autonomy 
One of the major benefits of introducing the private sector into water supply is that it provides 
the opportunity to eliminate day-to-day interference in operational matters by government. In 
Section 6.2, it was shown that the Karu - Mararaba concession had achieved this. The 
concession operator was however subject to considerable interference and control from its 
private sector shareholders particularly after the departure of the first General Manager. The 
findings presented in Section 6.2.4 indicate that this lack of autonomy had a significant effect 
on RUL's operational performance and are consistent with the high priority (Rank 1) accorded 
by the WASH Institutional Assessment Guidelines (Cullivan et al., 1988) to operational 
autonomy (see Table 2.4). These are notable findings since they suggest that for medium-
scale private sector water supply the important issue of operational autonomy is not 
necessarily resolved simply because autonomy from government has been attained. 
The "principal - agent" problem was discernable in the relations between the owners (RDS) 
and the managers (RUL) (see Section 6.2). The owners appeared not to trust the 
management. Because of this, they had resorted to detailed monitoring of each expenditure 
activity. While the precise reasons for this increase in the level of detailed control were not 
evident from the data collected, contextual factors might help provide an explanation. The 
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second GM was appointed in late 2001 by which time it was apparent that revenues were not 
sufficient to meet total costs. There is evidence in the management literature of the tendency 
of senior people in organisations to tighten controls on managers particularly in lean times 
(Dawson, 1996: p39). The management and finance literature suggests appropriate reward 
and incentive structures related to managerial performance are a more efficient means of 
realising increased profits than detailed monitoring of the performance of the managers 
(Brealey and Myers, 2001; Baye, 2000; Begg et al. 1997). 
8.3.2 Leadership and organisational culture 
The findings presented in Section 6.3.1 showed that staff of RUL believed that overall 
leadership of the company was low - average. Furthermore, some of the staff believed that 
leadership was more effective during the tenure of the previous General Manager, which 
coincided with a period of superior corporate performance. These results would appear to be 
consistent with the suggestion in the WASH institutional assessment guidelines that effective 
top leadership is among the most essential success factors for water supply (Cullivan et al., 
1988; p 67). The following discussion focuses on whether such an inference can reasonably 
be made from the Karu-Mararaba concession and the extent to which one could generalise 
about the nature and importance of leadership in medium-scale water supply. 
The first General Manager was brought in to run a brand new water supply system at a time 
when there must have been much optimism regarding the future success of the operations. 
As was discussed in Section 8.3.1 above, he enjoyed a substantially higher level of autonomy 
and access to resources than his successor. The second GM on the other hand took over 
when it was already apparent from the first audited accounts that revenues were falling far 
short of overall costs. lt may even be argued that he had taken over a number of problems left 
behind by his predecessor. The data do not show that the relatively poor performance of the 
company in 2002 was due to any specific failure of leadership on the part of the second 
General Manager. A fair comparison between the effectiveness of the two managers as 
leaders could only be made if they had been operating under comparable conditions. 
What factors should determine the type of leadership required for medium-scale water 
supply? Firstly, the stage in the business cycle would appear to be important (Ciarke and 
Pratt, 1985; Rodrigues, 1988 and Adizes, 1988): In the Karu-Mararaba concession, the first 
General Manager was seen as a motivator with substantial technical water supply experience 
that was admired and acknowledged. His personal qualities were seen as contributing to the 
success of the newly formed company. The task of reorganisation, which would have been 
implemented by the General Manager required particularly strong leadership. This type of 
individual would seem to be essential to the success of a company in its start-up phase. lt is 
doubtful whether each new water supply company starting up would be fortunate enough to 
attract and retain this type of person. In such cases, it is perhaps worth considering using 
outside help in the form of consultants. 
Once the organisation is set up and running, the emphasis on leadership is likely to shift from 
charismatic top leadership to a more collective leadership that can keep the business running 
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efficiently. This view is supported by Badarocco (2001) and by the work of Kerr and Jermier 
(1978). In organisations with trained and able operatives, the need for leader-guidance on 
how to perform tasks will be low. The departmental heads within RUL (The Production and 
Maintenance Engineer and Accountant) appeared to be working effectively with minimal task-
supervision). Where tasks are straightforward, as might be the case in water supply 
companies involved only in bulk supply or operating in areas where the technology employed 
is of a standardised nature, the need for task-oriented leadership will also be low. The same 
will be true where water supply operations are widely dispersed or where procedures and 
objectives are laid down strictly; (for example where a medium-scale water supply company is 
operating under a business format franchise from a larger water service operator). 
Medium-scale water supply operation in low-income urban areas in many instances may not 
lend itself to a centralised leadership model. The requirements for working in diverse, 
changing and difficult environments will often require self-leadership qualities on the part of 
staff. One recent trend in leadership thinking that identifies the "superleader'' who develops 
leadership capacity in others thereby reducing their dependence on formal leadership 
(Huckzynzki and Buchanan, 2001: p 728) would therefore appear to have particular 
significance for medium-scale water supply. 
A final thought on leadership in medium-scale water supply relates to the difficulty of 
generalising about the requirements for leadership across different nations. National culture is 
considered an important contingency factor that can determine whether employees are likely 
to feel comfortable with certain management styles (Rollinson and Broadfield, 2001; pp 397-
400). As an illustration, Table 8.2 shows three of Hofstede's (1980) cultural variables for West 
Africa, East Africa and South Africa. 
Table 8.2 Hofstede's variables applied to East, South and West Africa 
f---R_e_g_io_n_t_c_o_un_t_ry_f---P-o_w-::e:-r-d:-is_t_an:-c-e:-::::--ln"':o,1 ~"'l~,dcu,_t~,_,1 :"':~"'-:-_j_-:---:M-:a:-sc:-u:-l-in:-it_y_----l 
Rank out of 53 countries I regions from high to low 
f-----:E::-a-s:-t A:-f:-ri"""'ca--t---'--'2::-'1:';,1;-----,----:-33::;;,, 391h 
South Africa 35 16" 14 
West Africa 10'" 41' 31 
Source Hickson and Pugh (2001: pp 22- 41) 
The widely varying rankings for the three African regions for each of the three variables in 
Table 8.2 indicates that appropriate management and leadership styles are likely to vary 
considerably even within the same continent. For example, Table 8.2 might provide a 
sociological explanation for the authoritarian manner in which RUL's parent company 
controlled day-to-day management decisions, since relatively high power distance might be 
expected in Nigeria (West Africa). Based on this, one might suppose that in a similar situation 
in South Africa, say, relations between operating company and parent company would have a 
more egalitarian character. Hofstede's scheme necessarily involves gross generalisations 
regarding national cultures but it is regarded as having considerable practical utility (Rollinson 
and Broadfield, 2001: p 728; Hickson and Pugh, 2001: pp 22-45). 
97 
8.3.3 External influences 
RUL's activities have been subject to external infiuences. One of the more significant relates 
to the relocation and loss of four selling points because of the upgrading main road that 
passed through the area (Section 5.1.4). All four of the selling points were originally located in 
prime locations close to the main road and were therefore likely to have been among the most 
profitable. The road improvement had therefore led to a significant reduction in RUL's sales 
potential. 
RUL also faced a significant threat from two Federal Government I World Bank-initiated 
projects involving water supply. Both projects were aimed at bringing improvements to the 
area and if implemented could wipe out RUL's operations. Although there appeared to be 
optimism that RUL, by virtue of its good performance, would feature in these programmes, 
this was not guaranteed. Had RUL been the main public water utility, it is more likely that the 
authorities would have considered its activities in the planning of both of these interventions. 
The evidence presented in Section 6.8 showed a high level of awareness by RUL's senior 
managers of the potential for future work from these programmes, the threats posed by them 
and opportunities for other business. 
The concept that organisational performance is a product of factors both internal and external 
to organisations (Dawson, 1996) seems particularly relevant to medium-scale private water 
supply businesses. The findings of this study appear to suggest that these businesses will in 
general be far more vulnerable to external factors than larger scale public sector water supply 
entities and that their ability to interact effectively with external organisations has a relatively 
more significant bearing on their success. 
8.3.4 Developing and maintaining staff 
In Section 6.5, it was shown that there was dissatisfaction among RUL staff regarding their 
pay and conditions. lt is normal for employees in any situation to feel that they could be better 
remunerated. However, the dissatisfaction was expressed in such strong terms that this 
aspect merits further discussion. 
RDS had tried to set a competitive level of remuneration based on comparisons with other 
organisations. They were also aware that the nature of the labour market in Nigeria would 
enable them to replace staff easily if they left for better jobs. The author's experience of 
working as a consultant to a number of water supply institutions in Nigeria suggests that the 
level of remuneration for all staff grades was perhaps low but not out of keeping with 
prevailing salary levels within Nigeria. lt is also to be remembered that staff costs were shown 
in Sections 7.3.1 and 7.3.2 to be RUL's largest expenditure item. Further increases in the 
already large wage bill would have had a detrimental effect on RUL's financial position. RUL's 
attitude towards staff costs was, understandably, one of reducing them as far as possible. 
Pay differentials within the same organisation rather than absolute levels of remuneration are 
often the reasons for dissatisfaction (Torrington and Chapman, 1983; pp 305-317). lt was 
shown in Section 6.3.2 that RDS drew a distinction between the 'higher level' consultancy 
activities undertaken within RDS and the water selling activities within RUL and stated that the 
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salary scales would therefore need to be different. RUL's staff would have been aware of this 
and it could have been part of the cause of the resentment felt towards RDS. 
11 is difficult to generalise about the appropriate level of pay and conditions for workers in 
medium-scale water supply companies. This will depend on labour market conditions and the 
cost structure of individual businesses. lt may however be beneficial for businesses to 
consider performance related pay. 
8.3.5 Commercial orientation 
RUL 's pricing structure 
RUL employed a declining block tariff structure with a lower scale during the wet season. 
Figure 7.5 shows that large step reductions were offered between one jerry can and 2-9 jerry 
cans and between 2-9 jerry cans and 1 0-11 jerry cans. There was therefore a clear financial 
incentive for households to buy more than one jerry can. However, as the quantities required 
by households increased, they would be more likely to prefer the services provided by 
vendors due to the energy and time savings that this service would provide. According to 
studies of water vending (for example, Whittington et al., 1988) households would be 
prepared to pay higher prices for this convenience. 
Water vendors particularly during busy periods were likely to require more than 10 jerry cans 
per day. However, the unit price reductions offered for additional purchases beyond 11 jerry 
cans were negligible. The discounts were so small that it seems doubtful they had the 
intended effect of encouraging vendors to buy large quantities. The option for vendors to bring 
in cheaper water from elsewhere may therefore not have been completely countered by the 
pricing structure. This is borne out in the interviews with vendors reported in Section 5.6: 
Three of the four vendors interviewed believed that RUL's water was expensive. Three of the 
four stated that they sometimes imported water into the area from other locations. 
There would therefore appear to be some scope for more imaginative pricing. The remainder 
of this section provides a brief review of some pricing strategies indicated by microeconomic 
theory that might be applied by small and medium-scale water supply providers. The 
strategies discussed are covered in textbooks on microeconomics or managerial/ business 
economics for example, Baye (2000); Pindyck and Rubinfeld (2001 ). 
Pricing under perfect competition 
Situations approximating to perfect competition in water supply will probably only be found in 
the small-scale retail sector where there is an abundance of the product, for example where 
there is a dense network of taps and equal access by water retailers. In such cases, economic 
theory suggests that the market, rather than the seller, will determine prices. In the Karu-
Mararaba, these conditions did not exist. The tap density was low as discussed in Section 
8.2.2 and provided limited coverage. In the dry season in particular, both RUL and water 
vendors would have some scope for increasing prices in monopolistic fashion at least in those 
parts of the concession area where competition was not strong. 
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Pricing with market power 
Entrepreneurs engaged in bulk water supply at the small or medium scale or operating in a 
vertically integrated mode (production and distribution) will probably be operating with some 
market power and will be able to influence prices to some extent. In such situations profit -
maximising pricing strategies are available that recognise the fact that the amount consumers 
are willing to pay for additional units of a good or service declines as more units are 
purchased (extracting consumer surplus). The following pricing strategies might be applicable: 
• Second-degree price discrimination -charging based on a schedule of declining prices for 
different ranges of quantities (similar to the declining block tariff used in the Karu -
Mararaba area by RUL). As discussed above, the price differentials between the rate 
blocks were probably too small to have an appreciable effect. 
• Third-degree price discrimination - charging different prices to different customers based 
on their demand elasticities (for example, different prices for residents and businesses). 
• Peak load pricing- charging higher prices at times of high demand than during off-peak 
periods (a technique used by electric utilities). 
In situations where bulk water suppliers sell to distribution units (franchised retail outlets for 
example) optimising the internal price at which the bulk supplier sells to retailers (transfer 
pricing) can result in maximising the profits of both the bulk suppliers and retailers. 
Pricing under oligopoly 
0/igopo/y refers to a market structure in which there are only a few firms, each of which is 
large relative to the total industry. The situation in the Karu-Mararaba area where independent 
borehole operators were doing business in close proximity to RUL's franchisees therefore had 
characteristics of this market structure. We will recall from the findings presented in Section 
4.4.2 that there was intense price competition between RUL and its competitors. In such 
situations, the following practical pricing strategies might be viable: 
• Price matching - an operator advertises a price and promises to match any lower price 
• Loyalty schemes - for example adopting a 'frequent filler' strategy whereby rebates are 
offered to customers if they purchase given amounts of water 
The effectiveness of these pricing strategies for medium-scale urban water supply is related to 
the service level offered to customers. Where the service level is low, as was the case in the 
Karu-Mararaba area, customers would be more likely to make increasing use of alternative 
sources. As noted above, second degree price discrimination was being implemented in Karu-
Mararaba. Peak load pricing could have been used to encourage high volume customers 
(water vendors) to fill their jerry cans during periods of low demand by residential customers. 
RUL and its franchisees were using a form of price matching by lowering their prices in 
response to price reductions by competitors. Further research may however be required to 
evaluate fully the scope for innovation in pricing. 
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8.3.6 Customer orientation 
Knowledge of the customer 
lt was shown in Section 6.1.2 that RUL had reorganised its operations on cost reduction 
grounds by outsourcing its water retailing activities. Consequently, RUL's main business had 
changed from retailing to residents and water vendors to bulk water supply to a small number 
of franchised outlets. RUL had ceased to have direct transactional relationships with residents 
and water vendors buying water from its facilities. The findings presented in Section 6. 7, 
Table 6.3, do however indicate that RUL viewed the franchisees not as customers, but as 
RUL's 'agents', front office' or 'links to the customer', even though well over 90% of RUL's 
sales were directly to franchisees. 
While there was nothing wrong in RUL realising that the ultimate user of the product was the 
resident, they appeared to have focused on the principal-agent aspect of their relationships 
with franchisees rather than the customer-supplier aspect. The remainder of this section is 
devoted to a discussion of the basis for relationships between various business entities in 
medium-scale water supply. 
Business relationships 
The interviews with franchisees show a situation that is familiar in franchising, namely, 
dominance and control by the franchiser through coercive contractual terms in an attempt to 
solve various agency problems (Quinn, 1999). The franchise agreement presented in Section 
6.1.2 was categorical on the issue of price and permitted no variations except where 
confirmed in writing. Franchisees complained about their inability to react quickly to price 
reductions by their competitors. The instances of non-supply of water by RUL (Section 6.1.2) 
were unlikely to have improved relations and in any case constituted a breach of the terms of 
the franchise agreement by the franchiser (RUL). Franchise theory suggests that because the 
franchiser's (RUL's) initial motive was a purely financial one, the quality of the relationship 
with franchisees was unlikely to be high (Hopkinson and Hogarth-Scott, 1999). 
The business relationships between RUL, the bulk water supplier, and those engaged in 
retailing and distribution (kiosk owners and water vendors) however must be regarded as 
critical to the survival of RUL; transcending cost reduction considerations alone. This is 
because competitive pressure put on franch isees by lowering of competitors' prices could put 
franchisees out of business and in turn, adversely affect RUL's ability to sell its product in the 
market. The implications of this are that the survival of RUL's business in the long-term 
required a greater investment in improved relational quality and a greater emphasis on 
mutually beneficial terms of business with its partners. 
Agreements between medium-scale water businesses acting as franchisors and other 
business partners should give greater recognition and emphasis to the needs and aspirations 
of other parties in order to make the business relationships mutually beneficial (Pizanti and 
Lerner, 2003). 
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8.3. 7 Internal organisation 
The WASH guidelines for institutional assessment, on which the data collection for 
management issues was based, do not include organisational structure as a factor for 
success. The findings from this study suggest however that it can have a significant effect on 
the performance of medium-scale water supply organisations. RUL's decision to outsource its 
retailing activities resulted in significant changes to its organisational structure as shown in 
Figure 8.1. 
Nov. 2000 General 
Manage 
Accountin~ Admin Productio Mararaba Mararaba Ado 
5 staff 11 staff 4 Staff 8 staff 8 staff 7 staff 
Dec. 2 002 General 
Manager 
-------··---
•·········· 
Outsourced Retailing 
activities 
[ Production 1 r Admln Accounting 13 staff 3 Staff 2 staff 
Figure 8.1 Change in RUL organisational structure 
Findings presented in Section 6.1.2 showed that staff functions had been merged and that for 
example, the production engineer was involved in commercial, customer service and 
accounting tasks. The organisational structure therefore changed from a flat functionally 
based design (similar to the typical Nigerian Water Board structure) to a more compact one 
embodying some characteristics of a matrix design (see Child, 1984: pp 89- 109). 
Had RUL continued with the original organisational structure, the following might have been 
expected: High staff costs and losses from non-revenue water described in Section 6.1.2 
could have affected profitability negatively. The quality of service to customers would also 
have been lower, since one reason given for the reorganisation was that staff were often not 
available at the selling points at certain times of the day. RUL had shown itself to be capable 
of implementing organisational change in order to respond to the needs of customers. 11 
moved from a mechanistic form of organisation to what might be considered a more organic 
one in order to achieve this. lt is suggested (Child, 1984; p 101) that matrix organisations 
enjoy similar advantages to the organic systems described by Burns and Stalker (1961), 
especially the capacity to operate effectively in a dynamic environment. There are however, 
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dangers associated with reducing staff numbers. In the case of RUL, some staff members had 
already started to complain that they carried a disproportionate burden of the workload. 
8.3.8 Relative importance of rating indicators 
Sections 8.3.1 to 8.3.6 have discussed the study findings corresponding to the performance 
indicators suggested by the WASH guidelines (Cullivan et al., 1988). This analysis appears to 
suggest that the relative importance of some of the performance indicators might be different 
for private utilities operating at the medium-scale, compared with large urban utilities. Table 
8.3 below suggests relative importance based on the evidence presented in this study. 
Table 8.3 Relative importance of performance indicators 
WASH Suggested rating Performance guideline Relevance to medium-scale urban water for medium-Indicator supply operators scale water rating supply 
Autonomy The issue for indigenous medium-scale High water businesses is autonomy from High 
shareholders rather than from government 
Importance of top leadership will vary 
Leadership High depending on stage in the business cycle. Medium - High Leadership at all levels is likely to be 
important 
Management and There will most likely be less of a need for 
administrative Medium elaborate billing, accounting and other Medium -low 
systems systems 
Commercial Medium important for survival of commercial High orientation businesses 
Customer orientation Medium As above High 
Technical capability Low Technology in medium-scale water supply Low 
will often be simple 
Developing and Low Depends on labour market conditions Low maintainino staff 
Organisational Low Difficult to link to performance Low culture 
Interactions with Water suppliers at the medium scale are 
external institutions Low more vulnerable to consequences of Medium actions of external oroanisations 
Organisational A change of organisational structure No rating was an Important factor In operational High structure effectiveness 
The study findings indicate that organisational autonomy is a highly important factor for 
medium-scale water private sector supply although the main difference with public utilities is 
that autonomy from company owners rather than government is the critical factor. Although 
the value of effective top leadership is considered important, the concept of self-leadership at 
all levels is also likely to be important for medium-scale water supply. The WASH guidelines 
accord a medium importance to customer and commercial orientation. While this may be 
appropriate for public utilities, they are regarded as highly essential for medium-scale private 
sector water supply. A higher priority is suggested for "interactions with external 
organisations" for medium-scale private water supply, since the study findings show that such 
companies will be vulnerable to actions by external bodies, including government. Finally, 
organisational structure is suggested as an additional success factor for medium-scale urban 
water supply in low-income areas. Table 8.3 suggests relative importance and does not imply 
that any particular category is either indispensable or unimportant. 
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8.4 Financial aspects 
8.4. 1 Financial viability 
RDS had entered into the concession arrangement, partly based on their consultant's advice, 
believing that it would be possible to recover the cost of the investment with in 3 years (see 
Section 7 .5.1 ). Consequently, they arranged a 3-year loan at a high rate of interest (thought to 
be in the region of 25% per annum). The analysis in Chapter 7 showed that RDS, upon 
realising that it was impossible to recover the investment through the revenues from the 
concession, had absorbed the loss through their other business activities. 
Figure 8.2 below compares the monthly repayments for a loan amount of W29.7 million 
(equivalent to the value of RUL's long-term assets, see Table 7.5) at different rates of interest 
and levels of subsidy. Two rates of interest are compared: 25% (typically available from the 
Nigerian banking system) and 5% (a rate of interest that might have been available from a 
development bank). Repayments are compared with no subsidy (solid lines) and with 50% 
subsidy on the loan amount (dashed lines). A further arbitrary assumption is that repayments 
are limited to one third of the average monthly revenue during the life of the assets. 
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Figure 8.2 Loan term, interest rate and repayments 
Point 1 represents the actual case - 25% interest over 3 years. The required repayments 
were well in excess of average revenue. Had the loan been taken over 10 years (point 2) the 
repayments would have been approximately equal to total revenues and therefore unfeasible. 
Points 3 and 4 show the repayments that would have been required for a loan at 5% interest. 
With repayment periods of 3 years (point 3) and 10 years (point 4), the repayments would 
have been greater than that considered feasible. 
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A subsidised loan at 25% interest would also have resulted in unfeasible repayments 
irrespective of the repayment period (points 5 and 6). A subsidised low interest loan (5% 
interest) however, would only have been feasible for repayment periods of 6 to 10 years 
(points 8 and 9) 
Figure 8.2 shows that for a long-term loan, even at a low rate of interest, to have been 
feasible, a substantial subsidy (approximately 50% in this case) would have been required. 
In many developing countries, including Nigeria, long-term, low-interest finance is not 
available within the domestic banking system. Macroeconomic conditions and the state of 
development of the banking and finance sector will therefore be critical factors in determining 
the feasibility of pure concessions. Subsidised concessions or enhanced leasing 
arrangements (in which government participates in the financing of infrastructure) may 
therefore prove more feasible for indigenous PSP at the medium-scale in urban water supply. 
8.4.2 Financial management 
The financial data presented Chapter 7 show that RUL was capable of recovering cash 
operating costs in the absence of any subsidy from government or concessionary loans from 
funding institutions. Furthermore, it was shown that the company kept books of accounts, 
employed reasonably good financial management procedures and had taken a number of 
important measures to reduce operating costs. 
One potential threat to RUL's long-term financial stability relates to the extraction of significant 
cash amounts by the owners of the business in 2002. lt is not suggested that the shareholders 
were necessarily wrong to do so. lt must be remembered that they had made a substantial 
capital grant to the business to compensate for the fact that the business was not generating 
sufficient funds to meet loan-servicing costs. The reasons for the withdrawals were not 
established. lt may well be that the funds were extracted to meet other obligations related to 
the RUL business. Another possibility is that they were facing cash flow difficulties in their 
other businesses. Whatever the precise reason, this points to a potential difficulty with 
medium-scale water businesses where the ownership is separate from the management, and 
especially where the owners have other business interests outside water supply. 
The general problem arises as to how to ensure that water supply revenues in similar 
undertakings are ring-fenced. Financial regulation would seem to be one solution to this 
problem, although the findings of this and other studies might suggest that the prospects for 
effective regulation are low. Elements of the co-operative model (Nickson, 1998) and the 
Community Water Board approach (Fragano, 2001) might also be worth considering as they 
offer the prospect of a collective responsibility for good corporate governance. 
Part of the reason for the detailed expenditure control exercised by the owners (RDS) was 
that the business was not meeting its total costs (including loan repayments). While this was 
an understandable reaction, there may be grounds for suggesting that this was 
counterproductive. Operational managers were generating sufficient revenues to meet RUL's 
recurrent obligations. Had the loan repayment terms (over which RUL's operations managers 
had no control) been appropriate, there is every prospect that they would have been able 
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meet total costs. Operating a water supply system based on minimum expenditure is likely to 
result in the omission of necessary maintenance and reduced stocks of essential inputs such 
as fuel, leading to the vicious cycle of system decline. There were signs of this in the Karu-
Mararaba concession in late 2002: The reduced expenditure on fuel and lubricants reported in 
Section 7.3.6 is consistent with the generally lower revenue levels shown in Section 7.4.3. In 
addition, franchisees reported instances of prolonged non-supply by RUL due in one instance 
to a lack of fuel (see Section 6.1.2). A more beneficial long-term strategy could therefore have 
been adopted that might have involved making the investments needed to increase sales to 
levels that would permit an increasing proportion of capital costs to be met. 
8.4.3 Revenue forecasting 
Section 7.5 showed that RUL's design consultants substantially underestimated the revenues 
despite using demand estimates that seemed reasonable and in line with existing guidelines. 
For example, WELL (1998) reports average consumption from wells or communal stand posts 
located within 250m of a household of 15 1/cid to 50 1/c/d (see Table 2.3) compared with the 
20 1/c/d assumed. The following four factors are suggested as major contributors to the 
difficulty faced in revenue estimation: 
1. large seasonal variations in demand for water from standpipes and water vendors shown 
in figures 4.2 and 4.3. 
2. differentiation in source selection depending on the use to which the water was to be put 
which was shown in Section 5.2.4 to have resulted in households being more likely to buy 
water for relatively low volume uses such as cooking and drinking. 
3. the low density of the tap network discussed earlier in Section 8.2.2 resulting in under-
utilisation of RUL's water supply system. 
4. the reduction of RUL's market share as a result of the activities of competing sellers of 
borehole water. 
A further factor related to the effect of competition is that sales to franchisees which account 
for roughly 95% of RUL's total sales were made at a basic rate of 18 kobollitre (1>13.60 per 20 
litres) compared with the N7 per 20 litres assumed in the design projections. This is partly the 
result of an upper limit placed on the price of water by the State Government. In view of the 
competition from small-scale water providers in the area it seems unlikely that the N7 per 20 
litre price could have been sustained since RUL was forced to offer discounts to franchisees 
as shown in Chapter 6. 
Predicting revenues for medium-scale water supply systems in low-income urban areas is 
therefore complex, as a multiple factors must be taken into account. Some of the elements of 
revenue estimation, such as predicting source choices, rely on knowledge of advanced 
mathematical modelling techniques, for example, (Mu et al., 1990; Madanat and Humplick, 
1993) that would be beyond the scope of many consultants, not to mention small-scale water 
suppliers. What seems lacking is a simple unified methodology that can be readily applied in 
these situations. 
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Chapter9 
Conclusions and recommendations 
This chapter presents the conclusions of the study and recommendations for future research. 
Section 9.1 presents a general conclusion and detailed conclusions relating to the specific 
study objectives. Section 9.2 suggests areas for future research. 
9.1 Conclusions 
9.1.1 General conclusion 
The aim of this research was to assess the potential of the indigenous private sector in the 
provision and delivery of water supply infrastructure and services in low-income urban areas 
of developing countries at the medium scale. The overall conclusion is that indigenous 
businesses can provide a potentially viable and operationally sustainable model for water 
supply at the medium scale. In particular, the results of this research suggest that the 
competition that occurs in low income urban areas can force private operators to improve the 
quality of their services and keep prices low, even where government's capacity of to regulate 
is weak. 
Based on this study, the capacity of the authorities to ensure competition and promote the 
adoption of customer focused and commercially oriented approaches by indigenous 
businesses are identified as potential constraints to the fulfilment of this potential. 
Sections 9.1.2 to 9.1.6 present detailed conclusions relating to the following: 
• Appropriate contractual and regulatory arrangements 
• Infrastructure provision, design and operation 
• Success factors and constraints relating to utility management 
• Service levels available to customers 
• Financial viability and financial management 
9.1.2 Contractual and regulatory framework 
Contractual arrangements for indigenous private water supply 
1. The concession model adopted in Karu-Mararaba was successful from a government 
viewpoint in that it resulted in an improved water supply to some 15,000 people without 
any expenditure of government funds. However, insufficient revenues and lack of term-
finance resulted in the private operator not being able to recover costs related to capital 
investment. The concession model with full investment responsibility given to the private 
sector may not be widely replicable in medium-scale water supply due to macroeconomic 
and financial sector constraints faced by many developing countries. lt appears more 
likely that contractual frameworks requiring the indigenous private sector to undertake 
management of water supply facilities wholly or partly financed by Government may be 
more widely applicable. 
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Regulation of medium-scale water supply 
2. A key element of the Karu-Mararaba concession was the existence of competition among 
service providers. This is consistent with the findings in other low-income urban areas and 
distinguishes medium-scale water supply from the operations of large centralised public 
water utilities. Competition within the market provides opportunities for developing 
pragmatic approaches to regulation that are not entirely reliant on enforcement. Such 
approaches should recognise governments' capacity weaknesses and emphasise 
enabling roles that are related to improving water supply services. 
9.1.3 Infrastructure 
Infrastructure provision 
3. The water supply infrastructure for the Karu-Mararaba area was designed, constructed 
and commissioned within nine months at a reasonable cost. This is taken as an 
encouraging sign that the indigenous private sector has the potential to provide cost-
effective infrastructure solutions for medium-scale piped water supply within short time 
frames. 
Design and operation 
4. The design, operation and maintenance of water production infrastructure in the Karu-
Mararaba concession area were generally satisfactory. Operational problems linked to 
infrastructure design tended to occur in the distribution system, as is the case in many 
water supply systems. Appropriate design of distribution aspects may therefore be an 
important issue for medium-scale water supply. 
9.1.4 Service delivery 
5. The Karu-Mararaba water supply system comprised mainly a low-density communal tap 
system that provided a service level lower than that desired by the majority of residents. 
As a result, RUL's revenues were lower than would have been the case had the service 
level been more in line with the demand. Water service providers at the medium scale 
have the opportunity to respond to customer demand and at the same time enhance their 
profitability. The range of service options that customers require can be provided through 
a combination of appropriate technical system design and commercial strategy. 
9.1.5 Utility management 
Operational autonomy 
6. The study of the Karu-Mararaba concession confirmed that operational autonomy was a 
critical factor for successful water supply operation. The study further showed that 
autonomy from private sector shareholders might be a more relevant issue for medium-
scale water supply operators than autonomy from government. 
Commercial orientation 
7. A commercial orientation is essential for the survival of any business. lt is therefore 
considered to be of the highest priority for private indigenous water supply operators. lt is 
however, a relatively unexplored issue in urban water supply in developing countries. The 
results of this research suggest that the concepts of business economics can be applied 
to water pricing in low-income urban areas. 
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Customer orientation 
8. The study in the Karu-Mararaba area indicated that there was a low awareness on the 
part of RUL as to who its customers were. Important business partners were viewed as 
agents rather than as customers with the result that the quality of its relations with these 
entities was poor. The most effective form of business organisation in medium-scale water 
supply will often involve the outsourcing of important functions to other individuals and 
organisations. Contractual arrangements should therefore be developed in ways that take 
into account the needs and aspirations of all business partners. 
External factors 
9. The activities of external organisations were shown either to have affected or to have the 
potential to affect significantly, the operations of RUL. By comparison with lager utilities, 
companies operating at the medium scale in urban water supply are potentially more 
vulnerable to the actions of external bodies. 
Organisational structure 
1 0. Organisational structure is found to be an important additional factor affecting the 
performance of water supply business at the medium scale. The results of this study 
suggest that the involvement of local individuals and smaller scale businesses in water 
distribution can result in improved service quality and lead to increased revenues. 
Cultural factors 
11. The wide variation in cultural conditions within and across countries makes it impossible 
to prescribe one set of management principles that will be universally applicable. 
Appropriate approaches to issues such as leadership and the motivation of workers will 
therefore need to be developed for each situation. 
9.1.6 Financial aspects 
Financial management 
12. Where the ownership of medium-scale water supply businesses is separate from 
operational management, water businesses could be susceptible to the effects of tensions 
resulting from the divergent interests of shareholder interests and operations managers. 
Forecasting 
13. The forecasting of financial flows for water supply businesses operating in low-income 
urban areas at the medium-scale is complex. Approaches are required that take into 
account the interrelationships between variables such as seasonality, water use patterns, 
service levels, competition, and underlying demand. 
9.2 Recommendations for future work 
9.2.1 Regulatory frameworks 
The regulation of private sector activity in urban water supply particularly at the sub-national 
government level remains a difficult problem. However, the nature of the water supply market 
in low-income urban areas provides opportunities for a reassessment of government's 
regulatory role. Further work is required to develop regulatory frameworks for water supply in 
109 
low-income areas that take into account the potential for competition within the market, but 
also recognise governments' limitations. 
9.2.2 Demand assessment and forecasting 
The technical simplicity and limited scale of water supply systems in low-income urban areas 
belies the difficulty of accurately forecasting revenues for small and medium-scale operators 
wishing to enter the water services market. This requires methodologies that take into account 
multiple factors that affect demand including seasonality, multiple source use, differentiation in 
source selection and the effects of competition from other suppliers. Available demand 
assessment methodologies are either too mathematically complex or do not take into account 
some of these factors. Further work is required to develop practical but robust approaches 
that can be used with ease by prospective medium-scale operators and their advisers. 
9.2.3 Business frameworks 
This research has shown that cooperation between water service providers operating at the 
medium-scale and other individuals and businesses in low-income urban areas is important 
for success. Further work is required to develop principles under which such relationships can 
be developed within a competitive environment. 
9.2.4 Commercial orientation 
This research established that the commercial orientation of RUL was limited. There is little 
specific guidance in the literature regarding commercial practices for water businesses in low-
income urban areas. Further work is required to develop approaches to commercial pricing 
and marketing for medium-scale water businesses. 
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Data Schedule 
Item Location In thesis 
Interview No. CF1 - Director, Nasarawa State Ministry Chapter4 
of Water Resources and Rural Development • 
Interview No. CF2 - Secretarf and- Legal-Adviser, Chapter4-
Nasarawa State Water Board • 
Interview No. CF3- with Legal Adviser, RDS Chapter4 
Interview No. UM1 - Administrative Officer I Secretary Chapter 6 
RUL * 
Interview No. UM2 - Production and Maintenance Chapter6 
Engineer, RUL • 
Interview No. UM3 - General Manager, RUL • Chapter6 
Interview No. UM4 - Group General Manager, RDS • Chapter 6 
Interview No. UM5- Former General Manager, RUL • Chapter 6 
Franchisee Interviews Section 6.1.2. 
Water Vendor Interviews Section 5.6 
Water Usage Survey Sections 5.2, 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5 
Letter confirming concession ** Chapter 4.1.2 
Infrastructure design assumptions** Section 5.1.2 and 7.5 
RUL Report and Accounts (2000/2001) Chapter 7; Appendix A5.1 
RUL Monthly expenditure records (2000 - 2002) Chapter 7, Appendices A5.2; A5.3; A5.4 
RUL Monthly revenue records (2000 - 2002) Chapter 7; Appendix A5.5 
Staff turnover details Section 6.5.5 
*Full transcripts are available from Water Engineering and Development Centre, (WEDC) 
Loughborough University 
•• Copies available from researcher 
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- ------ ----- -------------- --
Water usage questionnaire 
Interviewer Name Date I I 
SP/Ref No. HH No. 
Distance code Respondent: Male Female Child 
Section 1: Water Sources 
PART A: Main Water Sources- wet season 
To start with, I would like to learn about the different sources you or someone in your family get water 
from during the wet season, INCLUDING HAWKERS "mai·ruwa" 
1. Firstly I Would Like To Know Where You Get Your Water From during the wet season? 
.Rank in order of VOLUME: "1" for the most used, "2" for the next and so on] 
TYPE OF SOURCE 
Private well Owned I shared 
RUL Tap 
Other seller's Tap 
Neighbour's tap 
Pond or Dam 
River or stream 
Water hawker 
Rainwater• 
Tanker 
Other (specify) ............ 
RANK NAME OF SOURCES: 
SOURCE 1 ...................... . 
SOURCE2 ..................... . 
SOURCE3 ..................... . 
Go to parts B & C if more than 
one wet season source 
• Observation: Is There Guttering And Tank/Drum For Rainwater Collection? 
D Yes D No 
2. Why Do You Choose To Get Water From [say name of 151 source] 
[If only one reason is given say "are there any other reasons why you get water from this 
source?" TICK EACH answer the person gives] 
TICK REASONS TICK REASONS 
1 5 lt is the onl 
2 6 lt is the onl 
3 7 Personallfamil reasons 
4 8 Other ................... .. 
3. What Do You Use This Water For?[/f only one use is given say "do you use this 
water for anything else?" Tick EACH answer the person gives] 
TICK , USE TICK 
1 5 
2 6 
3 7 
4 house 8 Other ................................ . 
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4. What Kind Of Container Do You Use To Collect Water And How Big Is lt? 
[Ask person to show you if you are not clear] 
Type of container Approximate Litres 
5. How Many Jerry Cans (or other vessel) of Water do you use from this source 
each day? 
Number of Jerry Can/other container 
6. Do you pay for the water from this source? !IF NO GO TO QUESTION 81 
D Yes D No 
7. How much do you pay for a Jerry Can Or other vessel? I N: /jerry can 
Please include how much they pay a neighbour if applicable ...__ _______ __. 
8. How often is there no water at this source? 
D At least every day D At least once a month 
D Only occasionally D At least once a week 
PART B: Second Water Source- wet season 
1. Why Do You Choose To Get Water From This second Source? 
[If only one reason is given say "are there any other reasons why you get water from this 
source?" TICK EACH answer the person gives] 
TICK REASONS TICK REASONS 
1 Nearness 6 Poor quality at 1'' source 
2 Price 7 1'' source is inconvenient or crowded 
3 Good quality 8 Personal/family reasons 
4 No water at 15 ' source 9 Other ..................... 
5 Always available ............................... 
2. What Do You Use This Water For? 
[If only one use is given say "do you use this water for anything else?" Tick EACH 
answer the person gives] 
TICK USE TICK USE 
1 Bathing 5 Animals 
2 Cooking 6 Gardening 
3 Drinking 7 Laundry 
4 Cleaning house 8 Other ........................... 
3. What Kind Of Container Do You Use To Collect Water And How Big Is lt? 
[Ask person to show you if you are not clear] 
Type of container Approximate Litres 
4. How Many Jerry Cans (Other Vessel} Of Water Do You Use From This Source Each Day? 
Number of Jerry Can/other container 
5. Do You Pay For The Water From This Source? [IF NO. GO TO QUESTION 71 
D Yes D No 
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6. How Much Do You Pay For A Jerry Can or drum? N -/jerry can 
L-------~~------~ 
7. How Often Is There No Water From This Source? 
D At least every day 
D At least once a week 
Part C: Third source ·wet season 
D At least once a month 
D Only 
1. Why Do You Choose To Get Water From This third Source? 
occasionally 
[If only one reason is given say "are there any~ reasons why you get water from this 
source?" TICK EACH answer the person gives) 
TICK REASONS TICK REASONS 
1 Nearness f-6=---+-:P:-o_o_r_u-a""lit,.....a""'t""'1"'•,...s-o-u-r-ce------l 
2 7 1' source is inconvenient or crowded 
3 8 Personal/famil reasons 
4 When no water at 15 9 Other •......•.•.•......... 
source 
5 Alwa s available 
2. What Do You Use This Water For? 
[/f only one use is given say "do you use this water for anything else?" Tick EACH answer 
the person gives] 
TICK 
' USE TICK ; USE 
1 • Bathin 5 ; Animals 
2 : Cookin 6 Gardenin 
3 ~ Drinking .7 Laundry 
' 
4 1 Cleanin house 8 ! Other •••••••••••••••..•...••.••• 
3. What Kind Of Container Do You Use To Collect Water And How Big Is lt? 
[Ask person to show you if you are not clear} 
Type of container Approximate Litres 
4. How Many Jerry Cans (Other Vessel) Of Water Do You Collect From This Source Each 
Day? 
Number of Jerry Can/other container 
5. Do you pay for the water from this source? !IF NO GO TO QUESTION 71 
D Yes D No 
6. How much do you pay for a Jerry Can? N: /jerry can 
Please include price from a neighbour's tap if applicable 
7. How often is there no water at this source? 
o At least every day o At least once a month 
o At least once a week o Only occasionally 
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PART D: Main Water Sources ·dry season 
Now, I would like to learn about the different sources you or someone in your family get 
water from during the dry season , INCLUDING HAWKERS "mai-ruwa" 
1. Firstly I Would Like To Know Where You Get Your Water From during the dry 
season? 
Rank in order of importance: "1" for the most used, "2" for the next and so on] 
TYPE OF SOURCE 
Private well Owned I shared 
RUL Tap 
Other seller's Tap 
Neighbour's tap 
Pond or Dam 
River or stream 
Water hawker 
Tanker 
Other (specify) ............ 
NAME OF SOURCES: 
SOURCE 1 ...................... . 
SOURCE 2 .................... .. 
SOURCE 3 .................... .. 
Go to parts E & F if more than one 
wet season source 
2. Why Do You Choose To Get Water From [say name of 151 source] 
[If only one reason is given say "are there any other reasons why you get water from this source?" 
TICK EACH answer the person gives} 
TICK REASONS TICK REASONS 
1 Nearness 5 lt is the only source 
2 Price 6 lt is the only tap 
3 Good quality 7 Personal/family reasons 
4 Always available 8 Other ................ 
3. What Do You Use This Water For?[/f only one use is given say "do you use this water 
for anything else?" Tick EACH answer the person gives] 
TICK ! USE ·TICK ; USE 
1 Bathing 5 :Animals . 
2 i Cooking 6 i Gardening 
3 'Drinking 7 · Laundry 
4 i Cleaning house 8 i Other .............................. 
4. What Kind Of Container Do You Use To Collect Water And How Big Is lt? 
[Ask person to show you if you are not clear] 
Type of container Approximate Litres 
5. How Many Jerry Cans (Or other Vessel) Of Water Do You use From This Source 
Each Day? 
Number of Jerry Can/other container '--'--------' 
6. Do you pay for the water from this source? !IF NO GO TO QUESTION 8] 
D Yes D No 
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7. How much do you pay for a Jerry Can Or other vessel? 
Please include how much they pay a neighbour if applicable 
8. How often is there no water at this source? 
N: /jerry can 
o At least every o At least once a month 
o day At least once a week o Only occasionally 
PARTE: Second Water Source· dry season 
Let me ask you about the second source you get water from during the DRY SEASON 
1. Why Do You Choose To Get Water From This second Source? 
[If only one reason is given say "are there any other reasons why you get water from this 
SOURCE?" TICK EACH answer the person gives] 
TICK REASONS TICK REASONS 
1 Nearness 6 Poor quality at 1°" source 
2 Price 7 1" source Is inconvenient or crowded 
3 Good quality 8 Personal/family reasons 
4 When no water at 1"' 9 Other ..................... 
source ............................... 
5 Always available 
2. What Do You Use This Water For? 
[If only one use is given say "do you use this water for anything else?" Tick EACH 
answer the person gives] 
TICK USE TICK USE 
1 Bathing 5 Animals 
2 Cooking 6 Gardening 
3 Drinking 7 Laundrv 
4 Cleaning house 8 Other ......................... 
................................ 
4. What Kind Of Container Do You Use To Collect Water And How Big Is lt? 
[Ask person to show you if you are not clear] 
Type of container Approximate Litres 
5. How Many Jerry Cans (Other Vessel) Of Water Do You Use From This Source Each 
Day? 
Number of Jerry Can/other container 
6. Do You Pay For The Water From This Source? !IF NO. GO TO QUESTION 71 
o Yes o No 
7. How Much Do You Pay For A Jerry Can or drum? 
8. How Often Is There No Water FROM THIS SOURCE? 
0 
0 
At least every day 
At least once a week 
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0 
0 
/jerry can 
At least once a month 
Only occasionally 
Part F: Third source -dry season 
1. Why Do You Choose To Get Water From This Third Source? 
[If only one reason is given say "are there any other reasons why you get water from this 
source?" TICK~ answer the person gives] 
TICK REASONS TICK REASONS 
1 Nearness 6 Poor quality at 15 ' 12"" source 
2 Price 7 15 ' 12'"' source is Inconvenient or crowded 
3 Good quality 8 Personal/family reasons 
4 No water at 1" I 2"" source 9 Other ............. 
5 Always available 
2. What Do You Use This Water For? 
[If only one use is given say "do you use this water for anything else?" Tick EACH answer the person 
gives] 
TICK i USE . TICK 1 USE 
1 : Bathing 5 i Animals 
2 ; Cooking_ 6 'Gardening 
3 i Drinking !7 · Laundry 
4 • Cleaning house 8 ' Other .................................. 
3. What Kind Of Container Do You Use To Collect Water And How Big Is lt? 
[Ask person to show you if you are not clear] 
Type of container 
L-------------~ 
Approximate Litres 
4. How Many Jerry Cans (Other Vessel) Of Water Do You Collect From This Source 
Each Day? 
Number of Jerry Can/other container 
5. Do you pay for the water from this source? [IF NO GO TO quESTION n 
o Yes 0 No 
6. How much do you pay for a Jerry Can? I w. 
Please include price from a neighbour's tap if applicable 
L---------------~ 
ljerry can 
7. How often is there no water from this source? 
o At least every day o At least once a month 
o At least once a week o Only occasionally 
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Section 2: Hawkers 
I would now like to ask you about whether you ever buy water from a hawker. 
1. Why Do You Buy From The Hawker? 
[If give only one reason, ask "is there any other reason?': Tick EACH answer given] 
TICK REASON TICK REASON 
1 Lack of assistance in the 5 No other source 
home to fetch water 
2 water points are far away 6 Restricted access to other sources (long 
3 Hawkers are convenient 7 
4 poor quality of other sources 8 
Section 3: RUL services 
I would now like to ask your opinion about the water services being offered by water 
sellers 
1. Have you heard of a company called RU Water/RUURU? 
o Yes o No 
2. How do you think RU Water can improve the service they give you 
[If only one SUGGESTION is given say "are there any other ways RU can improve its service?" 
TICK EACH answer the person gives] 
TICK IMPROVEMENT TICK IMPROVEMENT 
1 More selling points 5 Lower price 
2 House connections 6 Open earlier in the morning 
3 More boreholes 7 Stav open till later in the evening 
4 Better quality water 8 Less queues at selling points 
Section 4: Socio-demographic Information 
Finally, I would like to ask you some information about your household 
1. How Many People Live In Your Household? 
No. Women No. of Men No. of Children 
2. How Many Rooms Do You And Your Family Live In? 
135 
-------------------------------
Appendix 3. 
Report of the technical operations committee 
(September 2002) 
136 
12'" September 2002 
From: Members of the Operation Committee (Technical) 
To: The Chairman RUL 
PROBLEMS AT SITES 
Right from the inauguration of this committee, a lot of effort has been put in to correct some of 
the anomalies noticed in the operations of the company especially the technical aspect. 
lt was noticed that most of the generators were in a deplorable condition, there were no 
vibration dampers to take away the effect of shock on the machinery and the shafting 
systems. The generators were not being serviced as at when due, there were both oil and 
diesel leakages noticed on the generators, there was no strict monitoring of supply and usage 
of diesel. These boreholes were never flushed; the submersible pumps were never serviced. 
This led to the frequent breakdown of these pumps. 
All these problems, the committee have been doing its utmost best to take care of. But most 
times, the work of the committee is constrained by the lack of funds. We believe that a lot of 
profit will accrue to the company, if things are done properly vis-a-vis putting our machineries 
in proper shape and also putting an effective means of revenue collection in place. 
Some of the problems needing urgent attention for each of the sites are listed below. 
WATER SUPPLY 
Water supply has not been to encouraging resulting in to the loss of two selling points which 
has been attributed to size of pipes used to supply (2"), it is very important we convert this 
supply pipes to 3" pipes immediately. 
MARARABAI 
(i) Flushing of all the Three Boreholes 
Since the sinking of these boreholes, they have never been flushed. Borehole flushing is very 
important as this helps to preserve the life span of the submersible pumps. Most of the 
sand/stones and other impurities clog on to the shafting systems of the pump thereby causing 
the motor to burn. 
Secondly, it helps to increase the water yield of the borehole. Presently four submersible 
pumps of the company are damaged due to this reason. 
liil Construction of chambers and Wellhead Basement for one of the Boreholes 
This is very important to protect the boreholes from sand/stones and impurities that can 
contaminate the water and also damage the submersible pump. Also, it will save the pump 
from being tampered with by humans. The former head was damaged during storms last rainy 
season. 
(iii) Flushing of the Tanks and Chlorination 
Of recent, there has been complaint from our customers that the water we sell to them is 
discoloured and smells. To solve this problem, the overhead tanks have to be washed 
thoroughly and chlorinated. 
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(ivl De-carbonisation and Servicing of the Injectors and Nozzles 
There is need to remove carbon deposits found inside the engines. This is because they 
cause the engine to overheat and thereby leading to the breakdown of the machine. This 
becomes very necessary for us to do periodically because of the design of the generators at 
site and also due to the harsh weather condition during dry season. 
Also the Nozzles and the injectors have to be pressure tested for optimum performance of the 
machines periodically. 
lvl Replacement of the Damaged Pump 
For the past two months, only two boreholes are operational. lt will be prudent for us to install 
a new submersible pump (motor) in the non-functional borehole to enable us meet up with the 
explosion in demand of water during the dry season. 
(vi) Purchase of a new Battery for cranking of the Generator 
The old battery being used has gone bad. Three out of the six cells in the battery are dead 
and so the battery needs to be changed. 
(viil Changing of Water Meter to the Overhead Tank 
There is the utmost need to know the quantity of water being produced as this can go a long 
way to show the production level and quantify the quantity produced daily and distribution at 
each of the sites. This would enable us to calculate the revenue, losses and hence know 
whether the company is making profit or not. 
(viiil Availability of Servicing Parts 
The importance of servicing the generators as at when due cannot be overemphasised. 1t is a 
well-known fact that a generator that is well maintained and serviced, always works perfectly 
and lasts long. For this to be done, some serviceable parts such as fuel filters, air-filters 
should be kept in stock so that whenever a machine (generator) is due for servicing, it will be 
done without much stress and delay. 
Secondly, some tools needed for these servicing and other minor jobs should be provided 
such as filter remover, feeler gauges, AVO-meter and a set of socket spanners. 
MARARABAit 
(i) Flushing of the two boreholes 
(ii) Flushing of the overhead tank and chlorination 
(iii) De-carbonisation and servicing of the injectors and nozzles 
(iv) Changing of the water meter to the overhead tank. 
MARABAIII 
(i) Flushing of the overhead tank and chlorination 
(ii) De-carbonisation of the generator and servicing of the injectors and nozzles 
(iii) Changing of water meter to the overhead tank. 
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ADO 
(i) Flushing of the boreholes (3 boreholes) 
(ii) Construction of a chamber cover for two of the boreholes 
(iii) Flushing the tank and chlorination 
(iv) De-carbonisation and servicing of the injectors and nozzles 
(v) Welding of the neck of the oil inlet to the sump. 
SERVICING OF GENERATORS 
To cushion the effect of overheating during the dry season, the generators will be serviced 
once in two weeks. During servicing, oil additives will be used; this will help to maintain the 
viscosity of the oil. Each of the generators will require one tin of engine oil additive. So for the 
dry season spanning from October to March, we will require 12 (twelve) tins of oil additive. 
SUPPLY OF DIESEL 
For some time now, we have been experiencing scarcity of diesel in Abuja and its environs. 
Sometime last week, due to scarcity of diesel, we were forced to buy unknowing twenty five 
litres of adulterated diesel from "black market" which caused problems to the generator. To 
avoid this, we will like to stock diesel in readiness for the dry season. it will be wise to fill each 
of the tanks at the various sites with diesel as soon as it is available. Each of the tanks should 
take a maximum of 550 litres of diesel. Disregarding NEPA, this should last for a period of 
three-four weeks during the dry season. 
SUPPLY OF ENGINE OIL 
We will also require a drum of high grade DLMP-30 engine oil. This will invariably take us 
through the dry season. 
If all these things are done, the problem of machineries breaking down during the dry season 
will be a thing of the past and with an effective means of revenue collection, from all indication 
should all this be put in place immediately we would not have any interruption during the dry 
season weather the company should be realising between two- three million (N2 million - N3 
million) monthly during the dry season. 
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The Chi Square test 
This appendix provides a brief explanation of the Chi square test with particular reference to 
its application in Section 5.2.4. In Section 5.2.4 we were interested in establishing whether 
there was a statistically significant relationship between the uses of water and whether the 
water was paid for or not. 
The Chi square test enables us to determine whether or not there is a structured or systematic 
difference between categorical variables. In this case there were two variables: source type, 
(the independent or explanatory variable) and use of water (the dependent variable or 
outcome). In other words, the type of water source explained how the water was used. 
Both variables had two categories as follows: 
(i) source type:- whether the source used was (a) free (for example, an owned well or 
rainwater) or (b) paid for (for example water from a water vendor or RUL's taps), and 
(ii) use of water:- the use to which water was put (a} a potable use or (b) a non potable use 
The Chi square test enables us to determine whether one of two hypotheses is true: 
• The Null hypothesis (H0 ): There is no structured difference between the variables 
• The Alternative hypothesis (H1): There is a structured difference between the variables 
Chi-square statistic (x2) provides a measure of the "distance" between a table of expected 
values (corresponding to the case where there is no structured difference) and a table of real 
observed frequencies. A large l signifies a large difference between the observed data and 
the expected frequencies, implying that there is a systematic relationship. A small x2 signifies 
a small difference and implies that there is no systematic relationship. 
Having determined the value of x2, there then remains the question of judging whether its 
value exceeds some critical value that allows us to infer a structured relationship. This 
depends on the size of the table and the level of significance at which the test is being carried 
out. In this example the test was done at the 95% as is usual in the social sciences. 
The size of the table is expressed as the number of degrees of freedom (df), defined as; 
df = (number of rows - 1 l + (number of columns - 1 ). 
In our example, the number of degrees of freedom was therefore "1 ". 
From statistical tables it is possible to determine the critical values of ()(2) corresponding to 
various significance levels and degrees of freedom. For this case the critical value was 3.84. 
The calculated value of Chi square in the dry season (4.89) exceeded this figure and we 
therefore concluded that there was most probably a structured relationship between the two 
variables. For the wet season, the calculated x2 (1.72) was below the threshold value and we 
conclude that there was probably no structured relationship. 
11 is possible to calculate the probability (p) that a given x2 value is exceeded. In our case, the 
probabilities were 2.7% and 19% for the dry and wet seasons respectively. Since we were 
testing at the 95% significance level, this implies that the dry season x2 value was higher than 
the critical value and lower for the wet season. 
Further detail can be found in (Gayle, 2000: pp 385-397). 
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Financial data 
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A5.1 RUL Accounts (2000 I 2001) 
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BALANCE SHEET 5 
PROFIT AND LOSS ACCOUNT 6 
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NOTES TO THE ACCOUNTS 9-10 
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Page 1 
RIVEROAKS UTILITIES LIMITED 
CORPORATE INFORMATION 
1 BOARD OF DIRECTORS 
Humairi Ahmed 
Olatunji Baoku 
Jibrin Ahmed 
2 SECRETARY 
Mohammed Yaro Zakari 
3 REGISTERED OFFICE 
68 Mississippi Street 
Ministers Hill 
Maitama - Abuja. 
4 AUDITORS 
Messrs Dele Afunku & Co 
Chartered Accountants 
18, Balogun Street 
Anifowoshe, lkeja. 
5 BANKERS 
Inland Bank (Nig) Plc 
Bank of the North Ltd 
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RIVEROAKS UTILITIES L TD 
DIRECTORS' REPORT FOR THE YEAR ENDED 30TH JUNE. 2001 
The Directors submit their 1'1 Report together with the Audited Accounts of the company for 
the period ended 301" June 2001. 
1 OPERATING RESULT 
Profit/(Loss} before Taxation 
Taxation 
Retained Earnings 
2 NATURE OF BUSINESS 
2001 
=N= 
(5,014,533) 
(5,014,533) 
The company is a pioneering company in business of drilling, packaging and distribution of 
drinking water. 
3 DIRECTORS OF BUSINESS 
The following person serves on the Company's Board during the year: 
Humairi Ahmed 
Olatunji Baoku 
Jibrin Ahmed 
4 FIXED ASSETS 
Movements in fixed assets during the year are shown on Note 2 of pages 8 and 9. 
In the opinion of the directors, market value of the company's properties is not less 
than value shown in the accounts. 
5. EMPLOYMENT AND EMPLOYEES 
a) Health and Safety at Work and Welfare of Employees 
Health and safety regulations are in force within the premises of the company. The 
company provides subsidy towards transportation, housing and medical to all 
employees. 
b) Employees Improvement and Training 
The company is committed to keeping employees as fully informed as possible 
regarding the company's performance and progress and seeking their views 
whenever practicable on matters which particularly affect them as employees. 
Management professional and technical expertise is the company's major assets, 
and investment in their further development continues. 
Dated this day of _____ .2001 
By order of the Board 
M. Y.ZAKARI 
COMPANY SECRETARY 
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REPORT OF THE AUDITORS TO THE MEMBERS 
OF RIVEROAKS UTILITIES LIMITED 
Page3 
We have examined the financial statements of RIVEROAKS UTILITIES LIMITED set out on 
page 5 and 11 and have obtained all relevant information and explanations, which we 
considered necessary. 
Proper books have been kept and the Financial Statements, which are in agreement 
therewith, comply with the requirement of the companies and Allied Matters Decree 1990. 
To the best of our knowledge and belief, the company complied with the guidelines of the 
Productivity, Price and Income Board during the period ended 301h June 2001. 
In our opinion, the Financial Statements, which have been prepared on the basis of the 
accounting policies set out on page 9, give a true and fair view of the state of the company's 
financial affairs as at 30th June 2001 and of its Profit and Loss, Cash Flow Statement for the 
period ended on the date. 
Lagos- Nigeria 
1 o'h October 2001 
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DELE AFUNKU & CO 
Chartered Accountants 
RIVEROAKS UTILITIES LIMITED 
BALANCE SHEET AS AT 30TH JUNE 2001 
EMPLOYMENT OF FUNDS 
Fixed Assets 
Current Assets 
Less: Current Liabilities 
Net Current Assets 
Pre-operational Expenses 
FUNDS EMPLOYED 
Share Capital 
Riveroaks Drake & Sweeney 
Profit and Loss Account 
NOTES 
2 
3 
4 
9 
6 
7 
........................................................... ) 
........................................................... ) DIRECTORS 
........................................................... ) 
2001 
=N= 
The Accounting Policies and Notes !hereon form part of this account. 
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34,006,213 
1,085,372 
10,420,000 
(9,334,628) 
176,000 
24,847,585 
1,000,000 
28,862,118 
(5,014,533) 
24,847,585 
RIVEROAKS UTILITIES LIMITED 
PROFIT AND LOSS ACCOUNTS FOR THE PERIOD ENDED 
30TH JUNE 2001 
Turnover 
Less Closing stock 
Gross Profit 
DEDUCTIONS: 
Salaries and wages 
Distribution Expenses 
Repairs and maintenance 
Motor vehicle expenses 
Printing & Stationary 
Office Expenses 
Operating fuel 
Medical and Staff fuel 
Local transport expenses 
Electricity bills 
General Expenses 
Bank Interest, Charges etc 
Miscellaneous Expenses 
Professional charges 
Audit fee 
Rent 
Depreciation 
Net Profit/(Loss) for the period 
Taxation 
Profit/(Loss) after Taxation 
Balance Brought Forward 
Retained Earnings 
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NOTES 2001 
1 
6,005,443 
218,253 
413,980 
257,110 
170,555 
115,196 
1,076,876 
225,410 
250,380 
106,670 
306,968 
1,851,876 
27,570 
50,000 
120,000 
145,000 
5,455,641 
PageS 
=N= 
11,810,368 
27,970 
11,782,398 
16,796,931 
(5,014,533) 
(5,014,533) 
(5,014,533) 
RIVEROAKS UTILITIES LIMITED 
STATEMENT OF VALUE ADDED FOR THE PERIOD ENDED 
30TH JUNE 2001 
Turnover 
Bought in materials and services 
Value Added 
APPLIED AS FOLLOWS: 
Employees salaries 
Provision for Fixed Assets 
Depletion in shareholders fund 
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% 
50 
46 
(196) 
100 
Page 6 
2001 
=N= 
11,810,368 
11,341,289 
469,079 
=N= 
6,005,443 
5,455,642 
11,930,164 
467,079 
- ~~~------------~-- -
RIVEROAKS UTILITIES LIMITED 
CASHFLOW STATEMENT FOR THE PERIOD ENDED 
30TH JUNE 2001 
OPERATING ACTIVITIES 
Profiti(Loss before Taxation) 
Adjustment for items not involving movement of funds 
Depreciation 
Funds from ordinary operating activities 
FINANCING ACTIVITIES/OTHER SOURCES 
Share Issue proceeds 
Shareholders' Deposit (Holding) 
INVESTING ACTIVITIES 
Pre-operational 
Purchase of Fixed Assets 
Net Movement in Working Capital 
CHANGES IN WORKING CAPITAL COMPONENTS 
lncrease/(Decrease) in stock 
lncrease/(Decrease) in Debtors 
lncrease/(Decrease) cash and bank balances 
(Increase )/Decrease in creditors accruals 
lncrease/(Decrease) in working capital 
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2001 
=N= 
(5,014,533) 
5,455,642 
441,109 
1,000,000 
28,962,118 
30,402,227 
176,000 
39,461,855 
9,434,628 
27,970 
157,913 
(9,997,598) 
120,000 
9,434,628 
RIVEROAKS UTILITIES LIMITED 
NOTES TO THE ACCOUNT FOR THE PERIOD ENDED 
30TH JUNE, 2001 
1 I ACCOUNTING POLICIES 
PageS 
The following summaries the accounting policies applied by the company in arriving at 
the accompanying accounts. 
a) Basis of Accounting 
The accounts are prepared on the historical cost basis. No adjustment has been 
made in the accounts for the effect of inflation and rising prices. 
b) Turnover 
Turnover comprises the net value of sales invoiced to third parties. 
c) Depreciation 
Depreciation on fixed assets is calculated to write-off the cost on a straight 
line basis over the expected useful life of the assets concerned. 
Annual depreciation provision is charged to the profit and loss account. 
Motor vehicle 
Machinery & Equipment 
Office Furniture & Fittings 
Bill Boards etc 
d) Stock 
25% 
10% 
20% 
50% 
Stocks are valued at the lower of cost and net realizable value. 
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2. FIXED ASSETS' SCHEDULE 
Land at PI I & Office Motor Bill COST Tap an Furniture Boards, Total 
Locations Equipment & Fittings Vehicle Shade ate 
=N= =N= =N= =N= =N= =N= 
Balance b/f 
Acquisition during the period 7,000,000 29,722,590 974,325 1,650,000 114,940 39,461,855 
Balance cif 7,000,000 29,722,590 974,325 1,650,000 114,940 39,461,855 
PROVISION FOR 
DEPRECIATION 
Balance b/f 
For the period 4,458,389 292,298 618,750 86,205 5,455,642 
Balance elf 4,458,389 292,298 618,750 86,205 5,455,642 
NET BOOK VALUE 7,000,000 25,264,201 682,027 1,031,250 28,735 34,006,213 
3. CURRENT ASSETS 2001 
Pre-payment 340,000 
Stock 27,970 
Debtors 415,000 
Cash at Bank: Aso Savings & Loans 302,402 
1,085,372 
4. CURRENT LIABILITIES 
Creditors and Accruals 120,000 
Taxation 
Bank of the North 10,300,000 
10,420,000 
5. OPERATING RESULTS 
The operating profit is stated after charging the following: 
Directors Emolument 
Audit fees 120,000 
Depreciation 5,455,642 
6. SHARE CAPITAL 
a) Authorized Capital1,000,000 Ordinary 
N1 000 000 
Shares of N 1.00 each 
b) Issued and fully paid-up 5,000,000 
N5 000 000 
Ordinary Shares of N1.00 each 
7. Riveroaks Utilities Limited is wholly owned by Riveroaks Drake & Sweeney Limited 
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A5.2 Expenditure summary (2000) 
2000 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec TOTAL 
Salaries and Wages 323,570 326,565 291,450 325,245 329,495 264,160 96,000 457,040 371,149 325,124 3,109,796 
Staff Welfare 
- -
4,500 3,000 3,000 2,210 3,460 12,630 29,020 
Leave Grant 
- - - - - - - - - - -
Medical - - - - - - - - - - -
PAYE - - - - - - - - - - -
Printing and Stationery 41,340 6,000 7,430 5,250 9,150 10,370 4,740 13,475 6,000 107,755 
Office Expenses 413,650 500 25,100 24,300 11,200 115,360 2,450 3,610 1,610 9,020 606,620 
Local transport 5,500 7,220 6,500 7,450 6,900 21,700 14,900 17,500 14,250 12,630 114,750 
Rent 
-
145,000 - - - - - - - - 145,000 
Miscellaneous 
-
231,390 2,510 12,650 22,150 13,400 6,450 109,500 
- -
400,250 
Hotel and Others 
- - - - - - - - - - -
RUL - - - - - - - - - - -
Distribution System 66,125 11,610 30,260 6,500 14,400 20,270 7,560 63,530 23,190 9,360 255,045 
Plants and Equipment 16,760 14,690 2,640 30,400 5,445 1,300 3,200 
-
3,700 10,450 90,605 
Maint. of Building & S.P 
- - - - - - - - - - -
Motor Vehicle 1,500 - 4,000 2,500 600 10,250 4,250 26,700 17,300 7,100 74,400 
Diesel 
- - - - - - - - - -
-
Fuel and Lubricants 41,240 61,050 70,030 27,320 36,490 74,350 37,600 56,460 95,600 76,200 576,560 
Utilities 
- - -
6,500 2,000 3,000 4,500 4,500 
- -
20,500 
Borehole Drilling - - - - - - - - - - -
Bank charges - - - - - - - - - - -
Recurrent expenses 913,705 806,225 444,640 448,315 441,030 537,180 186,060 752,335 538,279 462,934 5,530,703 
Capital Expenditure - - - - - - - - - - -
Transfers to head office - - - - - - - - - - -
Total Expenses 913,705 806,225 444,640 448,315 441,030 537,180 186,060 752,335 538,279 462,934 5,530,703 
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A5.3 Expenditure summary (2001) 
2001 JAN I FEB I MAR I APR I MAY I JUN I JUL I AUG I SEP I OCT I NOV I DEC TOTAL 
Expenditure 
Salaries and Wages 349,677 329,750 292,724 292,647 290,790 301,970 304,384 314,032 267,579 294,778 287,408 291420 3,617,158 
Staff WeWare 2,800 46,080 500 78,200 700 54,921 1,775 12,110 1,800 175160 374,046 
Leave Grant -
Medical -
PAYE 10,645 41,130 36,947 10,749 99,471 
Printing and Stationery 12,040 950 4,760 1,100 7,880 10,510 11,850 650 11,950 4,200 4,990 1340 72,220 
Office Expenses 13,833 5,410 5,060 1,460 13,630 8,240 12,310 6,370 4,250 3,660 4,660 2260 81,143 
Local transport 12,900 17,280 2,380 1,700 900 2,950 3,560 550 2,380 400 2,600 2280 49,880 
Rent -
Miscellaneous 280 17,790 8168 22,000 13,850 4,540 13,595 30,127 950 79,591 2,515 5550 198,956 
Hotel and Others 40,100 40,100 
RUL -
Plants and Equipment 14,850 28,600 200 113,700 25,370 850 20,550 1,300 17,340 25.940 29,060 20830 298,590 
Main!. of Building & S.P 970 163,500 16,625 4,600 9,000 2,980 8010 205,685 
Motor Vehicle 20,890 20,810 11,710 21,000 37,460 10,900 2,200 200 1,600 5,800 36190 168,760 
Diesel -
Fuel and Lubricants 60,100 75,900 69,770 70,690 72,670 66,976 49,800 41,200 37.200 44,200 91,350 64380 764,236 
Utilities 4,000 67,970 5,700 6,000 29.000 112,670 
Borehole Drilling 
-
Bank charges 171,039 120.948 127,205 159,928 201,389 171,540 134,426 229,707 249,194 272,879 270,737 211281 2,320,273 
Recurrent expenses 662,409 664,488 522,477 925,925 731,909 595,521 671,351 665,683 683,067 746,538 695,120 838,701 8,403,187 
Capital Expenditure 68,500 79,139 120,570 34,050 12,500 48,000 47,100 74,600 99,919 14100 598,478 
Transfers to head office -
Total Expenses 730,909 743,627 643,047 959,975 744,409 643,521 718,451 740,283 683,067 746,538 795,039 852,801 9,001,665 
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A5.4 Expenditure summary (2002) 
000 Naira 
2002 JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC TOTAL 
EXPENDITURE - - - - - - - - - -
Salaries and Wages 242,538 257,110 247,126 230,137 267,187 
-
610,200 222,459 241,357 1,375 2,319,489 
Staff WeWare 7,560 -
-
7,260 
- - - -
14,820 
Leave Grant 
- - -
3,600 20,640 
-
36,885 - - - 61,125 
Medical 
- - - -
- - - - - - -
PAYE - 22,162 22,160 43,837 43,837 - 42,569 - - - 174,565 
Printing and Stationery 3,690 10,790 5,240 820 5,050 850 4,400 - 5,500 5,500 41,840 
Office Expenses 8,090 15,000 18,830 10,050 750 - - - 600 980 54,300 
Local transport 2,010 3,320 1,630 4,930 4,350 1,620 4,070 3,530 2,620 380 28,460 
Rent - - - - - - - - - - -
Miscellaneous 27,297 13,970 1,160 860 32,280 - 1,070 1,350 5,000 52,730 135,717 
Hotel and Others - - - - - - - - - - -
RUL 51,420 - 103,230 - - - - - - - 154,650 
Distribution System 44,380 6,690 0 18,830 2,500 420 35,890 800 15,500 
-
125,010 
Plants and Equipment 9,100 137,190 5,320 48,990 11,800 6,600 2,100 9,900 4,600 5,650 241,250 
Main!. of Building & S.P 1,000 - 29,700 44,980 1,800 - - 1,000 - - 78,480 
Motor Vehicle 4,500 - - 19,000 - - . 300 1,400 . 25,200 
Diesel 60,000 60,900 109,150 92,180 62,200 49,960 24,880 29,800 24,000 25,160 538,230 
Fuel and Lubricants 1,528 21,122 7,719 50,330 12,000 0 0 3,000 1,200 2,725 99,624 
Utilities 53,952 25,330 13,400 5,790 5,600 5,600 11,100 200 18,500 5,200 144,672 
Borehole Drilling - . . 260,000 170,000 20,000 . - - . 450,000 
Bank charges 218,100 183,169 158,061 125,910 116,723 112,776 119,684 - 134,007 
-
1,168,431 
Recurrent expenses 735,165 756,752 722,727 960,244 763,978 197,826 892,848 272,339 454,284 99,700 5,855,864 
Capital Expenditure 400 2,000 5,000 7,400 
Transfers to head offiCe 200,000 375,000 727,790 611,000 154,400 21,000 2,089,190 
Total Exj>e_nses 735,165 756,752 722,727 960,244 963,978 572,826 1,621,038 885,339 613,684 120,700 7,952,454 
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A5.5 Monthly cash receipts (March 2000 to October 2002) 
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul 1 Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Total 
Year2000 
ADO - - 123 167 154 73 77 41 110 70 193 245 1,252 
Mararaba 1 - - 154 271 239 90 149 151 105 119 221 212 1,711 
Mararaba 2 
- -
102 139 118 65 59 78 99 103 206 262 1,231 
Mararaba 3 
- - - - - - - - - - - - -
house connections - - - - - - - - - - - 74 74 
Total 
- -
380 576 511 228 285 270 314 291 620 793 4,268 
Year 2001 
ADO 320 313 393 383 179 70 56 49 34 91 147 154 2,188 
Mararaba 1 213 323 446 431 304 121 98 98 116 155 277 194 2,775 
Mararaba 2 274 249 333 423 294 151 108 51 67 157 243 298 2,648 
Mararaba 3 
- - - 36 85 74 55 58 118 144 277 264 1 '111 
house connections 59 52 206 28 42 40 80 120 63 24 62 203 979 
Total 866 937 1,378 1,301 903 456 397 375 398 570 1,007 1,112 9,701 
Year2002 
Ado 225 224 217 184 164 104 49 28 11 15 
- -
1,220 
Mararaba 1 280 157 366 217 261 133 88 39 11 62 
- -
1,612 
Mararaba 2 354 344 347 340 266 231 84 75 68 69 
- -
2,178 
Mararaba 3 237 290 343 311 313 167 100 141 173 62 
- -
2,137 
House connections 84 45 32 59 26 19 - 65 12 20 - - 341 
Total 1,159 1,059 1,305 1 '111 1,029 655 320 348 275 228 - - 7,488 
156 
I-
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 

